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

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DISSENT is a journal devoted to radical ideas and the values of socialism and democracy. It seeks to serve as a forum for writers devoted to these ideas and values, while also welcoming a wide variety of other opinions. Each writer speaks for himself; there is no effort made to exact editorial consensus or uniformity.

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Natalya Gorbanevskaya

Three Poems

These poems are reprinted from Natalya Gorbanevskaya, *translated and edited by Daniel Weissbort, with a transcript of her trial and papers relating to her detention in a prison psychiatric hospital. The book, copyright © 1972 by Daniel Weissbort (introduction and translation of poems) and Dr. Sidney Crown (comments on the case of N. E. Gorbanevskaya), was published by Carcanet Press Limited, and is distributed in the United States by Dufour Editions Inc., Chester Springs, Pa. 19425.*

Nothing at all happens — neither fear,
nor stiffening before the executioner:
I let my head fall on the hollowed block,
as on a casual lover's shoulder.

Roll, curly head, over the planed
boards, don't get a splinter in your parted lips:
the boards bruise your temples,
the solemn fanfare sounds in your ears,

the polished copper dazzles the eyes,
the horses' manes toss —
O, what a day to die on!

Another day dawns sunless,
and in the twilight, half awake, or suffering
from some old fever or some new apocrypha,
my casual lover's shoulder
still smells to me of pine shavings.

Don't touch me! I scream at passers-by —
they don't notice me.
Cursing alien rooms,
I hang about alien lobbies.

But who will put a window in the wall?
Who'll stretch a hand out to me?
I am roasting over a slow fire.

In my own twentieth century
where there are more dead than graves
to put them in, my miserable,
forever unshared love

among these Goya images
is nervous, faint, absurd,
as, after the screaming of jets,
the trump of Jericho.

Only music, nothing else, is left —
neither happiness, nor peace, nor freedom;
in all this glassy sea of suffering
the only saving grace is music.

Yes, for an hour or maybe more,
where there is neither past nor future,
in the depths of winter a flute
sings like the woodland oriole of summer.

But this brief moment of oblivion ends,
the human bird falls silent and
again, barefoot over broken glass,
we enter the emptiness, the blizzard and the c

A star from the heavens, an enchanting sonnet —
nothing will beguile you anymore,
and "Sleep peacefully," you will murmur
and silently cry, "There's no peace left." □

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Michael Harrington

Our Proposals for the Crisis

The current crisis of the capitalist system seems so deep that even investment bankers, like Felix Rohatyn of Lazard Frères, are advocating "state planning of the economy." There is, therefore, no question as to whether there will be structural change in our economic institutions. The issue before the nation is who is going to make those changes and how. Will they come from the corporate Right or from the democratic Left?

If they are to come from the democratic Left, it will be necessary to go far beyond the conventional wisdom established 40 years ago by the New Deal. It will be necessary to take steps toward the *socialization of investment* in the United States.

In saying this, I do not for a moment dismiss the struggle of the labor movement and the liberals for immediate responses to the recession-inflation. On the contrary, we see the more basic changes we propose as the fulfillment of the economic and political logic of desperately needed increments of reform. That is why we are for massive deficit-spending to achieve full employment. The nation is already running an unconscionable deficit of the wrong kind. Millions of workers are on the streets. Not only are their personal hopes dashed; the nation also loses their economic output and must pay high costs for the custodial care of their suffering through unemployment programs, increased welfare rolls and, most tragic of all, through a rise in crime, family breakdown, and social pathology.

That is why we need deficit-spending for social purposes. We advocate a productive investment in the human future of America; the traditionalists are for the reckless wasting of the country's resources while they wait for the intervention of a free market mechanism that long ago stopped functioning.

As part of that full employment program, we advocate the immediate creation of 1 million new public service careers. Our current commitment in this area is only the merest of beginnings: it does not generate jobs as fast as the recession destroys them.

We are for a national energy policy. The hodgepodge of reactionary measures offered by President Ford, capped by a proposal for rationing by the purse which is an allocation system designed to favor the rich and injure the poor, is utterly inadequate. We need a national plan to eliminate the incredible—and profitable—waste in the system and to come up with a unified transportation policy emphasizing mass transit. We need a publicly owned gas and oil corporation to take the lead in developing new energy technology.

We favor a comprehensive national program for health security. The soaring costs of medical care have been a prime factor in inflation. Moreover, in New York State we are now being treated to the terrible spectacle of how medicine for profit—in this case nursing homes for the aged paid for with government monies—can speculate on human misery. What we need ultimately is socialized medicine in which the society will pay all medical costs out of general revenues raised by a steeply progressive tax and under which the only question to be asked a new patient is, *what do you need*?

We must cut back on military spending and, above all, we must reject any new American involvement, direct or indirect, in Indochina. The Brookings Institution tells us that the 1975 budget proposals conceal major new investments in weapons systems. We believe that this is an area in which it is possible to effect some of those economics that President Ford prefers to inflict upon the people who need food stamps.

The items I have listed are not an exhaustive inventory of what the nation needs, but they clearly

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indicate our enthusiastic support of the programs of the trade unionists and liberals. If, however, the democratic Left contents itself with even such an impressive array of immediate reforms, it will forfeit one of the greatest opportunities for much more basic social change since the New Deal. Worse, it will find itself standing by while sophisticated conservatives carry out a program much more "radical" than that offered by the Left.

AT THIS POINT, the specifically socialist content of our analysis comes into focus. First of all, we see the current crisis as a crisis of the system requiring structural change. Second, we know that, unlike the situation in the '30s, there is an imaginative corporate plan to accomplish those structural changes in order to benefit the rich in this society. And third, we counterpose a democratic Left program to the corporate planners, one that moves in a clearly socialist direction but is not, in and of itself, socialist.

On the first count, let me simply and briefly recapitulate an analysis I have made elsewhere in detail. In the area of energy, our problems do not derive primarily from the OPEC cartel, even though its quadrupling of the price of oil has obviously had an important impact. We made ourselves vulnerable to OPEC by a generation of federal policies that followed corporate energy priorities rather than those of the common good. As the *Wall Street Journal* put it, the oil price increases are a threat "only because of the prior and present economic mismanagement by the Western governments themselves." That the *Journal* then proceeds to a downright silly reaffirmation of the proposition that the free market will solve this problem—and probably cure the common cold—is beside the point. The essential fact is indeed that the "prior and present economic mismanagement by the Western governments" is a critical factor.

That mismanagement included the subordination of the public interest to corporate profit by the use of American power to shoulder the British out of Saudi Arabia in 1943 and to reduce their influence in Iran in 1953, in the latter case through the CIA subversion of a popular government. It proceeded by way of the special oil tax deductions of 1950, a foreign aid program for reactionary Arab anti-Communism passed behind the backs of the American people, through the oil import quotas, the depletion allowance, the expensing of intangible drilling costs, and the rest of the measures that added up to a multibillion-dollar annual gift to the richest corporations in the world. All this was crowned by multibillion-dollar federal subsidies to big cars and the suburban middle and upper class, a policy that helped destroy the railroads and mass transit, isolate the poor and minorities in rotting cities, and make us the most wasteful nation in history.

In the area of food crisis, the American government has been paying agribusiness billions not to produce ever since the '30s. So it was that between 1969 and 1973 this nation subsidized the nonproduction of the equivalent of 8 billion bushels of wheat. Our food shortage, in other words, stems more from the limitations of corporate-oriented politics than from those imposed by nature.

And our inflation results, in some considerable measure, from the fact that the New Deal, thank God, deprived capitalism of its most effective anti-inflationary tool, mass unemployment, but provided no substitute for it.

IN EACH of these areas, the capitalist system, in its sophisticated corporate statist variant, does not work. This fact, however, is not simply known by socialists and radicals. It is well understood by bankers and executives. That is why the 1970s, in contrast to the '30s, may well see two programs of structural change, not one. In the Great Depression, conservatism was not simply conservative; it was also stupid. But even the rich learn.

David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan signaled the change several years ago. The last time the social contract was rewritten, he said in referring to the '30s, business simply opposed the whole process and as a result had no influence upon it. Now, he continued, there is going to be another revision of that contract. This time business should be in the forefront of change. Mr. Rockefeller, whose brother has since been translated to the spheres in which social contracts are rewritten, did not specifically spell out the fact that this corporate creativity would be dedicated to corporate interest. He did not need to do so.

In the December 1 *New York Times*, Felix Rohatyn of Lazard Frères has given us an idea of what this business creativity might mean. He has called upon the government to become an "investor of last resort." This means that a new institution will be created, along the lines of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). It would buy stock in companies and banks that were in trouble, thus giving them an infusion of equity rather than of debt. It would remain as a stockholder only so long as an enterprise was in difficulty. As soon as it

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could stand up on its own, the RFC, having socialized its risks with public funds, would retire, leaving the private sector to enjoy the profitability that a gracious government had restored.

If anyone thinks this is fanciful, let them look for a moment at the American railroads. The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that the United States Railway Corporation will soon present Congress with a scheme that will avoid the "extreme of full nationalization." Under it, the federal government will directly own the tracks, and will subsidize the cost of locomotives and freight cars through the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). But the companies will remain in private hands. Conrail, it is reported, will need between $3 billion and $5 billion in outright grants or long-term loans. It is also estimated that Washington will have to pay the railroad creditors as much as $13 billion. But we will not have nationalized anything, *except the costs and debts of the system.* The superior efficiency of the private sector will be vindicated even if it takes almost $20 billion of public charity to do so.

Rohatyn is quite aware of how radical his ideas are. His proposal for an RFC, he says,

> can be perceived as the first step toward state planning of the economy. Yet the time may have come for public debate on this subject. ... At a time when the oil-producing countries are levying an initial tax of $60 billion a year on the rest of the world, the U.S. has been capital-poor. The possible impact on this country's welfare, as well as its security, of foreign control of major enterprises has not been evaluated. The premise that, under such circumstances, the country has to husband its resources more carefully, allocate them more prudently, and match its financial capabilities with its social priorities would appear to be worth considering. What many will call state planning would, to the average family, be no more than prudent budgeting.

I leave aside any reference to that last and hilarious sentence, since I do not know of any families that receive multibillion subsidies from the government as they prudently balance their budget. Rohatyn speaks in the authentic tones of an American Gaullism terrified by *le defi arabe* and our own indigenous crisis, determined to use state power to restore the grandeur of the capitalist system.

It is precisely because we are socialists that we understand that this outrageous proposal might, for a time, work. There is no automatic "final conflict," no inevitable apocalypse, built into capitalism even though some radicals mistakenly think so. It changes itself reluctantly when it breaks down, but it does change.

THIS LEADS to my third major point. We must move toward the socialization of investment in America.

I do not urge this as a panacea. It is, as you will see, not one demand, but a series of demands with a common thrust. It is not a finished program, a blueprint for social engineering, but a direction to be taken in which the details will have to pass the test of trial and error.

I think that Felix Rohatyn and the corporate conservatives have us over a barrel—much as the Arabs have them over a barrel. So long as the dominant economic institutions in this society are corporate—so long as basic investment decisions are made in the executive suite—then the government can cajole and bribe with its subsidies, but it must act prudently so as not to disturb the private sector as it takes charge of the social process of economic accumulation. After all, as the *Wall Street Journal* proclaimed a short while back, profits are only another name for savings. That is one of those magnificent half truths of the capitalist epoch. Yes, profits are essential to the dynamics of the system, a fact known to those hardy souls who have ventured into Volume II of *Das Kapital* as well as to the editorialists of the *Wall Street Journal.* But they are also the great engine of social inequality, of antisocial priorities in the economy, of the degradation of the environment, of the ruin of the central cities.

But so long as America concedes the control of investment to private, corporate decision-makers, just so long will government intervention in the long run turn out to be a system of subsidies to the corporate rich. Vermont Royster, a columnist for the *Wall Street Journal,* recently and proudly resurrected Engine Charley Wilson's famous *mot* that what was good for the country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. It is not true, as Royster naively thinks, that if government pursues policies good for business in general that "they would inevitably benefit the whole country." Our energy and food disasters, created by precisely such a united front of business and government, are cases in point. But Royster is right to suggest that, as long as General Motors is one of our chief transportation and energy planners, Washington has got to be nice to it. Nicer than to auto workers who make the cars.

That is why it is necessary to change the very structure of the system and to assert a democratic control over an increasing portion of basic investment decisions. This can be done in a number of ways.

First, the companies that are major suppliers of

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the government, like Lockheed, should not be subsidized. They should be nationalized.

Second, and more generally, where corporations and/or banks get into difficulty, the government should consider nationalizing them. Take the Franklin National Bank. It suffered $46.8 million in losses in the first five months of 1974 because of the activities of foreign speculative interests that controlled it. The Federal Reserve then extended credits of $1 billion to Franklin National. Instead, the bank should have been nationalized, as Congressman Reuss proposed. Such a nationally owned bank could make socially desirable loans, refuse to speculate, and turn its profits over to the public. It could be a yardstick by which to measure the performance of the 300 largest banks in America that have, almost unanimously, turned their backs on voluntary Federal Reserve guidelines for consideration of social priorities in their operation.

Third, the United States should establish a federal gas and oil corporation, which should be given privileged rights to develop new energy technology in the public interest and for public purposes.

Fourth, employee and public representatives should be placed on the boards of directors of all major industrial and financial corporations with instructions to inform the public of the bias of the pricing, technology, plant location, and other policies of these corporations.

Fifth, a national planning mechanism should be established, both as a part of the office of the Presidency and as an office under the control of the Congress. It should, for example, come up with a ten-year plan for transportation and energy in the United States, after the consideration of presidential proposals, congressional hearings, and a vote in the House and Senate. That plan would be indicative, since it does not require the public ownership of the heights of the economy as a precondition, but it will only work in the people's interest if the plan can be enforced by way of a vastly enlarged democratic participation in investment decisions.

These specifics merely indicate a direction. We must, just as Felix Rohatyn says but not for his reasons, husband our resources more carefully, allocate them more prudently, and match our financial capabilities with our social priorities. That is sound good sense, and the corporations are going to propose just that in order to save themselves from the dead end into which they have led the nation. We must make counterproposals, democratic proposals for the socialization of investment decisions in America. □

H. Brand

A View of Wage-Price Controls

Wage-price controls are not currently on the political agenda—partly because of a widespread ideological abhorrence of direct government intervention, but mostly because wages and, to an extent, prices as well are now being restrained by the rapid decline in the demand for goods and services—and much more effectively than by administrative controls. This decline in demand, however, will eventually halt and reverse; the question of controls will then reassert itself. A discussion of it therefore remains in order.

The rationale for wage-price controls is deceptively simple: they are meant to stop or retard wage-price "spirals" so as to facilitate expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Wage-price spirals characterized the booms of the mid-'50s and the middle and late '60s. These booms absorbed the unemployed fairly rapidly, although the Vietnam War and the manpower needs it generated may have concealed the growing difficulties of such absorption. At any rate, with the unemployment problem diminishing, fiscal and monetary policies could be used to dampen inflationary pressures. But the sensitivity of wage and price levels to such countercyclical measures, as well as to declining employment and demand, evidently lessened in the late '60s and early '70s (the reasons remain obscure).

President Nixon, planning to build an electoral alliance with blue-collar groups, rejected the "game plan" of his economic advisers, according to which restrictive policies were to engender unemployment levels sufficiently high to limit, or nearly limit, wage claims to the longer-term rise in productivity. Policy was reversed; but with the reversal (although not exactly coinciding with it), a wage-price freeze was imposed, followed by formal controls. Thus, unemployment could presumably be cut further by an expansionary federal budget and easier credit, without serious inflationary consequences. In sum, the "trade-off" point between unemployment and inflation was to be reduced by the controls; and fiscal and monetary measures, rather than feed inflation, would stimulate employment.

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THE IDEA that there is a "tradeoff" between unemployment and inflation pervades the economic literature of the past 15 years; its simplicity has had and continues to have a strong appeal to the leading decision-makers. "... [there] is probably universal agreement [among economists]," Robert Hall has written in the *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, "that low unemployment rates imply high rates of wage and price inflation, or, equivalently, wage and price stability requires a high rate of unemployment."[1] George Perry, also an economist associated with the Brookings Institution, has stated that, "with many variations and refinements, the concept of a tradeoff between wage changes and the aggregate unemployment rate has been the framework for most discussions of inflation during the past decade."[2]

A historical study by A. W. Phillips, titled "The Relationship Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957"[3]—although dealing with an era noted for the mildness of most of its cyclical price uptrends as well as for the severity of its deflationary phases—has provided Americans with a simple conceptual scheme for examining the "tradeoff." Phillips presented evidence showing that the price of labor tended to vary inversely with the supply of labor. The graphed relation between supply, measured by the unemployment rate, and changes in the average wage rate, has become known as the Phillips curve. Since labor costs constitute a major component of most prices, a high unemployment rate, being associated with small upward as well as downward movements in wage rates, tends to make for stable to moderately declining prices. And the converse tends to be the case for a low unemployment rate.

For the 1950s and early '60s, the "acceptable" tradeoff between price increases and unemployment has been calculated to have been 2 percent for the former, and 4 percent (of the labor force) for the latter. In actuality, this condition of tradeoff was not attained; but the 4 percent unemployment rate remained a target of economic policy for many years after it was first pronounced as an "interim" objective on the way to a lower rate in the 1962 Economic Report of the President.

As the rate of price advance rose and accelerated from 1965 onward, that target came to be increasingly questioned, and in time virtually abandoned. Changes in the composition of the unemployed (relatively more women and youths came to make up their ranks) supposedly shifted the Phillips curve upward, meaning that "acceptable" price advances now required substantially higher unemployment rates than earlier—with estimates ranging from 5 to 6 percent of the labor force. A staff study made in the Treasury Department, cited by Senator Proxmire in early 1972,[4] noted that "over the next few years, a 4 percent unemployment rate as a national goal is not feasible without significant inflation. This might apply even if some fundamental approaches in manpower training not now in sight were tried."

The difficulties experienced in administering the wage-price control program appear to have reaffirmed the conviction of high officials that the Phillips curve portrays no mere statistical correlation, but suggests a cause-effect nexus. According to Robert Hall, "Some economic policy-makers within the federal government are reluctant to ratify 8 percent wage inflation. Increasingly, their unhappy experience with price and wage controls has convinced them that the 'old time religion' of contraction in the aggregate economy is the only way out."[5] Hall has no doubts about the effectiveness of this "prescription;" he presents calculations showing that a 6 percent unemployment rate would drive wage "inflation" down to 3 percent a year by 1979.[6]

The government's budget for the fiscal year 1976 shows these calculations to be "optimistic." The so-called economic assumptions presented as part of the long-range fiscal outlook detailed in the budget spell the following unemployment-inflation trade off:

	CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (percent change)	UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (percent of labor force)
1975	11.3	8.1
1976	7.8	7.9
1977	6.6	7.5
1978	5.2	6.9
1979	4.1	6.2
1980	4.0	5.5

Source: *Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1976*, p. 41.

The "theory" implicit in these projections and the

[1]March 1970, p. 369.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 411.

[3]Reprinted in *Inflation: Selected Readings*, eds. R. J. Ball and Peter Doyle (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969).

[4]U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *The 1972 Economic Report of the President*, Hearings, Feb. 15, 16, and 17, 1972, p. 325.

[5]*Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2/1974, p. 377.

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fiscal policies meant to control them are that a high, if gradually declining unemployment rate will also gradually cut the rate of inflation.

NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE exists for what the Phillips curve suggests: namely, that full (or high) employment generates inflation because wages rise faster than the long-term trend in productivity. Yet the argument implied by the Phillips curve remains plausible: where the level of final demand for goods and services permits it, higher labor costs will be passed on in the form of higher prices. Again, however, labor costs represent but one component of prices, and prices will often rise at a higher rate than labor costs, even when labor costs remain stable. A rise in the price level may, to an extent, be caused by higher labor costs, which—in the form of the higher income they spell—will validate the price rise when translated into additional purchases of goods and services. Yet much of the increase in final demand that pulls up prices during certain phases of the business cycle are caused by expanded employment and the additional income it generates. For these reasons alone, increases in labor costs cannot be regarded as determinate factors in price trends.

Even if there were a sound empirical basis in support of the Phillips curve argument, it would fail to explain a large part of the reasons for inflation—and would possibly explain none of them. Therefore it would be fatuous to relate the rampant, worldwide inflation of the past two or three years to rising labor costs; we will return to this aspect of the discussion shortly.

For many years prior to 1972, the costs of business and households were driven up by factors the Phillips curve argument cannot account for. Interest rates, for example, have risen much more rapidly than the price level; their rise has by far exceeded the inflationary "premium" demanded by creditors as reimbursement for the declining purchasing power of the return on the debt instrument they hold. Thus, while prices rose 74 percent between 1953 and 1973, the interest yield on corporate bonds climbed 133 percent, and on long-term Treasury securities, 146 percent. Rising interest rates have spelled soaring interest costs. Interest on the federal debt, for example, rose 130 percent between 1963 and 1973, while the debt itself rose by less than half that rate. Total monetary interest payments increased from 2 percent of the national income in 1953 to 12 percent in 1963 and to 19 percent in 1973.[7]

High costs of construction are usually blamed on the big wage settlements enjoyed by the construction unions. Notwithstanding these settlements, however, on-site labor costs have *declined* drastically relative to the total costs of construction during the postwar period. According to a study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,[8] on-site labor costs in residential construction dropped from 33 percent of total costs in 1949 to 18 percent 20 years later. The costs of land rose from 11 to 21 percent, and the costs of financing from 5 to 10 percent. (The share of the costs of materials increased somewhat, while the share of profits and overhead fell.) Thus, most of the rise in the cost of shelter, an important item in the Consumer Price Index, has been unrelated to labor costs.

There are many other kinds of costs for which the Phillips curve cannot account, but which are at the root of inflationary price trends. For example, after import quotas were imposed on foreign steel beginning in January 1969, the average annual rate of increase in steel prices rose to 6.7 from 4.1 percent during the nine years preceding the quotas.[9] The textile quota agreements with Far Eastern countries made in 1972 are estimated to have added up to $2.5 billion to U.S. consumer outlays for textiles.[10] Furthermore, the process of capitalization of government subsidy benefits—as in farm land, research and development, and business equipment on which investment tax credits are allowed—greatly raises costs and prices.[11] These aspects of the evolution of costs have found little attention and have been ignored by the theorists of the "unemployment-inflation" dilemma.

Wage-price controls and the question of their effectiveness became virtually irrelevant in the face of the worldwide inflationary tidal wave that began in 1972. The leading policy-makers alluded to this event in terms of helplessness. The Wholesale Price

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 378.

[7] Based on the pertinent tables of the national accounts. See *Survey of Current Business*, July 1974.

[8] Robert C. Joiner, "Trends in Homeownership and Rental Costs," *Monthly Labor Review*, July 1970, p. 26 ff.

[9] The Comptroller General of the U.S., *Economic and Foreign Policy Effects of Voluntary Restraint Agreements on Textiles and Steel*, March 21, 1974, p. 23.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[11] See relevant passages relating to capitalization of farm subsidies in Charles L. Schultze, *The Distribution of Farm Subsidies: Who Gets The Benefits?*, staff paper, Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

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Index rose 14 percent in 1973 alone, with its crude materials component soaring 36 percent. And this happened mostly *prior* to the petroleum price increase imposed by the OPEC cartel. John Dunlop, chairman of the Cost of Living Council, stated in early 1974 that "two-thirds of this inflation was concentrated in food and energy, and at a time when we had more stringent price controls than in phase II"—and this he found "particularly perplexing."[12] Arthur Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, after analyzing the major elements of the inflation, stated that "When an economy is beset by inflationary forces of such exceptional character, governmental intervention in pricing decisions or wage bargaining can hardly be expected to be very effective."[13] Progressive loss of control over the levers of national economic policy marks the course of developments since the mid-'60s, and especially during the 1972–74 boom and inflation—thus leading to events that justify allusion to natural disasters.

Among these events were the successive devaluations of the dollar, beginning in late 1971, which depressed the dollar by as much as 17 percent over the next 18 months in terms of other major currencies—thus leading in time to an enormous rise of exports not only in agricultural commodities but in finished goods as well. According to Burns, foreign orders of durable goods other than motor vehicles soared 25 percent in the year ending in the fall quarter of 1973, while domestic orders rose 17 percent over the same period.[14] Beyond question, dollar devaluation was a major inflationary force, one beyond the control of national institutions and policies, the end result of a worldwide credit and investment expansion whose dimensions and destabilizing dangers were magnified by the uninhibited power of the banks and nonfinancial corporations that carried it.

THE UNIONS' CLAIM that the wage-price program was unfair to labor cannot be assessed in detail here. Let us say this much: a wage-price program *may* conceivably be part of a broadly rooted political tendency that promotes the redistribution of income and wealth toward greater equality. But this controls program was not. Rather, it was motivated in part by a desire to retard redistributional trends that presumably favored labor, especially unionized labor. It was meant to maintain the existing income distribution.[15] No matter how "fairly" administered, it was bound to perpetuate unfair results.

It will be said that these are abstractions: unions, working people in general, are less concerned with "unfairness" as such than they are with changes for the worse. The AFL–CIO has been traditionally concerned with stabilizing the economy so as to secure full employment and high wages. That is why it supported the controls program at its inception, with the proviso that it encompass *all* factor incomes—rents, profits, dividends, interest, executive compensation, as well as wages and salaries.[16] Moreover, the unions agreed that the trend in overall wage increases should run parallel with the long-term trend in the productivity of the private economy, plus a moderate allowance for changes in the cost of living.[17]

The agreement was undertaken as part of a "rapprochement" between the AFL–CIO leadership and President Nixon, a development that proved transient. This setting was most favorable to middle-income wage earners, whose interests were perhaps safeguarded, or at least not hurt, by the stabilization the controls program promised. But from the outset the top union leadership was under pressure to raise the level of wages below which controls should not apply; in time Congress and the courts compelled the Pay Board to remove wages of $3.50 an hour or less from the controls, involving roughly half the total work force. The union leadership's effort to share in the stabilization effort came to naught—if only because the "unfairness" of the income structure (including the pattern of relative wages) proved unacceptable to a substantial if largely unorganized segment of labor, whose interests the leadership could not, and could not have wished to, ignore.

Whatever unfairness there may have been in the *operation* of the wage-price control program derived

[12]U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, *Oversight on Economic Stabilization,* Hearings, Jan. 30 and 31; Feb. 1 and 6, 1974, pp. 416, 417.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 670.

[14]*Ibid.*

[15]*Distribution of Income: Economic Report of the President, February 1974.*

[16]U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, *Selective Credit Policies and Wage-Price Stabilization,* Hearings, March 31; April 1 and 7, 1971, p. 87.

[17]Barry Bosworth, "Phase II: The U.S. Experiment with an Incomes Policy," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,* 2/1972, p. 355.

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largely from a setting that exalted the rights of private property and resisted the disturbance of market relations. In such a setting, control of wages is bound to be more effective than control of prices. Workers are by and large linked to their jobs by family responsibilities and community ties, and by their stake in acquired skills and experience, which with time become almost nontransferable. Hence no matter how strong their union, their bargaining power is limited; their concern with job security will be at least as great as their concern with income. Capital, on the other hand, is relatively mobile. An unprofitable plant will be closed down. Investments can be shifted to low-wage areas at home or abroad. New technologies or processes, changes in product quality, discontinuance of low-margin products—all can vitiate the desired effects of price controls. Moreover, large sectors of the economy do not operate within conventional markets where prices can be presumably controlled. There are no markets for aircraft carriers, space rockets, supersonic jets—only costs that forever outrun original estimates. For all these reasons, price controls cannot be expected to be "fair"—at best, given favorable political circumstances, they may be devised so as not to make an unfair situation still worse.

ASIDE from such questions as "fairness," it follows from what has been said here that structural and cyclical factors have defeated wage-price control efforts. This has been true for the United States since controls were first introduced in 1971, and has been documented as well for earlier periods for socially more highly organized countries.[18]

The present world economic crisis, however, forces or will force certain structural changes. There is bound to be, for example, increasing government control of the allocation of capital. At present, the government promotes price increases in the energy and agrobusiness sectors, which represents a kind of forced savings imposed on consumers so as to provide the profits and hence the capital for the expansion of those sectors. The pricing practices of the administered price industries, such as steel and autos, have been innocuous compared with those now being imposed by the alliance of government and oil, government and the public utilities, government and agrobusiness. These government-endorsed and government-promoted pricing practices will prove far more inflationary. What is more, they threaten large segments of American industry with ruination. Therefore they are unlikely to be tolerated for very long and are likely to be replaced, at least in part, by formal capital controls. These in turn will very probably be part of a broader program including wage-price controls as one of the politically more acceptable means to limit consumption in favor of investment.

Voices clamoring for limitations on consumption have recently included that of John Galbraith.[19] Galbraith believes that consumption is excessive, and that it should be reduced because it causes inflation. I believe this to be a thoroughly mistaken view. Consumer goods and service industries are subject to severe overcapacity problems, even in times better than the present. There has been no excess demand for years, and its contribution to inflation, when it did occur, was of brief duration. More to the point, Galbraith helps set the tone for those who wish "to encourage the creation of an economic climate which will increase the total flow of savings and hence the funds for productive investment."[20] The New York Stock Exchange, projecting an enormous "savings gap" over the coming decade, advocates, like Galbraith, a cutback in current consumption so that the "gap" may be closed.[21] The conservative proponents of consumption limitations are of course opposed to controls, preferring to rely on high prices to generate additional capital. But, for the reasons indicated, while prices are indeed likely to rise, capital controls are probably inescapable. The reimposition of wage-price controls will then be "rationalized" not on the basis of the Phillips curve, but as a means to curtail "inflationary" consumption.

The tendencies I have outlined here assume a historical context in which the United States seeks to reverse the trend toward its own integration in the world economy and strives to become self-sufficient in the major critical fuels and materials on which its industrial power is based. Whether this attempt can succeed is another question, not at issue here. At present it is a program that enjoys broad political support, but in time it is bound to lose a good part of that support, since it requires enormous amounts

[18]Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flanagan, *Wage Restraint: A Study of Incomes Policies in Western Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

[19]"The Economics of the Current Anxiety," *New York Times,* Dec. 8, 1974.

[20]Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Dangers in U.S. Aid for Utilities," *Wall Street Journal,* Jan. 23, 1975.

[21]*The Capital Needs and Savings Potential of the U.S. Economy: Projections through 1985,* New York Stock Exchange, Sept. 1974.

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of capital and therefore restrictions on consumption. This means that the standards of living of large groups of wage- and salary-earners will decline. Resistance to such a decline will be condemned to futility unless accompanied by programs urging rational alternatives: public ownership and management of all resource industries and banks, and the construction of an international economy based on the mutually agreed-upon distribution of raw materials, fuels, manufactured goods, services, and capital. □

Sanford Gottlieb

U.S. Arms Budget and Israeli Needs

You don't have to be Jewish to love Levy's Rye, but can you be both a dove *and* an American supporter of Israel? Obviously, there's no built-in contradiction. Yet some of us who stood together in opposing the American intervention in Vietnam have drifted apart on the Middle East. For me, part of the problem stems from the tendency of some supporters of Israel to buy the Pentagon's whole bottle of snake oil in the hope that a few drops will lubricate Israel's security needs.

First, let's agree on three assumptions: (1) the preservation of Israel is a firm objective; (2) Israel needs outside arms; (3) the United States will remain the major supplier of such arms. These are wholly realistic assumptions, but they have limits. These limits shouldn't be extended into an uncritical embrace of military programs, which have little to do with the defense of Israel, may even damage Israel's interests in the long run, and clearly weaken the United States.

In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, Israel received $2.2 billion worth of military aid from the United States. Israel's needs centered on planes, tanks, antitank guns, and ammunition. Israel is reportedly seeking assurances of several billion dollars worth of additional American arms for each of the next several years. But even if Washington were annually to renew such support at a level of $2–3 billion, this would represent only a fraction of our enormous military budget.

Last year the Nixon administration requested about $100 billion in "obligational authority" for the Pentagon and the AEC's weapons programs. Congress cautiously trimmed that sum, but will be confronted with a still higher request from the Ford administration for fiscal 1976.

What do these enormous sums buy in this "generation of peace"? What do they have to do with the defense of Israel?

Here are some of the major items the military budget buys: nuclear overkill, military commitments throughout the world, a top-heavy command structure, 1 million Pentagon civilians, military aid to dictatorial regimes *including those in the Middle East,* and more contracts for the military-industrial complex.

Our nuclear stockpile contains the equivalent power of 615,385 Hiroshima bombs. We have more than 8,000 H-bombs. These can destroy the major Soviet cities 36 times over, but they cannot prevent Soviet H-bombs from destroying major American cities. More bombs on more launchers, permitted under the Vladivostok agreement, have little military significance for the superpowers and less still for Israel.

Conventional or "general-purpose" forces may seem more relevant to Israel's defense needs. However, as long as Israel requests only supplies rather than American combat forces, it is hard to see how anything beyond sea transport or airlift capacity meshes with her needs. The airlift of 1973 received lots of publicity, and the Pentagon no doubt will use it to press for more cargo planes. But we already have hundreds of military cargo planes, plus the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. As one experienced Pentagon official inelegantly observed, "We have airlift out the ass. We already had ten times the airlift we needed at the peak of the Vietnam War." The lack of planes wasn't a problem during the Yom Kippur War; the lack of refueling facilities was.

The United States has military commitments to about 40 countries, and we station half a million troops in 21 of them, not counting the small but important military aid contingents in another score of nations. Some 300,000 American troops plus their dependents are in the NATO area. The Pentagon, for its own purposes, often suggests a link between NATO and Israel. Yet the harsh fact is that

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Portugal was the only member of NATO to grant transit rights to the United States during the Yom Kippur War, and it is not likely to do so again. So NATO force levels, with the possible exception of the U.S. Sixth Fleet to protect sea transport, are irrelevant to the defense of Israel.

About 56 percent of the Pentagon's budget goes for manpower. No one objects to paying people adequately, but the truth is, American taxpayers are financing a lot of blubber. There are today more top officers to command 2.1 million men and women in uniform than there were during World War II to command 12 million. Not proportionately, but in actual numbers. Officers and noncoms make up 78 percent of our armed forces. Even conceding that the armed forces, more dependent on technology than they used to be, now require more noncommissioned technicians, I still think 78 percent represents a lot of chiefs and very few Indians.

This top-heavy command structure is matched by a weak combat-to-support ratio. Today, only 17 percent of all military personnel are assigned to combat-skilled jobs. The military budget pays for many clerks and others who never see a weapon. In 1972 there were 75,000 men and women assigned to such edifying noncombat positions as full-time athletes and competitive marksmen and as staff for commissaries, post exchanges, officers clubs and NCO clubs, and chauffeurs for officers.

Life at the upper reaches of the armed forces can be very pleasant, again at taxpayers' expense. Many generals and admirals receive tax-free entertainment allowances, up to $4,000 each per year. The widespread use of military servants became common knowledge when Senator Proxmire introduced legislation to restrict this practice. And until Congress cracked down in 1973, thousands of officers were receiving flight pay and not flying—at an annual cost of $75 million. Another $13.9 million still comes out of the Pentagon budget to maintain 300 military golf courses in 19 foreign countries and the United States.

Supporting the 2.1 million men and women in uniform are 1 million Pentagon civilians. This incredible ratio of one civilian for every two in uniform is maintained at a cost of $15 billion according to the Pentagon, $17 billion according to Senator Bentsen.

FOR YEARS the United States has been Number One in arms exports, with the Soviet Union in second place. Between them, they have managed to supply arms to most of the world's dictatorships. For over a decade the American practice in supplying arms has largely followed this sequence: first, grants of free military aid, then credit sales, then cash sales. The Pentagon is a major promoter of cash sales, and Congress has yet to find a way to control the practice. In fiscal 1974, the United States doubled its cash sales to $8.5 billion, most of them to countries in the Middle East. This figure does not include the special appropriation for Israel.

The Administration has a sporting view of arms exports. It likes to maintain the military "balance" by supplying both sides in a conflict where possible. How else explain the recent deals to sell F-5 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia and antitank guns to Lebanon? For $756 million, the Saudis will receive 60 planes plus pilot training, special outfitting, and other equipment. "The sale represents," says the *Washington Post,* "an initial step in carrying out a Pentagon recommendation last year that the United States step up military cooperation with the oil-rich Persian Gulf nation, supplying aircraft, tanks and warships valued at billions of dollars over the next ten years." The Post observes that, under the terms of the agreement, "Saudi Arabia would not turn over the planes to another country without U.S. agreement. In practice, however, there is little the United States could do but protest such a transfer."

The new ingredient in the arms traffic is oil money. Since the Administration pushes arms sales to overcome balance-of-payments deficits and the Pentagon pushes them to help keep weapons production lines open, it is clear that billions in oil profits will be exchanged for sophisticated weapons in coming years. Even if the United States continues to supply Israel with arms, where will the latter stand a few years hence in the regional arms race in the Middle East? Isn't it time for the friends of Israel to think about supporting a policy of *reductions* in arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the United States?

Finally, our bloated "defense" budget buys more contracts for the military-industrial complex. This is a wondrous institution where billion-dollar contracts are let by the Pentagon without benefit of competitive bids, cost overruns averaged 300 percent during the Cold War, firms are paid for what they spend rather than what they produce, and gross inefficiency (such as Lockheed's 3,327 defects on C-5A landing gear in a six-month period) is rewarded with federally guaranteed bank loans. In studying the contracts of the top defense contractors, Professor James Kurth of Swarthmore College discovered that new contracts are invariably phased in (1) as old

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ones are phased out (where else do we find such splendid planning?) and (2) when particular firms run into economic troubles (where else do we find such beneficence?).

By its nature, military industry is highly inflationary. It uses vast resources and pumps vast sums into the economy without producing goods and services consumers can buy. When it assumes the cozy working habits of the Pentagon-Lockheed type of relationship, it contributes even more to the inflationary surge now engulfing us.

The simple moral of this tale is: beware of snake oil salesmen. It's painful, for example, to see the newsletter of the main American-Jewish lobbying organization publish, without qualification, the U.S. Navy's pitch for an American base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Top admirals may be smart enough to hold a briefing for American Jews, but they can't afford to surrender their long-standing skepticism. Nor should the supporters of Israel forget that, however much the Defense Department tries to suggest linkage between its broad array of programs and the specific defense needs of Israel, the Adminisration is playing a many-sided and dangerous game in the Middle East. □

Dennis H. Wrong

Oil, the Marines, and Prof. Tucker

The lead article in the January *Commentary*, prominent on the cover, was "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention," by Robert W. Tucker.* It argues a case for the armed seizure by the U.S. of the Arabian coastline bordering the Persian Gulf that produces 40 percent of the total petroleum produced by the OPEC countries and contains an equal proportion of the entire world's proven reserves.

*Not to be confused with Professor Robert C. Tucker of the Department of Politics at Princeton, a onetime foreign service officer, author of books on Marxism and on Soviet politics, and in the past a contributor to DISSENT.

Few recent articles have aroused such attention. One reason was the publication later that month of an interview with Henry Kissinger in which, referring to the oil crisis, Kissinger denied that "there's no circumstance where we would not use force" and suggested that "some actual strangulation of the industrialized world" might be such a circumstance. Although there was nothing particularly novel about these carefully hedged remarks, they were interpreted as giving greater substance to earlier reports of Pentagon plans and troop maneuvers envisaging military intervention against oil-producing countries in the Middle East.

The attention received by Tucker's article recalls that given to the anonymous 1947 article in *Foreign Affairs* advocating American "containment" of the Soviet Union, whose author was later revealed to be George Kennan. Did Tucker, a professor at Johns Hopkins, have any ties to policy-makers in Washington? Was his article a "trial balloon"? I have done some checking and conclude there is no reason to doubt that it was the author's own idea to write it. Moreover, the article has been originally rejected by *Foreign Affairs* itself. Nor is there any evidence that Israeli hawks or their American supporters had anything to do with its acceptance by *Commentary*.

This last point is worth stressing because I.F. Stone attacked *Commentary* in the *New York Review of Books* for publishing the article on the grounds that it was likely to encourage "anti-Semitic paranoia" in the United States, deepen American Jewish "hysteria over Israel," and play into the hands of "Israeli hard-liners." Stone's preoccupation with American Jews and Israel seems a bit odd because Tucker barely touches upon Israel in two short paragraphs in which he says the American "interest in oil would be unchanged with or without Israel." Stone complains that the timing of the article was "unfortunate" because it came "*after* the appearance ... of the Secretary of State's interview which put war into the headlines" (my emphasis). But the January issue of *Commentary* reached subscribers at least two weeks *before* January 13. Stone's concern with the appearance of the article in a Jewish magazine would scarcely be worth dwelling on, were it not that James Reston quoted Stone approvingly in the *New York Times* in support of his contention that the intransigeance of Israel's American Jewish supporters was making it harder for Kissinger to negotiate an Arab-Israeli settlement.

TUCKER ARGUES that American forces could occupy

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the coastal oil-producing region, restore full production after sabotage within three or four months, and avoid extended military involvement with either the Arabs or Russia. He doubts that the former could wage guerrilla warfare in the desert and assures us that "the Russians still lack the naval forces needed for effective interposition in the Persian Gulf." In any case, "the Russians simply do not have the interest here that we have."

I claim no expert knowledge of either warfare or oil technology, but even without making what Tucker disparages as the "worst-case assumption," this "scenario" surely slurs over a lot of difficulties. I have never been to Arabia, but I have flown over the Gulf region and refueled at Kuwait, and Tucker is quite correct that there are no trees and few people. But there are a lot of sand dunes and the emptiness of the land would, I should think, facilitate as well as hamper regular or irregular troop movements from Iraq or the unoccupied interior. As for restoring the flow of oil after sabotage, perhaps the repair of pipelines presents no great problem, but what about the power to operate pumps, some of which, I understand, is generated in the interior of the peninsula? The Russians *might* wish to appear uninvolved, apart from rhetorically exploiting the situation to win credit with the Arabs and the Third World, but without difficulty they could clandestinely supply Arab forces in the area to harass the Americans.

Another dubious feature of Tucker's projected intervention is that he nowhere discusses just how we will get the oil out of the region and to the West Europeans and the Japanese whose potential economic collapse as a result of the OPEC price rise provides the rationale for the venture in the first place. Tankers would have to be heavily convoyed by destroyers. If they successfully traversed the Persian Gulf without "Russian interposition," those heading for Europe would have to go the long way around Africa since the Suez canal would certainly be blocked to them. The Russians have submarines. Couldn't they lend a few with "volunteer" crews to the Arab countries?

Tucker actually devotes only about a page and a half of his ten-page article to discussing the technical feasibility of American intervention. He justifies his perfunctory review of the difficulties by arguing that

> the burden of proof must rest upon those who dissent from the judgment that intervention in the Persian Gulf is not militarily feasible. Given the American force structure and the experience we possess, however, why is it unreasonable to insist that the burden of proof rests upon those who insist we lack the military capability to intervene successfully?

One does not have to be much of a military expert to be staggered by this reasoning. Does not all the experience of the past quarter-century (and of World War II) suggest that military enterprises are by their very nature fraught with incalculability? Modern military technology has not disproved the adage that he who sows the seeds will reap the whirlwind. We are not talking about Caribbean islands in America's backyard, or peninsulas separated by mountain ranges from the Asian landmass, but of a landlocked gulf coast that is at some points less than 700 miles from the border of the Soviet Union. An area, moreover, in which neighboring and nearby countries have been richly supplied by the great powers with the most advanced weaponry!

Tucker is even more perfunctory in discussing the potential deterioration of conditions in Western Europe and Japan resulting from higher oil prices, although this deterioration is the sole justification for the intervention he proposes. The major theme of his article, and of a later article in the February issue of *Commentary* referring only briefly to the oil crisis, is that the apparent post-Vietnam proscription of the use of force in international affairs may have worse consequences than the selective application of limited force. An effective critic of American involvement in Vietnam, Tucker is now concerned with the possible overgeneralization of its "lessons." Yet all of this has little bearing on the *specifics* of intervention in the Middle East, even if it is agreed that a vital national interest is at stake there, as was not the case in Vietnam.

Tucker tries to refute the claim that the country would not "stand for" another intervention after the Vietnam experience. He blurs, however, the factual issue of whether the public would *in fact* support or "consent to" a war over Middle Eastern oil with the moral issue of whether it *should* give its consent—a posture often assumed by advocates striving to influence the very public opinion they recognize as crucial to the adoption of the policy they favor. (About the moral issue of intervention, Tucker is singularly mute.)

I have nothing against theorizing or professors who specialize in it, but in the world of action the applications of a theory must always be made in a time-bound context that the theory necessarily minimizes. To recognize this is the essence of what is usually called "historical perspective." The oil

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crisis comes only two years after the still incomplete American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, less than a year after Watergate has discredited the "imperial presidency," and when—a situation without precedent—neither of the nation's two top officeholders owe their positions to the national electorate. No doubt these are historical "accidents," from a theoretical perspective, but their implications cannot be ignored in assessing the wisdom of a new unilateral military action abroad, particularly this one, with all the deeply distasteful moral issues surrounding it. Whatever the merits of Tucker's general thesis about the risks of a world order in which no nation is free to use force in defense of its vital interests, his case for American intervention in the Persian Gulf amounts to a 1970s version of General Omar Bradley's "wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place." □

Umashanker Phadnis

Gandhian Revolt Against Indira Gandhi

"I know," wrote Mahatma Gandhi way back in 1930 when Indian independence was still a dream, "that if I survive the struggle for freedom, I might have to do nonviolent battles with my own countrymen—battles that may be as stubborn as any in which I am now engaged."

Twenty-six years after his assassination, Gandhi's foreboding seems to have become a reality.

A student agitation in early 1973 against high mess costs in Gandhi's home state of Gujarat was soon transformed into a wider movement, articulating protest against soaring prices, corruption in high places, and the general unresponsiveness of parliamentary institutions to public grievances.

The state of Bihar followed suit. Economically perhaps the most backward state in the country, Bihar has a government that has consistently been subservient to the dominant castes. This largely explains why the land tenure system evolved during British rule continues with all its exploitative features, despite legislation ordaining reforms and an electoral mandate demanding that the ruling party implement these reforms.

It is here in Bihar that, on conservative estimates, 20,000 smallpox deaths have occurred during the past year, largely because, at the outbreak of an epidemic, the state government failed to push through preventive programs.

And in Bihar, for the last eight months a civil disobedience movement has virtually paralyzed the administration. With the students at its vanguard, this movement has withstood one of the fiercest repressions of peaceful agitation in India since independence. Its leader, Jayaprakash Narayan, a Marxist turned Gandhian, has threatened to organize elections for a parallel "People's Assembly" with its own administrative organs at the grass-roots level, if the officially elected legislature is not dissolved by then.

NARAYAN'S MOVEMENT IN BIHAR appears to be the pace-setter for similar movements elsewhere, questioning the moral legitimacy of the political institutions conceived by the elite that inherited power from the British colonial rulers. What is being intensely debated is not so much the policies of the government as the viability of the state structure and the socioeconomic milieu that has evolved after 27 years of independence.

To use a Marxian terminology: it is as if the bourgeois democratic state, created and operated by the leadership elite, is no longer capable of coping with the contradictions in ensuring distributive justice simultaneously with economic growth, or of coping with the pressures generated when a stratified social structure is exposed to the process of political "modernization."

With the near-breakdown of the established institutions and no alternative in sight, this is a classical "revolutionary situation" a Marxist might envy. Yet the responses that most seriously challenge the system are more intelligible in Gandhian than in Marxian terms. The password "Back to Gandhi" no longer expresses the nostalgic sentiment of a handful of romantics but has begun to attract a wide spectrum of radical opinion, including the segment that prides itself on "realism."

It is easy to identify the causes of this widespread disillusionment with conventional Left approaches and the turn to Gandhian guidelines. With 40 percent of the population below the poverty line, in

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terms of a consumption level of Rs. 40 (about $8) a month, and with a bare 10 percent of the population cornering as much as 30 percent of the income generated by the economy, all the "socialist" rhetoric with which planning had been varnished these 20 years has worn out. With it, also, went the credibility of centralized planning along perspectives sanctified by virtually the entire Indian Left and occasionally appropriated by the ruling Congress party.

Inherent in the economic development, fostered all those years, has been the growth of a new exploitative elite. Comprising perhaps 20 percent of the population, it consists of entrepreneurial elements, large and small, the landowning and trading classes, and organized labor. This elite controls vital leverages in the economy. Pampered for the contribution it was expected to make to the gross national product, it gained strong influence among the political groups that have been running the country since independence.

Consequently, the quest for an altogether new set of policy assumptions is designed so as to involve the masses in the productive process of the economy. The planners' original design was for the benefits of growth in the gross national product—a growth that *has* occurred—to percolate down to the masses; but in fact, too large a portion of it has stayed in the hands of the elite of the country, enabling it thereby to perpetuate its privileged status.

In this context, the economic ideas Gandhi envisaged for free India bear an immediate relevance. As an element of industrial planning, for instance, he repeatedly insisted that industrialization on the Western model would not work in India and he projected instead a model that emphasized "production by the masses" of the goods they needed. He insisted that science and technology should be geared to refine traditional rural industries so as to minimize unit labor inputs and maximize output rather than apply them to sophisticated capital intensive techniques that, willy-nilly, would have to be financed by exploiting a large mass of the population or with a huge import of foreign capital. Mobilization of savings in a poor economy and an iniquitous society, as is now clear, imposes a burden which is heaviest on the poor unorganized segments of the population that is least involved in the productive process.

It is not as though planners or the government were totally unaware of the hazards of a thoughtless pursuit of growth models appropriate either to capitalist economies of the West or a Soviet type of society. In the early years of planning, efforts were made to incorporate some elements of the Gandhian program into the plans. What mattered in the Gandhian outlook, however, was whether the needs of the lowliest had the first priority in the planning. But the newly emerging Indian elite had acquired such sway that it made sure the economy was oriented to serve their own purpose.

To Gandhi, village-based cottage industries constituted the hard core of the rural economy, and though an effort was made to incorporate such a program, it was far too tentative and was never worked out seriously as an integral part of planning. Investments intended for community welfare facilities in rural areas were either diverted to other sectors or accorded a low priority. Land reform measures remained paper commitments and no earnest attempts were made to implement the legislation that had been put through. What mattered to the government was whether or not plan outlays served to boost the GNP, regardless of distributive injustices that might follow.

In this situation, the credibility of the Left parties has steadily eroded. Those who tried, "constructively," to identify themselves as part of the system became trapped in its failures. Those who thought to capture state power also were stymied—the "functioning anarchy" that has characterized Indian society did not lead to the kind of total breakdown that would have facilitated an elitist seizure of power. Meanwhile, the state was able to isolate these revolutionary elements and match their sporadic violence with a fuller, more structured violence.

This explains why the present, still inchoate revolt had its origins quite apart from the parties. Suspicious that the sole purpose of the parties was to marshal electoral support, the student leadership has kept aloof from all of them and has pledged itself to Jayaprakash Narayan and his colleagues as they carry forward the tradition of Gandhi.

Gandhi knew that freedom for India did not begin and end with the overthrow of colonial rulers. He insisted that the masses would have "real" freedom only in a nonexploitative society wherein India's 500,000 villages would be self-governing units, economically viable as far as possible, so that they could enjoy a measure of equality with the towns and cities. His blue-print provided for a decentralized structure with the capital-intensive core industries, such as machine-tool manufacturing, and geared to the needs of the labor-intensive cottage industries that served essential consumer wants.

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Regarding ownership of industry, Gandhi sought to generate a moral climate in which the entrepreneur would be a deviant if he did not respect his social obligations as a "trustee" of the property he managed for the welfare of the country. He advised the capitalist class that it could enjoy its property only to the extent to which it voluntarily would renounce its rights over it—which otherwise, he warned, would be expropriated.

Gandhi did not expect that the society he envisioned would come about through state action. Soon after independence his advice was that the Congress party, now that it had served the purpose of securing independence, should give up its political orientation and convert into what he called "the Lok Sewak Sangh," an organization committed to work among the masses for creating a society on his model.

Precisely who would run the newly independent state and what the relation would be between the LSS and the political institutions—these matters were not spelled out by Gandhi, for he was assassinated the day after he had submitted a brief note on this proposal to the Congress party leadership. Unable to comprehend the implications of his advice, the Party leadership just let it lapse. It has been left to the hard core of Gandhians, the strict adherents to the principles of nonviolence, to work out a strategy.

On the eve of independence, Gandhi enjoined them not to get involved in the scramble for state power. His logic was that, by remaining outside the system, they would wield a moral authority among the masses, and this, in turn, would enable them to influence state policies.

Going by this advice, the Gandhian workers have now constituted themselves into an organization known as the Sarva Seva Sangh, meaning an institution to work for the welfare of all. The Sangh members refrained from joining any political party or from contesting elections and demanded a strict adherence to the principles of nonviolence.

The Sangh and its workers were to be apolitical but not antipolitical. In respect to elections, for instance, the Sangh made its stand clear: it would use its weight with those parties and individuals who were closest to the principles laid down by Gandhi. Though it refused to accept the state as final arbiter of the people's destiny, the Sangh did not ignore the advantages of having friendly elements running the state.

Perhaps the most spectacular achievement of the Gandhian workers has been the change in the land-ownership pattern they have brought about through persuasion. It is now generally acknowledged that more land has been distributed through voluntary action than by the government, which, with all its political sanctions, has not been able to implement land reform measures providing for ceilings on holdings and to distribute surplus land among the landless.

Beginning as an individual land-gift movement soon after a violent insurrectionary attempt by the Communists in the state of Andhra had failed in the early 1950s, the drive for land distribution among the landless evolved into a campaign for the communal ownership of land. In 100,000 villages, 75 percent of those owning 51 percent of land have vested ownership rights with the popularly elected village councils. A number of state governments have enacted legislation to legitimize this pattern of landownership. As might be expected, the legislation has been a dead letter primarily because of the pressure of vested interests.

THE GROWING DIVERGENCE between the policies of the state and economic and social developments set in motion outside the state system by the Gandhian workers has led the latter to the conclusion that the time has come for tactics of Satyagraha or nonviolent civil disobedience, such as Gandhi successfully employed against the British. And the immediate object of protest is corruption in public life, particularly in electoral practices.

It is too early to see what shape the movement will take but there is hardly any doubt that it is the most broad-based and effective challenge the Congress party has faced in its 27 years of rule. What seriously worries Indira Gandhi and the party leaders is that the bulk of congressmen are known to be sympathetic to the aims of the movement. Indeed, a large number of Congress party MPs met Narayan and openly expressed their support for him at a time when Indira Gandhi had publicly said that Narayan and his movement had to be resolutely fought.

A campaign for ruthless state action against the movement is being carried on by the Moscow-accredited CPI, which is projecting itself as an uncompromising champion of parliamentary democracy. Narayan, charge the Communists, is out to impose a "fascist" system in collusion with "American imperialists" and indigenous "reactionary elements." The Marxist Communist party, which is sympathetic to China, is divided over its attitude to the movement and has taken a rather

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ambivalent stand, both approving it and finding troublesome the support lent to it by the "Right" opposition parties. Socialists of all shades are active in the movement.

To be sure, none of the parties that have extended their support accept the Gandhian outlook. Narayan has declared that for the time being the movement will not aim at bringing about fundamental institutional changes along Gandhian lines. Even so, the setting up of "People's Committees" for choosing candidates in the general elections due in 1976, to which several opposition parties have agreed, will pose an agonizing choice for these parties. Narayan's statement that the "People's Committees" would nominate only those who are known for their integrity and concern for the poor is intended to minimize the opportunist elements. How all this will work out—whether it will initiate a fundamental reformation of Indian society or prove a mere ephemeral gesture of protest—remains to be seen. But it is possible now to report, without exaggeration, that new and vital popular energies are being stirred into action, energies that might yet save Indian democracy. □

Ernest Clark

Russian Dissidents Debate on Détente

The debate over Soviet-American détente called for by Secretary Kissinger has been in progress now for some time. Parallel with the discussions in the United States, an unofficial debate among the Soviet dissidents over the terms of détente has taken shape. Three principle camps have formed around spokesmen of courage and ability. Andrei Sakharov takes a position favoring rapprochement, but only if accompanied by the democratization of Soviet society. Roy Medvedev has become the leading advocate of most of the policies connected with the détente; although he qualifies his support, he opposes, for example, Congress's attempt to withhold most-favored-nation status from the Soviet Union until certain demands regarding Jewish emigration are met. Alexander Solzhenitsyn has become the sharpest critic of prevalent conceptions of détente; in different contexts he can be seen as a strong one-worldist and a classic Russian Slavophile.

To a considerable extent, it is the Jackson-Vanik amendment that has sparked the internal Soviet debate. The emigration issue grew in tandem with the "democratic movement" out of two strong ethnically centered movements—the Soviet Jews' intense campaign to emigrate and the demand of the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland. The dissenters have defined emigration as an issue of basic human rights: every individual should have the right to choose the country of his residence.

At the same time there arose two countervailing tendencies. On the one hand, many of the dissidents sympathized with the yearning of Jews, and other groups (notably ethnic Germans), to leave a country where assimilation seemed both mandatory and barred; nevertheless they considered that the most important struggle lay in making Russia itself a just country. Roy Medvedev and Solzhenitsyn have echoed this feeling. The other tendency arises from a sense that the contemporary nation-state cannot avert the threats of mass destruction from nuclear war, hunger, or environmental exhaustion. In many ways this comes as a reaction to Stalin's dogmatic insistence upon preserving rigid ideological boundaries between two forever hostile social systems. This anti-ideological, one-world sentiment therefore opposes ideological dogmatism as much as chauvinism.

The debate really begins in the summer of 1973, with Sakharov's outspoken interview with Olle Stenholm of Swedish television. For the first time, Sakharov publicly denounced what he called the Soviet Union's "rules of the game" in its détente policy; if the West accepts Soviet terms in détente, he claimed, the results would be "very bad." In August he elaborated on this idea in another interview: if rapprochement is *not* accompanied in the U.S.S.R. by democratization, then rapprochement will be even more dangerous than the previous absence of détente. Sakharov reasoned that if all that happens is that the West extends economic, scientific, and political concessions to the Soviet Union, the closed Soviet state will benefit, not the cause of peace. Such a détente would only spur the strengthening of Soviet military prowess and exacerbate the real international problems. In any case, he has argued, how can détente rest on any basis but

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mutual trust, and how can trust develop if one of the parties refuses to open its society?

The regime's response to these notions was virulent. The U.S.S.R.'s Deputy Procurator General called in Sakharov for a warning. Sakharov was subjected to a denunciation campaign in the press; its premise then was that the reduction of world tensions could take only one form: the Nixon-Brezhnev détente. Given the "dilemma of the one alternative," this logic required that Sakharov be labeled a hawk.

In response to this vitriolic abuse, Sakharov issued a clarification of his position in September 1973. His new statement reiterated his commitment to a *meaningful* rapprochement as a step toward eliminating the threat of nuclear war. His main concern was that a false détente might delude people into believing that the threat had diminished when in fact it had, if anything, intensified:

> I have always welcomed and welcome now the relaxation of international tension and the efforts of governments toward rapprochement of states, toward limitation of the arms race, toward elimination of mutual mistrust. I have believed and believe now that the only real way to solve world problems is the movement of each side toward the other, the convergence of the capitalist and socialist systems accompanied by demilitarization, reinforcement of the social protection for workers' rights, and creation of a mixed type of economy.

Since he considers the right to emigrate both to symbolize and to promote democratization, he has explicitly supported the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

Solzhenitsyn is more radical in denouncing the hope of détente; he simply denies that the Soviet political system *can* democratize. Thus he sees the search for détente by the West as another Munich. In fact, he asserts, détente will improve neither the internal nor the external situation. In its naive search for trouble-free relations, the West seems to have forgotten the question of human rights *within* the U.S.S.R. The right to emigrate has captivated the West's interest, while the situation of those who remain behind continues to deteriorate.

Over and over Solzhenitsyn has attacked what he conceives to be the world's double standard in excusing "socialist" immorality while harshly condemning capitalist immorality. If morality is taken as a standard for international behavior, then it ought to be a single yardstick applied impartially everywhere. By such a measure, the Soviet Union represents a threat to the world's security, and China a worse threat. The West's indifference to Soviet repression is as immoral as the Soviet Union's claim that repression is an "internal affair." Solzhenitsyn insists there is no such thing any more as a state's internal affairs.

Yet because of what he sees as the imminent collapse of the Western capitalist states (the U.S., he finds, closely resembles Czarist Russia just before 1917), and the threat of Chinese demagogery, the Soviet Union must seek its salvation within itself. In his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" Solzhenitsyn strikes a strongly patriotic note in his insistence that the welfare of the homeland impels drastic reorientation of its external policies. Given his disillusionment with the West, it is perhaps not paradoxical that Solzhenitsyn swings between one view emphasizing the need for international moral integration and another urging Russian national isolation.

THE VIEWS of the historian Roy Medvedev pose a further contrast to Solzhenitsyn's and Sakharov's contrasting positions. A former Party member, Roy Medvedev remains devoted to his interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. (By contrast, both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn have lost any hope that Marxism-Leninism offers practicable solutions.) Medvedev has been an indefatigable opponent of Soviet repression; his conception of the Soviet Union's problems derives from his careful distinction between Leninist norms and Stalinist distortions. In the fall of 1973, Roy Medvedev wrote a closely reasoned article on détente that took issue both with Sakharov's gloom and Solzhenitsyn's "Moscow-Centrism." Détente, for Medvedev, is most devoutly to be wished, along with scientific cooperation, trade, and exchange of tourists. He believes in détente even though the Soviet leaders are joining it to increased internal repressiveness. Medvedev explains this fact as an attempt by "rightists" in the leadership to discredit de-Stalinization in foreign policy. Ultimately, however, the process of détente will tend to lower the ideological barriers between states. The logical end is the free international movement of people and ideas. What Medvedev does not consider, for it would imperil the argument, is that there is no intrinsic dynamic forcing détente to a logical end-point.

It is true, argues Medvedev, that pressure from the West has been useful in extracting certain concessions, such as the abolition of the emigration education tax, and the continued liberty of Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. (This was, of course, before Solzhenitsyn's arrest and expulsion.) This kind of pressure, though, has certain natural limits. Too

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much would provoke further repression; the Jackson amendment will not result in any new law, he reasons. His argument centers on his belief that the isolation of the Soviet Union is responsible for the vestiges of Stalinist repression. Once this isolation is overcome by good international relations, world public opinion will gain influence in Soviet internal policy. The coming generation of Soviet leaders will be more receptive to these influences, less inclined to dogmatism and repression. Society will demand the intellectual and spiritual satisfactions that only a free exchange of ideas can provide. Though its benefits may be evident only in the long run, the course of détente seems the only possible one for the world.

Medvedev's argument merits considerable attention. He offers the fullest and most persuasive arguments for the original Nixon-Brezhnev vision of détente available from the unofficial Soviet world; indeed it hinges on a belief that there can only be one vision, one form of détente. Détente—or no détente.

But this unexamined assumption may be the chief weakness of his argument. It presumes that the terms of great power relations are immutably given, that the best interests of the two peoples are represented in the negotiated U.S.-Soviet agreements of the past few years. In fact, the evidence on this point is by no means unequivocal, and the logic is questionable. As a recent article by Henry Pachter in DISSENT suggests, one may distinguish between détente and détente-ism.

THE COSTS of opposing Soviet policy in strategic matters are high. It is especially hard for people who have suffered so much through war and repression to oppose a détente policy. What some dissenters have found, however, is that the appearance of détente may short-circuit its substance. Détente, they insist, must address the real threats to world peace. They concur that détente can only be meaningful if it brings democratization with it. Medvedev considers democratization inevitable; Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn warn that simply signing trade agreements does not necessarily prevent war or facilitate democracy.

Reading the dissenters, one is moved to seek the distinguishing features of a "true" or "meaningful" détente. Formally, détente is defined as the reduction of international tension. But this is a negative definition. The elements of a genuine détente today would presumably include two-sided compromises on arms control, mutual understanding on strategic interests, and closer integration of societies through the exchange of information and freer travel. The agreements Secretary Kissinger has forged (such as the Vladivostok agreement) have been difficult to evaluate precisely because we don't have sufficient information about potential alternatives. When governments negotiate, as when they wage war, such terms as "détente," "national security," or "*raison d'État*" become catchwords for legitimating all official decisions. We have recently seen how easily such umbrella terms are abused for particular interests. By labeling hopes for better agreements unrealistic, the U.S. and Soviet governments may make "détente" simply another mystification. One must hope that the debate over détente in this country will not be so blinded by Kissinger's "triumphs" as to forget that the terms of improved relations may, to some extent, be a matter of choice. □

Al Bilik

A Modest Proposal for True Competition

If a clear resolution seems lacking for such vexing problems as unemployment and high prices, recrimination is not. Labor blames business, business blames labor, and both blame the federal government. Not to be outdone, the federal government blames local government—at least for the failure to do something about jobs.

When a representative of the U.S. Department of Labor blasted the city of New York recently for letting almost $3 million in 1973 Public Service Jobs funds go unused, he caused much eyebrow-raising and disbelief. How could a city like New York, constantly in financial crisis, ignore federal funds that would have provided jobs for 3,000 people? Mayor Beame's reply was equally puzzling. The city of New York, he said, was awaiting word from Washington as to the conditions under which the

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money might be used. By this time a year had elapsed since the passage of the 1973 law.

The experience of New York City under that statute is no different from that of hundreds of other cities asked to sponsor public service jobs to combat unemployment. The 403 participating cities made use of *only one-third* of the billion dollars allocated by the federal government last year for creating public service jobs. This year's new, expanded version will make several billion dollars available.

As a nation, we at last seem committed to the proposition that government has a major responsibility to directly cause the creation of jobs. It makes good sense to invest in existing employment situations, quickly translating dollars into constructive jobs. The cities would appear to be eminently qualified, in many instances as employers of "first" resort.

For example, New York City, for financial reasons, has laid off several thousand employees who had been performing necessary jobs. One assumes that, as "employer of first resort" of those laid off, New York would use its federal government grant to either retain or recall the same people who were already trained workers. But, unfortunately, New York City was not permitted to recall its own laid-off employees and was required instead to fill the jobs with people laid off by other employers. This restriction and others have caused the limited application of previous Public Service Jobs statutes and threaten to scuttle the more massive program recently enacted by Congress.

The insistence that cities by-pass their own laid-off employees, that new people hired under the Jobs program be classed separately from regular employees doing the same work, and that civil service protections be diluted has made city officials wary of the program. Artificial salary limitations have not helped. Public employee unions fear that segregated conditions established for workers hired under the Public Service Jobs program will undermine seniority and other carefully guarded rights. The ultimate irony in the New York City situation was that thousands of laid-off city employees, ineligible for unemployment compensation and for recall to their own jobs, were replaced under the federal Jobs program by privately laid-off workers who were eligible both for the vacant job and for unemployment compensation!

There may be a way to alleviate the problem by applying the "employer of first resort" principle and by direct use of already existing facilities, plant, and personnel, but for varied kinds of public service. For example, thousands of workers have been laid off in the auto industry and thus are eligible for public service jobs. If we narrow our thinking to city employment only, those with clerical skills would no doubt be able to transfer readily. But assembly-line workers would have to accept relatively less skilled jobs.

Now let us consider a broadened concept of public service enterprise. No time-consuming tool-up would be needed if American Motors, which stays in business only by sufferance of the big three, were converted into a public corporation. Instead of doing relatively unskilled public work for a city, auto workers laid off by any of the auto makers could apply their acquired skills in producing a competitive, small, efficient, energy-saving, antipollution car. This would be a clear public service! GM and Ford could choose to continue to produce the bigger cars or smaller cars, and of course anything else that appeals to the profit motive.

Besides creating or at least saving many jobs, the "Americanization" of American Motors could enable it as a public service enterprise to set valuable standards for the auto industry in such areas as prices, quality, and social utility of commodities produced; in effect it could demonstrate the method of assuring *real* competition in the industry.

Just as the idea of publicly created jobs ought to be creatively considered, the problem of prices, inflation, and competition also suggests interesting, even ironic speculation. At year's end the *New York Times* was asking if indeed the time had come for the nation to take a more direct hand in the economy rather than leave prices and other practices to the vagaries of the marketplace or, worse, to the venality of corporate back rooms.

A FEW PEOPLE, socialists particularly, may take heart and use the occasion to call for outright socialization of basic industry.

I would not. Rather than seek to impose centralized government control or ownership, I propose the establishment of true competition in those essential industries found to be dominated by one or a few firms. Where collusion has overwhelmed competition, the classic response has been Justice Department action designed to dissolve the offending giant or giants into a host of competing units. Despite such efforts since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the trend to monopoly has continued. Traditional antitrust action has failed to restore competition. On the other hand, outright

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nationalization in a nation that is philosophically indisposed to it will produce a monstrous state bureaucracy more destructive than the evil it seeks to correct.

If inflation and recession are largely attributable to pricing and other restrictive practices of monopolistic and near-monopolistic corporations, the remedy may be found in a uniquely American experience—the Tennessee Valley Authority. The TVA was formed in 1935 as a U.S. public enterprise for the purpose, among others, of providing low-cost electricity for the people living in the Valley. Private power companies coexisted with TVA and still do. But it is no coincidence that the private utilities, extolling their virtues in newspaper ads a few years ago, did correctly claim that their electric rates were no higher at that time than they had been in 1935. Of course. TVA, a public corporation serving as a yardstick against which to measure the performance of its private counterparts, had kept prices down over the years. This is the kind of constructive competition that should be generated in auto, steel, and other basic industries.

Housing and other urgent construction needs go unmet as unemployment approaches 15 percent in the building trades and bankruptcy threatens many contractors. Banks for some time have maintained a prohibitively high interest rate, thus discouraging the borrowing needed to stimulate the construction industry. Although the government's Federal Reserve Board policy is slowly being relaxed and proposals are offered to indirectly stimulate lending by savings and loan institutions, no immediate breakthrough is in sight. The U.S. does not have to nationalize the private lending business; it need simply compete with it.

It's been done before. The federal government established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation during Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration, which offered low-interest loans directly to business enterprise for purposes of new construction and expansion of plants. And following World War II, the Veterans' Administration was authorized to directly lend money at low interest rates to veterans who had difficulty in financing home purchases.

To be sure that competitive public enterprise is proposed intelligently in a particular industry, the federal government should regularly supply authoritative information regarding every facet of the operation of the basic industries. Pricing, production, and marketing policies should be reviewed and if necessary investigated by a specially constituted public agency, which also must bear careful scrutiny itself by appropriate legislative bodies. There should be no repetition of the embarrassment to the American government when at the worst of last year's oil crisis the reliability of data, provided begrudgingly at times by the oil companies, could not be ascertained.

A simple yet long overdue device for assuring public accountability may be the federal chartering of interstate and international corporations. As a condition for receiving and retaining its charter or license to do business across state and national boundaries, the corporation could be required to file information regarding its employment, pricing, marketing, and other pertinent policies. It is time that the power to charter giant corporations were taken from the states and granted to the national government. Consider the prospect of Delaware disciplining DuPont!

Now, almost 30 years after the passage of the Employment Act of 1946, it is time to determine that we will take the steps to assure the creation of a truly competitive economy in which constructive full employment is guaranteed. □

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Peace in the Middle East?

A Conversation between Amos Oz and Irving Howe

The following discussion between Amos Oz, the gifted Israeli novelist, and Irving Howe, an editor of DISSENT, took place toward the end of 1974. Some details of the Middle East situation may change by the time the following transcript appears in print; but the essential points made by Mr. Oz, as a leading Israeli figure and a supporter of the "dove" position in Israel, remain of immediate interest. – ED.

IH: There is obviously a great deal of anxiety in America today concerning the situation in the Middle East. Many people feel that there was ground for modest hopefulness concerning negotiations before the Rabat Conference, but that it has seriously undermined this possibility. We fear that we are headed toward war in the Middle East during the next year.

AO: By a strange coincidence I happened to arrive in America on the day of Arafat's speech at the UN. I was very worried, not so much by what he said—which was no news to me—but by the extreme anxiety, sometimes verging on panic among Americans, especially American Jews. Coming from the Middle East into New York on the day of Arafat's speech felt almost like coming from the midst of a drama to the verge of a comedy. I don't really think that whatever he said in the UN is going to be decisive to our future. Whatever will happen to us will be decided in the Middle East.

The atmosphere in Israel right now is one of sad and sober determination, not anxiety or depression. Sad, because we might well be heading toward another war—which I believe, we shall win—and which still would be as pointless as any war could be. We have nothing to gain; we can't afford to lose. The mood is sober because very few illusions are left among Israelis, and I would say that in a strange sort of way there is more concensus nowadays between hawks and doves in Israel than ever before. It is not that the hawks have become less "hawky" or the doves less "dovish"—it is perhaps that the light, sometimes irresponsible optimism of the doves is gone. The doves, since the Yom Kippur War, are fully aware of the Arabs' intentions—whereas the hawks are perhaps becoming more aware of the depth of the Palestinian problem as the crux of the matter.

I am not going to forecast or prophesize, but I have the feeling that if anyone in or outside Israel ever believed in a quick reconciliation, he must be disillusioned by now. The best we can hope for is not a melodramatic reconciliation through a magical formula. The best scenario I can see is an interim, partial, unsatisfactory settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Both parties might leave the conference hall with a secret determination to teach the other party a lesson one day, yet such negotiations may eventually create the climate for a gradual deescalation of emotions, and this is essential before a peace can be achieved. The alternative scenario is simply messianic and unreal—very "Jewish" in a sense: either a full-scale eternal peace or no settlement at all. No, I would go for a partial, interim, and unsatisfactory arrangement with the Palestinians.

IH: That leads to the crucial question. In your judgment, is there an authentic Palestinian national sentiment that requires consideration and respect even from its opponents? And do you think that the Israeli governments have been mistaken or perhaps too stubborn in their

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earlier refusal to recognize this national sentiment?

AO: Well, I think one can be a good Zionist and a good Israeli and yet admit that the Palestinian Arabs have a certain case, without identifying with the ruthless and fanatic way in which they struggle for their case, especially the PLO. A Palestinian national identity certainly had not been there in the days of early Zionism, when the entire Arab population of Palestine hardly numbered half a million people with no sense of national identity whatsoever. Ironically enough, the Palestinian national identity may well be a by-product of Zionism, the result of a love-hate relation between enemies. Anyway, it is there, and it should be satisfied in some way. Not at the expense of Israel's existence and security; but I believe it could be satisfied essentially or at least up to a point without threatening Israel's existence. Sooner or later—and I don't know how long it will take—there should come about a mutual recognition of the PLO by Israel and of Israel by the PLO. This would not, of course, be the end of the drama; it might well be the beginning of harsh, painful bargaining about territories, frontiers, guarantees, etc. But it seems to me essential.

When I think of Israel's policy between the 1967 war and the 1973 war—and I have been in bitter opposition to the Meir-Dayan policies—I do not accuse the former Israeli government of not wanting peace. Far from it. They did want peace. I do not even accuse them of arrogance, although a certain amount of arrogance was in the air in Israel. I blame them for being unimaginative. I blame them for not seeing that the Palestinian problem is the crux of the matter, and Palestinian identity is building up very quickly. Things could be done during those years, such as, for example—and I am just speculating—enabling the Arab inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to express their views through a referendum or even to elect under international inspection some kind of national representation, an Arab agency, like the Jewish Agency under the British administration.

The results of such elections might have led to a Palestinian leadership that may still have been much too extremist for my liking, but also still less fanatic and extremist than the PLO. Nevertheless, this story is over, as well as the disappointing love affair with King Hussein and his irrelevant Hashemite kingdom.

I think that the policies of Israel have changed considerably. Prime Minister Rabin is a cautious and understating politician, but he did express an idea that would have been unthinkable in the days of Dayan and Golda Meir. Rabin said in the Knesset that Israel will never negotiate with anyone who is not willing to recognize its very right of existence—which is a clear hint of with whom Israel may negotiate.

Mind you, he did not exclude Palestinians, he did not even automatically exclude the PLO if the PLO were to change its policies.

Whether the PLO leadership will adjust to this possibility, I don't know. If they don't, if they still keep aiming at the disintegration of Israel or what they call a "democratic secular state," there is no escape from another war, and then another one, and still another one. You can't negotiate a compromise between existence and nonexistence. There is no half-existence. No Israeli, hawk or dove, would negotiate about the terms of a Jewish community living under Arab rule—this is out of the question. The basis must be a mutual, perhaps simultaneous recognition.

IH: When I was in Israel last winter, all of these questions were being debated, and one of the most remarkable things about Israeli life was the intensity and passion of its political life. I have never been anywhere where there was so much discussion and such freedom in the expression of every conceivable opinion. Some of the people with whom I visited expressed the view that Israel had been unimaginative in relation to the Palestinians and should have allowed political life on the West Bank, so that a more rational and reasonable Palestinian movement would have arisen in place of the PLO. But when this view was

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expressed, a number of the Israelis with whom I spoke, more or less connected with the Meir government, offered the following objection, which, I think, has a certain strength: all right, let's say we negotiate with some Palestinians, let's say we negotiate even with the PLO or the PLO in some disguise. As a consequence they set up a government of their own on the West Bank; they give the Israelis some kind of vague assurances—it is not likely that they would formally recognize Israel—and promise not to try to dismember Israel, at least not right away. Meanwhile they have gained the West Bank, and with that vast sums of money pouring in from the Arab powers, together with arms from the Soviet Union. So there is created an irredentist government on the West Bank which is—and you know one has to go there to see it—literally across the street.

"How do we know," these Israelis said to me, "that tomorrow Arafat isn't removed and George Habash takes over, heading a regime that is weak economically and socially but strong militarily? On the West Bank it would hold a gun literally to our hearts. This seems to us too great a risk."

Now, in the last election campaign, you supported the Moked, a dovish left-wing party with another point of view. How would you answer this argument of who were then the "establishment" people?

AO: First of all, let me say that I respect the arguments of my political opponents in Israel. After all, we are not playing chess. It is a matter of life and death for all of us. I have fought in two wars and I have children in the country. Although I am an Israeli dove, I still would not give territories in exchange for vague verbal assurances. What we need is practical, down-to-earth guarantees. And in this respect it is precisely the fact that the country is so small and the geography so dramatic, which may create the grounds for something more reliable than vague verbal assurances. Any Palestinian government on the West Bank and in Gaza should be interrelated right from the start to Israel in such things as the electricity system, the irrigation system, and other things that will create the grounds for a different Palestinian perspective.

I regard it as essential that the Palestinians will have something rather dramatic to lose if they break the settlement. Whoever is going to take over in this Palestinian state to be created alongside Israel will have something to lose and therefore will have to subdue his own extremists. We have seen this process working in several countries, Israel itself not excluded. Still, there is a risk, even if we have such guarantees and even if we get an effective demilitarization of the Palestinian state. But I think that in a sense that is what Zionism is all about. We step into history, we step into politics, we don't live with messianic expectations for a golden era to come. We take calculated risks.

IH: I am certainly sympathetic to your view that we should not have messianic expectations. But let me offer for the sake of argument what I think might be the reply to what you have said. Recently, there appeared the work of the young Egyptian writer Sana Hassan, obviously a well-intentioned young woman, and one feels if only she had power there would be no trouble, because she is talking in rational terms, just as you are talking in rational terms and just as most Israelis with whom you disagree also are talking in rational terms. (I am not sure that Menachem Begin is talking in rational terms, but I'll leave him aside.) The problem seems to me that there are people on the other side who are not talking in rational terms, who are inflamed with *their* messianic expectations. Right now they feel that everything is going in their direction—Soviet help, Arab oil money, UN endorsement, tacit support in Western Europe. They see the possibility of grabbing everything—which means the destruction of Israel.

The question that has to be asked is, what is the realistic plausibility of the acceptance of the kind of proposal that you make? But if there is no possibility of such a scheme being accepted by the Palestinians, what then is the force of the dove position in Israel?

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AO: Precisely those arguments make me rather skeptical about what I just described as the best possible scenario—best possible does not necessarily mean likely. Personally I am in an awkward position in Israel because I reach dovish conclusions, although I have hawkish assumptions about Arab intentions. Therefore I may be held in suspicion both by doves and hawks alike. But fundamentally I think that we have to bear in mind that if the renewed Arab extremism is going to last, we are certainly heading toward another war. It is a scary thought, but I think that a nation that tries to prevent war at any price is almost sure to get it. On the other hand, I have my doubts about the stability of the pro-Arab coalition. It is one of the most unlikely coalitions in history—Communist countries, oil sheiks, and the poorest countries in Asia and Africa who are more victimized by Arab oil policy than anyone else. So I do believe that the Arabs will realize very soon that this coalition cannot last very long. Now, if President Sadat is sincere in saying that he is ready to accept, even if under unlikely terms, Israel's existence, the real test will be, is he capable of bringing to the conference hall in Geneva or elsewhere a Palestinian delegation prepared to seriously negotiate? If all he has to offer is, first you withdraw from all territories and then you have to come to terms with the Palestinians, that means he wants to leave the mid-East bomb alive rather than dismantle it. But if the Palestinians were willing to live shoulder to shoulder with Israel, the risk of making an arrangement would still be considerable; yet, it might be worth taking. Let's bear in mind that whatever this Palestine is going to be, it will be half a Lebanon in size and population. No matter how reinforced by other Arab countries, it could not by itself endanger the existence of Israel. If, God forbid, an Arab coalition ever were stronger than Israel, then God help us all. And this must never occur, even if we have an "everlasting" peace and Sadat joins the Zionist movement. Even then I would still believe that Israel has to be stronger than any Arab coalition.

IH: Is there anything that the Israeli government could do at the present time to encourage, let us say, the more constructive trends among the Arabs? I have noticed that the Rabin government has been very cautious in the handling of recent developments. My impression is that the Israelis are waiting to see what will happen once the rhetoric dies down. But is there, in your judgment, any political gesture or statement that would help things?

AO: As you say, the Rabin government is a very cautious team; they have a very narrow majority, and within the coalition government there are some opponents to any compromise with the Palestinians. Personally, I wish Rabin would have been in a position to say more explicitly that we can offer recognition for recognition, legitimacy for legitimacy. To put it in a very straight-forward way, so that every Palestinian Arab in Nablus, in Hebron, in the old City of Jerusalem, or in the refugee camps in Lebanon will know that he has something to gain if he comes to terms with Israel.

At the same time, I think the government should never recognize unilaterally the PLO as long as the PLO refuses to recognize Israel. I would also try to deescalate the verbal exchange for technical reasons. It's not that I object on principle to the idea of calling Arafat and his gang murderers—they *are* murderers. Still, you sometimes have to deal with murderers in order to save human lives. Back in 1943, hypothetically, if Hitler would have suddenly decided that he was willing to let some Jews out, Weitzmann would have gone all the way to Berlin and even shaken hands with the monster in order to save human lives.

So I would prefer the Israeli government to say that we can't negotiate with the PLO, not because they are savage murderers, but precisely because there is nothing yet to negotiate about. Once there is something to negotiate about—mutual recognition—then there will be negotiations. That is about as far as I would like the present Israeli government to go. I would not recommend any further unilateral concessions. □

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Bernard Avishai

Zionist "Colonialism": Myth and Dilemma

> Mr. President, the roots of the Palestinian question reach back into the closing years of the 19th century, to that period we call the era of colonialism. ... This is precisely the period during which Zionism was born; its aim was the conquest of Palestinian land by European immigrants, just as settlers colonized and indeed raided most of Africa. ...
> — YASIR ARAFAT, *speech to the United Nations' General Assembly, November 14, 1974*

The Dreyfus affair was not uniquely the ordeal of Captain Dreyfus. Within a few years of his first trial, a collection of dissenting groups—liberals, socialists, and Zionists—had become his champions, primarily because they admired him for his enemies. The radicals who (often grudgingly) took up Dreyfus's defense perceived that they were equally vulnerable to the powerful alliance that, at least for the time, was aimed against the unlikely Captain.

This apprehension was intensified by a widely held conviction that the attack on Dreyfus was but the domestic side effect of a much larger and more ominous trend in international affairs. The "imperialists" appeared to be prostituting the foundations of democratic life in the Republic. Government officials, easily bought off by "special interests," channeled national resources into the extension of empire and the support of brutal colonial administrations. All of Europe seemed torn from the liberal moorings so painfully acquired in the middle of the century. The great powers (even America!) were locked in a frantic competition to plunder the resources, labor, and economic surplus of African, Asian, and Latin-American "natives." Armies and navies were mushrooming in the service of these imperial ventures; and the "war for steel and gold" (H. N. Brailsford's apt name for the European conflagration he foresaw) was already being plotted, in an atmosphere of panic and chauvinism.

For weather-vane liberals such as Hobson, Morel, Clemenceau, and Emile Duclaux, the ascendence of reactionary forces, linked to repressive colonialist policies, shattered the image of a self-regulating market society that might encourage democratic practice. The "new imperialism"—as Hobson dubbed it—had neither progressive features nor Christian mission; its sole content seemed to be a savage labor discipline that had to be opposed if only on moral grounds.

Even those socialists who had been disposed to view imperialism with profound ambivalence began to reassess their attitudes.[1] Bourgeois societies were swaggering to the corners of the globe; but the dialectical possibilities for liberal progress in the colonies—free property relations, a genuine market in labor, an "end to national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness"—which Marx had attributed to the imperial experience, seemed little

[1] As with Marx: "whatever may have been the crimes of England [in Hindustan] she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about [social] revolution." From the *New York Tribune*, June 25, 1853.

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evident. Imperialism now seemed the project of huge cartels whose colonial agents aimed only at securing more profitable outlets for capital investments and "overproduced" commodities.

This new view of imperialism quickly became a conventional wisdom among socialists; every foreign adventure became suspect as a particularly rapacious business operation. And it was a short hop from this opinion to the revolutionary theories of Lenin and Luxemburg: European colonialism might be effectively challenged only by colonial liberation movements charged with a measure of socialist internationalism. Monopoly capitalism had forged an international division of labor and in so doing seemed to have rendered all narrow national concerns obsolete. So the socialist Left began to argue, abandoning Marx's more cautious understanding of modernization and its slowly evolving preconditions.

For European Jews the period of the Dreyfus affair was a watershed of a different sort. Although it reinforced the suspicion of Europe's radicals toward nationalist appeals and colonial arrangements, the anti-Semitism unleashed by the alleged treachery of a Jewish officer drove thousands of Jews toward openly nationalist solutions and even colonial scheming.[2] If the time of imperialism provided the context for the Dreyfus affair, the anti-Semitism of the mob was its obvious content. Jewish nationalism and radical anticolonialism are thus the linked stepchildren of the same bleak history: both movements evolved political goals in response to the same historic conditions that aroused in democrats and Jews (often the same people) such bitter skepticism about the survival of democratic ethics in bourgeois, Christian Europe.

The despair that seized Herzl at the Dreyfus trial epitomized the widespread impatience of West European Jews with what came to seem their failing attempt at assimilation. Herzl, who only a few years before had fantasized about a magnanimous conversion of Jewish children to Christianity, now watched despondently as liberal, cosmopolitan Europe seemed to collapse in a tide of racist hysteria. The Jewish question had suddenly returned.

It must be emphasized, however, that Herzl and most of the other early Zionists did not believe modern anti-Semitism to be terribly mysterious. They saw its recurrence as but a fragment of a larger problem whose universalist solutions, although compelling, seemed remote and utopian. The socialist Zionists, for example, were truly persuaded that the market society had staying power and would provide no solution to the social and economic vulnerability of the Jews. Market society, Borochov argued, was indefinitely mired in complex class conflicts, of which anti-Semitic scape-goating was a predictable result. Jews would therefore have to take up the international struggle for socialism and democracy only after they solved their own special problems.

One recalls the poignant confrontation between Parvus, already a well-known Menshevik theoretician, and Nachman Syrkin, a mentor of labor Zionism, which occurred while the two young men were studying in Berlin. Railing against Zionism to a Jewish student circle, Parvus held up his jacket and pronounced upon the new international order: "... the wool in this coat was taken from Angora; it was spun in England, woven in Lodz; the buttons came from Germany, the thread from India ..." and so on, until Syrkin wryly observed that the rip in the sleeve had no doubt come from Kiev.[3]

The hatred of left-wing Zionists for all that was retrograde in bourgeois Europe was at the very core of their peculiar nationalism. These Zionists adopted with great enthusiasm the penetrating critique of Europe supplied by the radical milieu while swallowing, often apolo-

[2]See Hannah Arendt's fascinating account, "From the Dreyfus Affair to France Today," in *Essays on Anti-Semitism*, New York, 1946.

[3]See Marie Syrkin's memoir, *Nachman Syrkin*, New York, 1961, pp. 28–44.

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getically, the profound contradiction implied in their separatist hunt for an overseas territory. In fact, until it became obvious that the symbols of "Eretz Yisrael" were indispensable for harnessing the energies of the Jews in Eastern Europe—still culturally fixated by the orthodox liturgy, although more and more attracted to radical solutions—most "Zionists," including Herzl and Syrkin, were eager to take on any territory at all. Programs for settling in Argentina, Texas, and Uganda were promoted at various times. Clearly the aim, for the great majority of Zionists, was national reconstruction upon a territory and not—although this is being increasingly forgotten—the redemption of some historical "promise."

Not only the labor Zionists were troubled by contradiction. No one articulated the fundamental incongruities of the Zionist position better than Herzl himself. He was a nationalist to whom nationalism seemed vulgar; he despised the Kaisers and Sultans whom he had to court and hoped to exploit. He was an avid promoter of colonization who was revolted by the inhumanity of existing colonial arrangements.

In his revealing work *Altneuland* (1902), Herzl emerges as a confounded Viennese "progressive" far more than a Jewish nationalist. His *alter ego* in the book, Dr. Lowenberg, is bitterly estranged from the decadence of the new imperial bourgeoisie yet remains loyal to the cosmopolitan promise of "European civilization." The hero's profound *ennui* results directly from his reflection upon the betrayal of equality and liberty by the bureaucrats running the Austro-Hungarian empire. It was obvious to Lowenberg that the Jewish stake in the victory of democratic values cut deep; and Herzl's melodrama dwells broodingly on their apparent defeat.

By contrast, when Herzl finally gets down to his vision of the "New Society"—the name alone suggests the criteria by which he insisted the Jewish national home be judged—he exhibits all the monotonous righteousness of a Thomas More: economic development would be coordinated by a planning commission committed to the "national interest"; land would be publicly owned, workers' cooperatives encouraged and private ownership controlled although market incentives would be retained. The New Society would be, moreover, a model of Millian democracy; a genuine meritocracy in which opportunity was equal, civil liberties safeguarded, and public service a reluctantly accepted privilege (like the secretaryship of a kibbutz?). Ironically, Herzl could not foresee any need for army service. After all, no private interests would foul the public good.

Nor did he neglect to grapple with the problem of colonialism itself. Clearly defensive about his advocacy of a new colonial project just when stories of horrible cruelty inflicted by whites during the Boer War were reaching the "salons," Herzl was eager to anticipate criticism. The New Society, he asserted, would be braced by proletarian virtues—self-reliance, discipline, and cooperation; therefore the exploitation of any native population would be impossible. Besides, Herzl maintained, Palestine was virtually "empty"—a contention that would later create great embarrassment for Herzlian Zionists but was at the time not all that far from the mark: Palestine was in fact greatly underpopulated at the turn of the century, largely because of the economic stagnation and political repression imposed by a Turkish administration wary of Arab sympathy for the "entente powers."[4]

The "emptiness" of Palestine was not crucial for Herzl, since the Jewish national home would anyway strive to be a paragon of cosmopolitan values. The great European languages would be spoken, while Yiddish (and presumably Arabic) would have to *earn* a status equal to them. There would be no Jewish colons; the Jews, on the contrary, would provide a model of self-determination for the Arabs of Palestine and even for the

[4]See Desmond Stewart's "Herzl's Journeys in Palestine and Egypt," in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Kuwait University, Spring 1974, pp. 22–23.

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blacks of Africa ("all peoples need a home"). Social tranquillity in Palestine would be underpinned by mutually advantageous business relations, assuring the progress of the Moslem inhabitants (such as Lowenberg's devoted friend, Reshid Bey), and Jewish science, prosperity, and liberalism would serve as a catalyst for Arab modernization.

Herzl's suspicion of conventional colonial models reflected not only a newly popular radical morality but also the disappointing experience of earlier attempts at Jewish settlement in Palestine. Although the lesson would be fully grasped only later on by the labor Zionist settlers, even at this point such liberal Zionist leaders as Herzl and Nordau could agree about the basic reasons for the failure of the famous Biluim settlements. These had been founded in the 1880s and, even with Rothschild's extensive support, quickly became demoralized, losing many of their original members. The young Jewish pioneers, who had come to Palestine to take up a national challenge, found themselves increasingly transformed into Arabic-speaking overseers of Arab labor and finally grew disgusted. Those "Biluim" who remained became preoccupied with the viability of their vineyard enterprises and lacked the social cohesion that would prove to be an indispensable condition for the revival of the national language, Hebrew, and of the Jewish culture for which Hebrew would be a major instrument. This insight was first articulated by Achad Haam in 1899, but Syrkin and his young protegées in Palestine—Ben Gurion, Ben Tzvi, and Shazar—would eventually transform it into the animating dogma of the *Yishuv* (Jewish population): i.e., socialism among Jewish settlers must presuppose the reconstitution of a Jewish nation in Palestine.[5] The prevention of colonialist relations with the Arabs would be viewed as a pragmatic imperative as much as a moral ideal.

Herzl's *Altneuland* was therefore more prophetic than any document so unoriginal had a right to be. But with regard to the reconciliation of Arabs to the Zionist project, no amount of "willing" could materialize the fable. The Yishuv was from its inception perceived by the Arabs of Palestine as a spin-off of "European imperialism," and, no doubt, Herzl's grandstanding with imperial potentates—whether the Sultan or the Colonial Office—did little to dispel this perception. Few Arabs read *Altneuland*. The Zionist settlers, unlike the large yet economically primitive and politically inconspicuous orthodox Jewish communities of Jerusalem and Safed, seemed strange and unwelcome intruders. Palestine was a backwater of a dying empire where local "bourgeois-aristocrats" were striving to replace the Turkish administration at the apex of a despotic, quasi-feudal pyramid and where the political ambitions of the Zionists could not be easily harmonized with those of Arab political elites.

It mattered little to these Arab elites that the Zionists came, not as agents or allies of European imperialism, but as Jews fearful that they were to be the chief victims of a Europe going mad. The Zionist project was perceived as a European outpost: a relic of foreign domination and a challenge to stirred-up Arab xenophobia and nationalism. Nor can one deny the obvious fact that the Zionist effort would probably have been quite futile had Palestine not been subject to a foreign power. The penetration of Palestine by independent Jewish settlers would have been quite impossible in any conceivable sovereign Arab state, no matter how primitive.

This fact enabled leftist critics of Zionism, such as Maxime Rodinson,[6] to allege an inextricable connection between Zionism and imperialism—in order to promote a critical perspective on Israel within the Middle East conflict. Of course, "imperialism" dominated

[5]Ben Gurion's major theoretic work, *Memaamad Leam (From Class to Nation)* is the defense of precisely this principle.

[6]*Israel: A Colonial Settler State?*, New York, 1973, pp. 45–51.

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the fate of Palestine, as it did every other Middle Eastern and African country. But the Zionists operated within this political context no more comfortably than nationalist Arab leaderships and, on the whole, with far less success. Despite Weizmann's stubborn commitment to the "British connection," Arab elites were far more closely patronized by the Mandate government and the Colonial Office, and so indeed the Jewish settlers were finally driven to expel the British administration. Nor should it be forgotten that the mere promise of a Jewish National Home contained in the Balfour Declaration was promulgated during those same years that "British imperialism" actually created the three new Arab states of Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, mainly as reward for the Hashemite clan's support in World War I; and that this support was no more sincere or decisive than that given the Jewish Legion during that war. Finally, the Balfour Declaration, granting as it did a virtual veto on Jewish immigration to the Arab leadership, was more the forerunner of anti-Jewish policies—such as the White Paper—than of Jewish independence.

But Rodinson's rhetorical connection between Zionism and imperialism is not quite as irritating as are his cryptic allegations about Zionist "*colonialism*"—based on the obvious fact that Palestine was "colonized" by Jews.[7] Having dispensed with the "imperialist link," I now want to argue that *colonization is not the same as colonialism*.

Rodinson stumbles onto an important insight—he could hardly have missed it—without appreciating its significance: the Zionists came, not to dominate the inhabitants of Palestine, but to control sufficient land to facilitate the creation of an independent Jewish society, i.e., one in which Jews would be a majority. Quite deviously, Rodinson stretches the term "colonialism" to account for this phenomenon, also invoking the example of the brutal colonization of the New World. But this will not do; by stretching the term he destroys its descriptive value.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 87–89.

The Pilgrim colonists, like the Zionist pioneers, were not "colonialist." Hobson and Lenin both understood the difference between refugees and imperial adventurers—the former coming to establish a self-sufficient community, the latter to dominate and exploit an existing one for metropolitan benefit. Even if the American colonists were moral cretins about the native population, this did not make them "colons," certainly not in the sense that Rodinson is trying to establish. The Yishuv can and ought to be evaluated by the same moral criteria that made the American example so reprehensible. Since they obviously did not establish themselves as the colonialist masters of the laboring Arab majority, did the Jews expropriate, slaughter, and destroy the population they found in Palestine? But Rodinson would not find such an evaluation to be a useful weapon.

The Zionists, of course, built the Yishuv through settlement on the land and, in acquiring this land, displaced from 3,000 to 30,000 peasant fellahin (depending upon which statistics you use). No doubt, although this displacement was achieved by legal land purchase from absentee effendi landlords, it created tremendous immediate suffering for the families involved. Most of these people, however, were compensated by receiving other lands or became wage-earners in Palestine's newly energetic economy. The Peel Commission reports that all were successfully relocated within Palestine. Moreover, the Jewish National Fund purchased land at such inflated values that many Arab small-holders who might otherwise have lost their property found a new and vital source of collateral for the purchase of labor-saving (and hence land-saving) equipment.

This same point might be argued from a different angle. In 1938 the Palestine Partition Commission reported that the average-size farm of Arab tenant farmers was approximately 57 dunams, which, given their average technological standard, was dangerously small for supporting a single family. Therefore the fundamental viability of traditional agricultural

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society itself was greatly in question at the time of the Jewish National Fund's major land purchases. Why else, indeed, were the effendis so eager to sell? It might be credibly argued, in fact, that an imminent Palestinian Arab "enclosure movement," far more devastating to small Arab peasants than the Yishuv, was forestalled by these very purchases, and that those peasants who retained their land quickly benefited from superior Jewish technology.

Beyond these considerations, other points stand out. First of all, only a relatively small portion (between 25 and 30 percent) of the land that the Jews settled was acquired by purchase. Most of the land—the Huleh Valley, the Eastern Jezreel Valley, and the Bet Shean Valley—was reclaimed from swamp. The Negev was won by default. The image of a mass expulsion of Arabs from Palestine, so often promoted by modern critics of Zionism—and by hardline Israeli politicians such as Dayan who require this image to justify annexations of occupied territory—is simply a fantasy. From 1922 to 1947 the Arab population of Palestine rose about 100 percent—from 565,000 to 1,200,000; the Arab population of the area that became Israel almost quadrupled between 1918 and 1947. Most Arabs were attracted to Palestine during this period because of the vigorous commercial and industrial life developed by Jewish immigrants, and because of the lucrative Jewish market.[8] Moreover, the Arab population of Palestine enjoyed the highest birthrate in the Arab world, partly because of much higher wages, but also because of the Kupat Holim health care extended to them (while their reproduction rate remained that of a peasant society). The Zionists were neither colons nor cruel. One can only wish with Rodinson that this were really the point.

Rodinson and similar "pathfinders," like Ernest Mandel and Isaac Deutscher, have in fact understood the issue exactly backwards. The Jewish Yishuv came to be despised by the Arab leadership, and hence by the Arab masses, not because of Zionist colonialist practice, but precisely because of Zionist *anti*colonialist practice. The massive paradox of the Yishuv is surely that had the Jews attempted to penetrate Palestine as adventurer capitalists intent on the economic and political oppression of Arabs—the process for which the term colonialism was invented—they (the Jews) probably would have created little fuss. The effendis and muftis would no doubt have been eager to accommodate such Jews in the "pores" of this quasi-feudal society, so long as these new settlers would reciprocate with recognition of the political preeminence and the religious-cultural authority of existing Arab elites—and, of course, with a piece of the economic action. This was actually a familiar pattern throughout the rest of the Arab world where Jews were shown a measure of tolerance and respect. It is, on the contrary, because the Zionists did not come as profiteers to Palestine, because they rejected established exploitative relations, that traditional Arab elites felt so deeply threatened. The displacement of some Arab fellahin was less important than the fear that the traditional peasant society itself was to be displaced. It was the separatist, socialist, and hence corrosive ethos of the Yishuv in Palestine that could not be accepted.

Rodinson therefore is driven to the argument that Jewish separatism was the definitive proof of Jewish colonialism;[9] but here he is both confusing and confused. Exhorted by their influential socialist theoreticians, the builders of the Yishuv determined to avoid the creation of a new South Africa, and they did avoid it—often at great immediate sacrifice. Separatism was an instrument, not an end in itself. Beginning with the formation of the *kvutzot,* the kibbutz movement, and the Histadrut (the general federation of Jewish labor) in the 1920s, and culminating with the struggle for "Jewish Laboring" in the mid-1930s, socialist leaders—Ben Gurion, Ben-Tzvi, Katznelson—

[8]Said B. Himadeh, *The Economic Organization of Palestine,* Beirut, 1938, pp. 228–29.

[9]*Op. cit.,* p. 62.

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orchestrated with great skill and wide support the development of a comprehensive and cooperative Jewish productive base.

This plodding self-development was so genuinely impressive, that Said B. Himadeh, an economist at American University (of Beirut), related admiringly:

> Economic and social activities of the Histadrut are performed by the following main organizations: the Workers Bank, which was established in 1921 with the aid of the Zionist Organization; the *Nir* Company, granting long-term loans to agricultural settlements; *Truva* cooperative society which markets all products of all Histadrut agricultural centers; *Hamashibir Hamercazi,* consumer cooperatives for Jewish workers; the *Mercaz Hacooperatzia,* the center for transport and industrial producers cooperatives; "*Shikum*," which plans and executes workers' housing; Credit Cooperatives—loans and savings funds for workers; *Solel Boneh,* the contracting cooperative [which would become the largest construction firm in the Middle East—B.A.]; *Yakhin,* contracting for the plantation and management of citrus groves; *Kupat Holim,* health insurance; *Hasneh,* providing general insurance coverage; the employment fund for Histadrut workers; and, *Hevrat Ovsdim,* the centralizing institution of economic and social branches.
>
> The cultural and educational activities of the Histadrut are undertaken by the *Mercaz Lechinukh,* the school system; *Mercaz Letarbut,* the adult cultural organization; *Davar,* the daily newspaper; *Ohel,* the workers' theatre; and *Hapoel,* the workers' sport organization.

Almost out of breath, Himadeh then half-laments:

> Arab labor organization, as compared with Jewish, is still at an early stage of development. A number of Arab unions have been formed but few of them have been active. ... The problem of cheap native labor was attacked in part by (Jewish) attempts to organize Arab labor, but ... these attempts met with little success.[10]

What had been clear to Himadeh is fudged by Rodinson. Only after it became obvious that "fraternal cooperation" between Arab and Jewish workers could not succeed did the Zionist labor movement adopt its new tactic—*Avodah Ivrit* (Jewish Laboring). Jewish capitalists who hired from the huge pool of comparatively cheap Arab labor were picketed and closed down by Jewish workers, often despite the intervention of the British Army. No doubt the Jewish workers were motivated in part by the fear that, as in Russia's Pale of Settlement, they would be rendered superfluous by the illiterate and less demanding peasants.[11] But seen in the context of the other achievements and goals of the Zionist labor movement, including violently rebuffed attempts to organize Arab workers, "Jewish Laboring" made sense as a *revolutionary tool.* Most Arabs understandably saw "Jewish Laboring" as an exclusivist (even racist) plan to deny Arabs their livelihood. But this industrial strategy was rather a stubborn attempt to found a socialist society within the space of a traditional Arab society that did not share socialist aspirations, or, failing this, at least to spike the evolution of Jewish colonialist tendencies. Ironically, it was the very success of Jewish anticolonialism that proved to be the greatest historic impediment to peaceful Arab-Jewish relations.

When Nachman Syrkin visited an early kibbutz in 1920, he was startled to find that most members of the young settlement opposed producing an economic surplus in order to avoid the exploitation that was presumed to obtain in commerce with the neighboring Arabs. This was of course a vulgar interpretation of Marxian economics—"exploitation" occurs in production, not in exchange. But the attitude was an appropriate, if somewhat humorous, precursor of other self-imposed restraints by which the Jews sought to avoid the violation of the Arab communities in Palestine, while earning instead Arab suspicion and contempt.

[10] *Op. cit.*, pp. 290–99.

[11] See Ezra Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale,* Cambridge (England), 1970.

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The anti-Zionist reaction that developed very early and gained great momentum in the 1930s was hardly an expression of revolutionary resistance to colonial domination. Many Arabs simply did not understand the Jewish settlers; those who did, feared for their way of life. Secretary of the Higher Arab Council Jamal Husseini testified petulantly before the Royal Commission in 1937:

> As to the Communist principles and ideas of Jewish immigrants, most repugnant to the religion, customs, and ethical principles *of this country,* which are imported and disseminated, I need not dwell upon them, as these ideas are well-known to have been imported by the Jewish Community.[12]

Not surprisingly, Jamal Husseini himself was no laborer.

The point of this analysis is, however, not to provide some leftish moral sanction to Zionism and the Yishuv, but to probe to the nerves of the present conflict. The Jews, it is essential to grasp, were perceived as a foreign body, not because they came from another continent, but because they were the self-conscious catalyst of modernization in Palestine and so became the focus of reactionary resistance to it. This was far more perplexing than a conflict over land. It was a clash of two national movements, each promoting widely divergent images of human society.

The bitterness revealed in Jamal Husseini's testimony is therefore greatly revealing. For the openly condescending attitude of the labor Zionists toward cherished Arab cultural values—fundamentalist and fatalist religious precepts, accepted notions of political legitimacy and class privilege—did not help matters. The Zionists often did not appreciate that social revolution encouraged by "foreigners" can easily be misconstrued as cultural repression. Many Jewish workers came to Palestine with all the arrogance of purveyors of progress, fantasizing about their common struggle with an imaginary Arab proletariat, and even inciting Arab mob reaction by publishing articles and pamphlets heralding the Arab revolution. Achdut Haavoda and Shomer Hatzair committed themselves to socialist binationalism—the latter abandoning this principle only in 1948. Rodinson unyieldingly concludes that this condescension was a feature of Jewish colonialism, forgetting that colonialist administrations, although their members privately denigrate the "natives," thrive precisely on the preservation of primitive practices. The British, unlike the Jews, made a great show of admiration for Arab political culture. The "myopia" of Zionists was rather generated by their all-too-enthusiastic acceptance of radical dogma, sanctioning only those national projects that promise to hasten democratic and socialist vitality.

If Zionist development strategy is to be criticized for the dislocations and injury it inflicted upon the Arab population of Palestine, it ought to be also appreciated for the miseries it prevented (another Algeria?) and the political possibilities it created. Jewish and Arab nationalisms were apparently fated to clash for reasons far transcending the concrete relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. European anti-Semitism helped provoke Jewish dreams of independence in Palestine, just when Arab elites were becoming determined to kick out all Europeans.

Men do not make history just as they please; political choices are at best the decision to grapple with one set of problems and not with another. The Zionist settlers made a choice that, for all its shortcomings, has provided and still provides the two peoples of historic Palestine with genuine opportunity.

The separatist industrial strategy of the Yishuv concentrated on the construction of an independent Jewish political and economic infrastructure. The Jews determined to do their own work and avoid basing the economic viability of their Yishuv on cheap Arab labor. Were it not for this historical fact, the political autonomy of Jews and Palestinian Arabs would be impossible even in principle: How (unless one is the South African foreign minister) could one fathom the peaceful coexistence

[12]Quoted from Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism,* London, 1972, p. 246.

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of two nations, each presumably exercising sovereignty and cultural independence to the extent that the modern world permits, if the two form a single productive structure in which one nation commands property and the other does the labor? Today Arabs and Jews can still be reconciled to one another in historic Palestine precisely because the intended result of Zionist policies has been substantially achieved and class domination of one people by the other avoided.

This realistic separation, moreover, need not preclude cooperative or federative relations between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs in the future. At present Arab social and economic standards on the West Bank and in Gaza (and how much more so in the refugee camps of Lebanon) lag far behind those of Israel. The "law" of uneven development is operating: any premature integration of the two societies would guarantee "colonialist" relations. Indeed, the maintenance of separate political entities—assuming Palestinian Arabs are permitted and willing to get down to the painful task of economic development—is a precondition for whatever "binational" harmony may someday be possible.

Since 1967 the Israeli economy has, to be sure, strayed considerably from the ambitious principles of "Jewish laboring." Israel today employs regularly about 70,000 Arabs from the occuped territories in construction, industry, and agriculture; and although Arabs were originally hired through labor exchanges guaranteeing equal wages, Arab wages are in fact not keeping pace with Jewish standards. The Israeli labor establishment appears exhausted and more eager to accommodate a politically strengthened Israeli bourgeoisie than to reimpose those restrictions upon which its power and moral authority originally rested.[13]

Furthermore, the Israeli economy as a whole has become so dependent upon American government patronage and American Jewish capital that the pretensions of the early kibbutzim to self-sufficiency appear now as a cruel joke. Ten years ago, Israel produced about 80 percent of her needs. Today, after ten years of unprecedented industrial growth, only about 70 percent of domestic consumption (including military hardware) is produced in Israel. This puts the Jewish state in a class with Taiwan with regard to American economic leverage. No doubt, this has been largely responsible for the enthusiasm Israeli leaders have shown—particularly before October 1973—for the protection of other American interests in the Middle East.

Naturally these figures on employment and American economic leverage provide potent ammunition for leftish polemics against the Jewish state (and make for sleepless nights among Israeli socialists). But no matter how imperiled Israeli socialism has become—mainly owing to the fitful industrial booms and depressions, and labor "hard-hattism," resulting from periodic wars—this has little to do with the reality of the Yishuv or the ideological content of Zionism. War, not Zionism, is driving Israel step by step, expediency by expediency, to particular colonialist policies. But Jewish colonialism is still a distant nightmare and will not materialize except as the self-fulfilled prophecy of Palestinian maximalists who still resist the very concept of Jewish national life.

Palestinian terrorists seem incapable of appreciating not only the inherent morality but even the reality of Jewish economic and social independence. But their attempt to ape Algeria's FLN with revolutionary rhetoric and the more sensationalist motions of "guerrilla war" is bound to be disappointed. Israelis are not subject to the strategic weaknesses of a colonialist ruling class, and one reason is that their fathers determined not to become one. Israel will not be shaken out of Palestine like some ripe olive from a tree. For better or for worse—for Jews, better—Israel has elaborate roots of its own. Palestinian "guerrillas" reveal a macabre moral inadequacy when they

[13]See my "Israel: The Threat from the Right," the *New York Review*, May 16, 1973.

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attack school children, but they reveal perhaps more sharply the insincerity of their revolutionary claims. The victims of Maalot—Jewish and Arab—were clearly not constituents of some exploitative apparatus. Their crime was that they were Israelis, not that they were colons. But in a persistent flood of sophistry such distinctions blur. Children, if they are Jewish, may be killed in the name of democracy; and the oil blackmail of the sheiks, when directed against America and Europe (as a result of which millions of Asians are starving), may be hailed as third-world anti-imperialism!

There is, of course, no denying that the strategy of the Yishuv's leadership and (to a greater degree) the subsequent scourge of war have exacted a heavy toll from Palestinian Arabs. The refugee camps are a human tragedy and a political powder keg. Continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza demeans Palestinian national potential. But instead of ascribing to the Yishuv a character it never possessed—indeed set out not to possess—Arab leaders must come to grips with its concrete reality. Some form of repartition of historic Palestine—acceptable to Palestinian national aspirations and Israeli security considerations—must now be placed on the agenda in Geneva or elsewhere. And it is a fitting vindication of the obstinate, indispensable foresight of socialist Zionists that arguments in favor of political partition can still be put to work. □

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Donald S. Zagoria

China by Daylight

Ever since the West first came into contact with China 250 years ago, the Western image of China has been remarkably volatile. Based on an ignorance rooted in great differences in language, culture, ideology, stages of development, and geographical location—and reenforced by a Puritan heritage that requires us to make devils of our enemies and saints of our allies—this volatility has led us through various phases. Harold Isaacs characterizes them as the ages of Respect, Contempt, Benevolence, Admiration, Disenchantment, and Hostility.[1] Now, it would seem, with the opening to China during the Nixon administration, we have entered a new phase, that of Romanticism.

Various groups and influences promote this new romanticism. Many people who are alienated from contemporary American society project their dissatisfaction onto China. They see in China virtues that America once had but lost, such virtues as self-discipline and self-sacrifice. Some intellectuals, particularly those associated with the New Left, find in China the "pure" revolution that was supposedly betrayed in Russia, a revolution that, in the words of one of them will go "beyond Hobbes, Weber, and Marx." Still other intellectuals, disappointed with the performance of many Third World countries, see in China a solution to the problems of modernization. The Sinologists, restored to respectability, extol the "exceptional" and superior qualities of Chinese civilization and thus contribute to the aura of mystery on which the new romanticism thrives. And the mass media, with their hunger for novelty, sensation, and instant heroes, have promoted the Chinese-American rapprochement as though it were a pulp magazine story.

No wonder a whole set of new myths about China has arisen to replace the older ones. I want to examine here some of these widely accepted propositions about the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese experience in modernization, propositions that either do not stand up at all under close scrutiny or need to be qualified.

I

Authoritarian regimes of the Maoist type are the only ones that can mobilize scarce resources and bring about rapid economic development in the poor, agrarian countries of the Third World.

Contrary to many of the deterministic views that hold up the Chinese as the only or best way to modernize, the history of both 19th-century Europe and of the Third World in the 20th century strongly suggests that there are many ways to modernization and that each way has its particular costs and benefits. Alexander Gerschenkron, after thoughtfully reviewing the European experience with industrialization, points to "the great elasticity and variability in the industrialization processes," and to the creative ingenuity, originality, and flexibility of many once-backward countries in solving the *specific* problems of their industrial development.[2] His review of the European evidence concludes, in effect, that there are many ways to development and that it is difficult to make any generalizations except that they were all successful.

The same conclusion holds for any objective

[1] Harold Isaacs, *Images of Asia,* (New York: Capricorn, 1958).

[2] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Growth in Historical Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

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overview of the developing countries in the 20th century. Rapid economic development has taken place in many different places and in many different ways. Over the past 15 years, several developing countries have had growth rates exceeding 3 percent per head per year—that is, more than the two percent per head per year average rate achieved by the United States over the past 100 years and considerably higher than the averages of Britain or France. About 28 of these developing countries had growth rates exceeding 2 percent per head per year between 1955 and 1965. These 28 countries, as W. Arthur Lewis points out,[3] make an especially interesting list because of their variety. The list includes countries on every continent, of every race, religion, and creed, of the poor and the not-so-poor, of tropical and temperate climates. This list includes countries with different political and economic systems, some with conservative military dictators, some more and some less authoritarian, some with democratic institutions, some with command economies, and some with free-market systems.[4] Lewis's list of the top 28 includes:

Africa: Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Zambia.
America: Barbados, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela.
Asia: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand.

Some of the most rapid economic development in recent years has occurred in Northeast Asia. It has been made by both North and South Korea, both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, and by Japan, countries that culturally have much in common but little in terms of political or economic systems. Within the Asian subcontinent, various regions have made very rapid progress. Both the Indian and the Pakistani portions of the Punjab, for example, have been the scene of very rapid growth. Quite obviously, economic development can and does take place under extraordinarily diverse cultural, economic, and political circumstances. Most of the economists now studying this problem have come to this conclusion. One of them, in an article appropriately titled "There Are No Simple Answers," cautions that because there is no one factor responsible for rapid growth, there is a need for "more microscopic analysis" of the growth process, which would stress the distinctive problems faced by each country.[5]

Moreover, China's rate of growth, while substantial, is not remarkably high either in overall or in per capita terms when compared to the overall performance of non-Communist developing countries. Alexander Eckstein estimates that, in per capita terms, growth in China since 1952 ranged between 2 and 3 percent per year.[6] Rawski estimates a per capita growth rate of 2.9 percent per year for the period from 1952-71.[7]

According to the latest World Bank figures, this per capita growth rate for China (assuming the high figure of about 3 percent per year) is less than the *average* growth rate in Central and South America from 1960-70, which was 4.3 percent per year, and it is less than the *average* growth rate in the same period for all Asian and Middle Eastern countries excluding Japan, i.e., 4.2 percent. According to these figures, North Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, North Korea, and Taiwan all grew much faster than China. Elsewhere, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Kenya, and Sierra Leone exceeded the Chinese rate, not to speak of such oil-rich countries as Iran and Libya.

It may be objected that the comparisons made here between Chinese growth rates and the growth rates of other developing countries are

[3]W. Arthur Lewis, *The Development Process* (New York: United Nations Center for Economic and Social Information, 1970).
[4]I want to thank Prof. Stanislaw Wellisz of Columbia University for focusing my attention on the inadequacy of single-factor explanations of economic development.
[5]Robert Baldwin, *Economic Growth and Development* (New York: Wiley, 1966).
[6]Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Growth and Change in China," *China Quarterly,* April–June 1973.
[7]Thomas Rawski, "Recent Trends in the Chinese Economy", *China Quarterly,* January–March 1973.

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misleading because of China's unusually large population, which compounds problems of development. Yet a comparison between the growth rates of China and India, two countries of comparable size, is not dramatically favorable to China. Several detailed comparisons of Chinese and Indian *rates* of growth all conclude that, over the past 20 years, the two have been similar.[8] According to Subramanian Swamy, net domestic product grew 3.7 percent annually in India during 1952-70 and 2.3 percent in China, which is "barely above the rate of growth of population." There is general agreement among economists that India did better than China in agricultural growth, that China did somewhat better in industry, and that China's growth rate was much more erratic—impressive in the '50s and floundering in the '60s when growth was sacrificed to such politically motivated experiments as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

One scholar, Wilfred Malenbaum, has objected to Swamy's conclusions on the grounds that: (1) India has shown, in the 1970s, a progressive incapacity to cope with its problems; (2) India received much more foreign aid than China; (3) India remains a "soft" state while China ranks among the superpowers; (4) India's expansion was favorable to the wealthy.[9] All of these objections have some degree of validity, particularly the last, which I shall take up in a moment.

Nonetheless, it remains true that in the '50s and '60s there was not much to choose between Indian and Chinese growth rates, and that Indians did not have either to surrender their political liberties or to close off their country from foreign influences in order to promote growth.

Perhaps the most relevant comparison to test progress under the Maoist regime is one between pre-1949 and post-1949 growth rates. Such a comparison suggests that China was on its way to modernization well before 1949 and that the decisive variable may not be the nature of the Maoist regime, but the skills, ingenuity, education, and organizational capacity of the Chinese people.

In fact, agricultural performance under the Communist regime was not, at first, dramatically better than the performance in the late '20s and early '30s, before the Japanese invasion that disrupted the countryside. According to John Lossing Buck, the average harvest in 1929-33 was 182 million metric tons of grain and between 1931-37 it was 170 million metric tons.[10] During the '50s, according to all Western estimates, Chinese grain production was generally well below 180 million metric tons, except for 1957 and 1958; it did not rise consistently above 180 million tons until 1963. Between 1963 and 1971, however, there did appear to be a substantial growth average of 4 percent per year although a decline in 1972 brought the average for the period 1963-72 down to 3.1 percent per year.

The foremost student of Chinese industrialization in the 19th and early 20th century, Albert Feuerwerker, has recently written that, in industry,

> there is incomplete but convincing evidence that output of the modern industrial sector of China's economy increased at a very respectable rate throughout the period 1912-1949, notwithstanding the many obstacles to such a development. The often repeated epithet of stagnation has no merit when applied to this sector of the economy. A recent study of industrial production in China, including Manchuria, indicates that net value added in industry grew more or less continuously through 1936. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 brought that growth to a halt and occasioned a marked decline. As Japanese industrialization efforts in Manchuria gained momentum, however, output expanded again and by 1941 exceeded the 1936 level. The peak year was 1942, followed by a sharp drop in 1945–46, and a partial recovery in 1947–48.[11]

Annual rates of industrial growth in pre-

[8]Subramanian Swamy, *Economic Growth in China and India, 1952–70: A Comparative Appraisal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); Eckstein, *op cit.*;
[9]Wilfred Malenbaum's review of Swamy's book in the *Journal of Asian Studies,* November 1974.

[10]John Lossing Buck, *Food and Agriculture in Communist China* (California: Stanford University Press, 1966).
[11]Albert Feuerwerker, "Industrial Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China: The Chee Hsin Cement Co.," in

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Communist China *averaged* 13.8 percent between 1912 and 1920 and 9.3 percent between 1931 and 1936. Much of this industrial growth was in light industry, particularly in textiles, which developed rapidly in coastal areas under foreign domination; these areas and the products of these light industries have remained the basis of much of China's industrial product since 1949.

These remarks are not meant to deny or minimize the economic development that has taken place in China during the past 25 years. My point is simply that the gap between pre-1949 and post-1949 economic performance is not as great as is often contended. Moreover, much of Chinese development may have less to do with the specific nature of the Maoist regime and more to do with the Chinese people. It is evident that Chinese, wherever they are and regardless of the regimes under which they live—whether in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaya, Singapore, Taiwan, and throughout Southeast Asia— tend to be harder working, thriftier, more entrepreneurial, and have a greater gift for organization than their non-Chinese counterparts. It is equally evident that other peoples of Northeast Asia who share many of the common elements of Confucian, Sinic civilization have on the whole achieved more rapid economic development than the peoples of South, Southeast, and Western Asia who are influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. Cultural factors, while not decisive in determining economic development, are clearly important.

Finally, those who stress the nature of the Maoist political system as a panacea for development overlook the fact that regimes of this type have built-in costs and weaknesses that impede development. Collectivization of agriculture has been a weak spot in all Communist systems. In Poland, peasant productivity increased dramatically after the decollectivization of the agricultural sector. In China, rates of growth in agriculture have been much slower than rates of growth in industry, partly, I believe, because of collectivization. Communist systems are also notoriously ineffectual in encouraging individuals to take risks and initiatives. The cost of failure in such a system is often too high. The continual purging and repurging of the Chinese cadres and the enormous pressures they face from above and below are not likely to encourage audacity. Why risk an initiative that may one day turn out to be "revisionist"?

Moreover, highly centralized economic systems involve the built-in risk that mistakes are magnified and difficult to correct. There is little doubt that the Chinese economy was thrown into a major depression in the early 1960s as a result of the Great Leap Forward. The mistakes of the Leap revealed yet another problem in Communist systems—the difficulty of obtaining accurate information from below. During that experiment, many cadres simply falsified statistics and other data to create the impression that things were going as well as the leaders wanted them to go. Finally, the frequent ideologically motivated campaigns that are an inseparable part of the Maoist-type system have caused Chinese growth to be extremely erratic. The recent "anti-Confucian" and "anti-Liu Piao" campaign, like the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution, has led to a decline in economic performance. So the Maoist system does entail costs, and these costs may have been substantial for China.

II

The fruits of Chinese economic development have been more equitably distributed in China than in other developing countries.

There are greater inequities in China than are generally imagined. In the countryside, there are inequities between rural communes close to cities and communes in more remote areas of the country, between rich and poor brigades, between different work teams in the same commune—depending on such factors as soil fertility, water availability, climate, distance to markets, size of family, and other factors. There are also considerable variations of rural income between and within provinces. One sample survey in 1965 found that average

Albert Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy, and Mary C. Wright, *Approaches to Modern Chinese History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 305.

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income per peasant in the richest commune studied was 3.4 times that of a peasant in the poorest one. Another study showed per capita peasant income in Kiangsu Province to be 74 percent higher than a comparable figure for Szechuan. Still another survey reported that the most affluent locality in Kiangsu Province had an average income 83 percent higher than the lowest.[12]

There are also substantial differences between urban and rural incomes. Although evidence on these facts is scarce, one survey found that in one province the *lowest grade* of construction worker was receiving a wage 46 percent higher than the average of males in the *richest* rural cooperative of the same province. Moreover, it seems likely that the urban/rural differential moved even further in favor of the cities during the 1950s, although this trend may have been reversed somewhat in the '60s and '70s.[13] The considerable resistance among urban workers, intellectuals, and youth to be "sent down" to the countryside—resistance that became particularly strong during the Cultural Revolution—is evidence of the continuing gap.

Unequal farm incomes and gaps between urban and rural incomes, as Lloyd Reynolds has pointed out, are both products of underdevelopment.[14] Both gaps are wider in the less developed than in the more developed countries, and can be closed only gradually, as a by-product of development. Income gaps between and within provinces are also a product of the Chinese principle of regional self-reliance, which necessarily favors those provinces and localities with better natural endowments.

In Chinese industry, jobs are classified into eight labor grades and the ratio of the highest to the lowest wage is about three to one, from about 40 yuan a month at the bottom to 110 yuan at the top. Engineers can earn as much as 150 yuan. University teachers earn about 70 to 350 yuan, although few are at the top rung. Top government officials can earn as much as 450 yuan.

There are considerable inequities between regularly employed factory workers and temporary workers who, according to data published during the Cultural Revolution, increased from 2.4 million in 1957 to 12 million in 1958, a figure equal to 26.5 percent of all workers and staff. The temporary workers are paid lower basic wages than permanent staff and do not receive the fringe benefits of enterprise welfare facilities, canteen access, etc. They also lack job security. The practice of employing temporary workers began in 1964 and was evidently designed to lower the cost of the state wage bill. During the Cultural Revolution, temporary workers organized themselves into groups and put forth various demands for amelioration of their status, demanding, above all, job security.[15]

It is nevertheless true that the Chinese have cut off the extremes of income distribution. There is no class of the very rich, nor is anyone allowed to fall below a certain minimal standard of living. As a result, there is no grinding, mass poverty, hunger, and destitution; this undoubtedly is one of the notable achievements of the Communist regime.

A second achievement is what I would call Ruralism. By ruralism I mean the opposite of what P. P. Streeten has called "Urbanism"[16]—the major weakness of development programs generally. In most development countries, planners put barely 20 percent of investment into farming—despite the fact that in most poor countries 70 percent or more of the people live on the land. In such countries, too, new employment opportunities favor industry, which is usually located in urban areas; food supply is usually geared to urban needs; educational, health, and other public services are skewed in favor of the urban sector. Under urbanism, agriculture is the chief source of savings for industrial investment and is geared to production for the market rather than for

[12]Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972* (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1973), p. 114.
[13]*Ibid,* p. 51
[14]Lloyd G. Reynolds, "China's Economy: A View from the Grass Roots," *Challenge,* March–April 1974.
[15]*Current Scene,* March 15, 1968.
[16]"Back to Grass Roots," *Times Literary Supplement,* December 19, 1968.

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subsistence, with the result that resources are inevitably diverted from small to big farmers, and so inequities are fostered.

Some Communist countries, notably Russia, have followed this approach. Stalin completely neglected and almost destroyed Russian agriculture in his single-minded quest for urban-oriented heavy industry. As a result, the standard of living of the Russian peasantry declined drastically and ever since has been lagging far behind the urban sector.

By sharp contrast, Mao has pursued a more balanced development program, favorable both to light industry and to agriculture. Inspired by a populistic version of Marxism that is more populist than Marxist, the Chinese Communists came to power by organizing and manipulating the legitimate grievances of the rural poor. They have continued to promote rural interests. As a result, the standard of living for the average small peasant in China has risen, even though the life of the Chinese city-dweller remains considerably superior to that of the peasant.

Yet there is no necessary relationship between Maoism and equitable development. As Irma Adelman has argued,[17] Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Israel all have grown rapidly and distributed the fruits of growth more or less equitably. To be sure, this is a very small and exceptional group of states, and it is not clear how far we can generalize from their experience. Still, the "Adelman model" for equitable growth, which stresses the importance of land redistribution and mass education, is not a recipe that only Communist dictatorships can use. Reasonably successful land reforms have taken place in Bolivia, Venezuela, Mexico, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Guatemala, and South Vietnam. The current land reform program in the Philippines, although deficient in some crucial respects, is also an important step in the direction of giving the peasantry social and economic justice.

But the most significant inequities in China today stem not from the economic but from the political facts of life. Like the Soviet Union before it, China has become, in the words of Barrington Moore, Jr., "a system of organized social inequality" in which the greatest gap is between the new bureaucratic ruling class and the masses. Several Western studies and the Chinese press itself reveal that by the '60s, "the relative egalitarianism of earlier years had been replaced by a system in which rating [of cadres] indicated very great differentials in power, prestige, salaries, and other prerogatives—and also involved great psychological distance between those at the top and those at the bottom."[18] Throughout the late '50s and early '60s, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders warned against cadres who no longer shared their lot with the masses, ate too much, received high rations, refused to take part in physical labor, assumed an attitude of superiority toward the masses, misused public funds, and sent their children to special elite schools that would qualify them for good jobs in the bureaucracy.[19] According to Red Guard publications, T'ao Chu, a former associate of Lin Piao, maintained luxurious guest houses at the expense of the state treasury, had a floating club, and was on the point of building a crystal palace when the Cultural Revolution began. And T'eng Hsiao-p'ing, one of Mao's closest associates now restored to power, was accused of building a club provided with every comfort for higher cadres in Peking.

Although this new pattern of bureaucratic stratification has been consistently attacked by the Maoists, it is fostered by the Chinese historical tradition of bureaucratic government.[20] And the Maoist diatribes against the scourges of bureaucracy—corruption, "feudal" mentality, opportunism, slavery to routine, pedantry, formalism—make it plain that this tradition is still very much alive.

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[17]Irma Adelman, "Strategies for Equitable Growth," *Challenge*, May–June, 1974.

[18]A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

[19]D. M. Ray, "China's New Patterns of Social Stratification," *Australian Journal of Politics*, December 1970.

[20]Etienne Balasz, *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

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In sum, the Chinese Communists have achieved a more equitable income distribution than most developing countries, and they have avoided some of the pitfalls of an urban-oriented strategy. But there is no reason to assume a necessary relationship between Communist-type regimes and equitable, balanced growth. Moreover, there are many sources of inequity in Communist China, some the inevitable product of underdevelopment and others a product of the political system itself.

III

The Maoist system involves a great deal of mass participation by ordinary workers and peasants, and Maoist values have gained widespread acceptance among the Chinese people.

Effective popular participation can be defined in many ways: participation in the making of decisions; protecting private interests and ensuring good government; the ability to organize for the protection of group interests; increasing the value of the freedom of the individual, etc. No matter how political participation in China may be defined, there are in fact many severe constraints. First of all, there is no historical tradition in China for legitimizing individualism, diversity, or dissent. The Communists had to go back to 300 B.C. to find a precedent in Chinese history for "letting 100 flowers bloom." One of the most crucial constraints is—as James R. Townsend has pointed out[21]—that the only political issues capable of rallying mass participation are those the Party itself first introduces and defines. The classic proof of this statement indeed was the Hundred Flowers episode in which some individuals tried to initiate debate on unauthorized issues, with an eventual result of either absolute rejection of the issues or continued debate on the narrow grounds defined by the Party.

But it was not only the crackdown on intellectuals during the Hundred Flowers campaign that revealed the limits of mass participation in China. In that relatively open period, workers as well as intellectuals were encouraged to express grievances and they began in 1957 to demand a variety of concessions, including the right to strike and to revive the long defunct Labor Bureau machinery for mediating conflicts with management. This led, in fact, to much stricter labor discipline and to the condemnation of these demands as "rightist deviations."[22] Trade unions, youth organizations, and many other groups were abolished during the Cultural Revolution, temporarily or permanently, because they articulated interests and grievances not in keeping with Party policy.

Indeed, the long-term trend of Chinese Communist politics, as Townsend says, has been the "emasculation of the state structure in general and representative bodies in particular. . . ."[23] Representative bodies of all kinds have been declining in effectiveness since 1956 because of:

- tighter Party leadership, which lapsed briefly during the Cultural Revolution but is now being reasserted;
- the Maoist philosophy demanding that constant and direct mobilization of the masses should replace institutionalized political activity;
- reduced enthusiasm for the process of participation as a result of a growing gap between the cadres and the masses;
- the lack of effective opportunities for ordinary people to express their views;
- the increasing signs of sterility and artificiality in popular participation.

Many of the so-called spontaneous Mass Movements in China have had the quality of "controlled spontaneity." During the Cultural Revolution, for example, pro- and anti-Establishment youth were recruited into rival Red Guard units and manipulated by different sections of the elite. Maoist-style participation has meant not popular formation and control of

[21]James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

[22]Howe, *op cit*, pp 94–95.

[23]Townsend, *op cit*.

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policy but popular execution of policy. In consequence, mass acceptance of Maoist values has been something less than total.

To get some insight into the question of how deeply Maoist values are accepted by the Chinese masses, let us examine one aspect of Chinese society that involves hundreds of millions of people, namely, the agricultural incentive system. Although the long-range effort of the Maoists has been to substitute nonmaterial for material incentives and collective for individual incentives, these efforts have had to be abandoned or drastically compromised. According to Frederick W. Crook, who has studied the agricultural incentive system in great detail, "the available evidence ... suggests that the Party leaders were unable to devise a practical system consistent with their socialist principles that was also capable of sustaining or increasing peasant motivation for production within the collectives."[24] When, after the collectivization of agriculture, villages with different levels of productivity were merged into one large collective farm that distributed income on a unified basis, members of the more productive villages soon realized they were subsidizing their neighbors at a disadvantage to themselves. To overcome their objections, the Party increasingly had to rely on incentives that would reward smaller groups. Thus local cadres increasingly began to sanction a system whereby the group to be rewarded was the smallest possible one, namely the individual peasant household.

Contracts were drawn up between the commune and individual peasant households according to which each family was allotted a fixed area of land to cultivate—often the same land it farmed before collectivization—and a given quantity of crop to be raised. Once the contract had been made, the individual family, not the cadres, had the responsibility to see that the contracted crop was planted, cultivated, and harvested. Overfulfillment of the contract gave the family additional cash income or a percentage of the surplus crop. In effect, this system, the so-called production contract to the household, was an abandonment of collectivization and a revival of the traditional landlord-tenant relationship in which the commune now assumed the traditional role of landlord. Such a reward system was about as far removed from Maoist egalitarian principles as one could imagine. Yet it persisted, often covertly, because it worked more effectively than other incentives.

There are many other areas of Chinese life in which the gap between Maoist values and actual practices are considerable. As Ezra Vogel has written in his classic study *Canton Under Communism*,[25] the early 1960s in China witnessed a growing divorce between faith and practice. In the early years of Communist rule, many people did act on the basis of their belief in the public good and the Chinese future. But by the early 1960s the romantic bond between the Party and the peasantry had been snapped; local cadres were less prepared to sacrifice for the future and more inclined to think of their own private lives; Party bureaucrats were saying what they were expected to say but going about their business in their own ways; concessions to "capitalism" in the countryside were weakening loyalty to the collective; concessions to quality in offices, schools, and factories were undercutting the class line and benefiting the children of bourgeois and landlord families at the expense of children of the peasants. To combat these "vestiges of capitalism" the Maoists launched one campaign after another. Yet, as Vogel concludes, "the Cultural Revolution was launched because years later capitalism, revisionism, and individualism remained rampant."[26] The Maoist ideals had become "canonized and ritualized, removed from daily life."

IV

The Chinese development path has avoided great costs and suffering to the Chinese people.

[24]Frederick W. Crook, "Chinese Communist Agricultural Incentive Systems and the Labor Productive Contracts to Households: 1956–1965," *Asian Survey*, May 1973.

[25]Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

[26]*Ibid*, p. 320.

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No revolutions are cost-free. Perhaps the greatest victims of the Chinese Revolution have been the intellectuals, particularly those trained in the West and unable to rid themselves of this Original Sin. The repression of intellectuals in China today has been so thoroughgoing that the Communist dictators in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as Generals Marcos, Thieu, and Park must surely be envious. In my various travels throughout the world, I have never encountered an intellectual class so intimidated and so fearful of engaging in discourse as that in China.

Nor is it hard to find the reason for their intimidation. In the brief liberalization during the Hundred Flowers campaign, there took place in China what no less an authority than Liu Shao-ch'i described as a "revolt of the scholars," involving students, professors, and later spreading to some sections of the working class. Some student leaders were executed; between 300,000 and 400,000 "rightists" were seized, one-third of them primary school teachers. To quell the revolt, 1,000 party officials were transferred to work in the universities, 200 of them being assigned to such senior posts as president or vice-president. The "rightists" were accused of "endorsing democracy" but being opposed to both centralism and control over culture and education. Students went on strike because of dissatisfaction over job prospects. Mao subsequently admitted to the Supreme State Conference that his "contradictions" speech could not be published because his colleagues feared it would spark even more serious student riots and strikes by factory workers.[27] Thus, contrary to much of the Maoist rhetoric that encourages initiative, boldness, and spontaneity, all genuine efforts to think independently about the Party have been quickly suppressed.

Workers, too, have been unable to express their grievances. The trade unions, abolished during the Cultural Revolution because they were becoming pressure groups for higher wages and better conditions of life, have since been reestablished under tighter Party control.

Another group with acute grievances is that of the tens of millions of "educated youth" in China who enter the labor force each year unable to find suitable employment and often are unable to find employment at all. According to some estimates, it is customary in Canton for junior and senior middle school graduates to remain unemployed for periods ranging from three to five years. Of the middle school graduates who do not go on to the university, only a handful can find jobs. Another report indicates that in Shanghai alone, 400,000 persons were unemployed in mid-1967, probably most of them youth.[28] While many young people remain unemployed in the cities, millions of others are being sent to the countryside for permanent relocation. According to one estimate, 8 million young Chinese have left the cities for the countryside since 1968; another estimate puts the figure at 15 million.[29] Regardless of which figure is correct, the Chinese have been undertaking the largest forced transfer of population any government has tried to organize since Stalin's mass deportations.

It seems quite clear that the removal of these so-called Educated Youths to the countryside is causing great strains in the society. During the Cultural Revolution, young people flocked back to the cities and organized into Red Guard units that demanded they be allowed to remain in the cities, and many were hidden by relatives.

Finally, there are the inmates of corrective labor camps, which are of two kinds: labor reform camps for more serious offenses and labor reeducation camps for less serious offenses. Although no confident estimates can be made of the number of such labor camps, of the total number of inmates confined in them, or of the economic importance of the labor performed within them, one former inmate, who for seven years was a prisoner in many such camps, has estimated their population to

[27]Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 314.
[28]*Current Scene,* March 15, 1968.
[29]Joseph Lelyveld, "The Great Leap Farmward," *New York Times Magazine,* July 28, 1974.

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be "colossal," in the "millions upon millions."[30]

Because the Chinese Communists have, unlike Stalin, sought to "reeducate" deviants both within and outside labor camps rather than to kill them, many outside observers have come to the conclusion that the Maoist system is much more humane. Yet C. S. Lewis reminds us that "of all tyrannies a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." Lewis goes on:

> It may be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience. ... To be "cured" against one's will and cured of states which we may not regard as a disease is to be put on a level with those who have not reached the age of reason. ... You start being "kind" to people before you have considered their rights, and then force upon them supposed kindnesses which they in fact had a right to refuse, and finally kindnesses which no one but you will recognize as kindnesses and which the recipient will feel as abominable cruelties.[31]

V

Can (or should) much of the Chinese experience in development be replicated by other developing countries?

Perhaps the most important reason why China is a questionable model for other developing nations is that so much of the Chinese development experience is explicable only in terms of China's own revolutionary past. Revolutions are rare, and revolutions of the Chinese type even rarer. They are the result of a certain set of conditions that are not generally found in developing countries, no matter how impoverished or exploited the peasantry. The austere values of the first-generation leaders of that revolution—asceticism, collectivism, leveling egalitarianism, and puritanism, a package that has been aptly called "pauperistic Communism"—developed in the course of that revolutionary struggle. Even in contemporary China, it is questionable whether the commitment on the part of the elite to those austere values will survive Mao.

There are strong pressures within some parts of the Chinese elite for a kind of Bukharinism or market socialism. This would mean the retention and perhaps extension of free markets in rural areas, the consolidation and perhaps even the extension of private plots, the more widespread use of the household as the main accounting unit in the communes, and perhaps even the legitimization of the "labor contract to the household" system. These and other devices have been called for by the Chinese "Bukharinites" as a way of increasing low productivity in agriculture.

In industry, the moderates stand for shifting from output to profit targets within the enterprise, changing the focus of power in factories from Party committees to control by managers and technocrats, and changing from nonmaterial to financial incentives. They stand, in short, for orderly central planning, a larger degree of freedom for enterprises, and a quasi-market system in agriculture and wholesaling.[32]

It seems likely that the moderates are arguing—as Marx did—that "socialism" cannot be based on scarcity and that, unless there is a dramatic increase in production, the entire enterprise in China will fail. People will not sacrifice themselves indefinitely to a utopian collective good without some tangible and growing increases in their own living standards. Since the modest increase in such living standards that could be had by leveling down has already been achieved, any further increases can only come as a result of a major breakthrough in production. Such a breakthrough must be achieved, even at the risk of some "bourgeois revival." The Maoists, of course, disagree with most of this prescription. Their emphasis is on continued revolution

[30]Bao Ruo-Wang (Jean Pasqualini) and Rudolph Chelminski, *Prisoner of Mao* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973).

[31]Quoted in Edward M. Opton, Jr., "When Therapy is Punishment," *Matchbox*, published by Amnesty International, Fall 1974, p. 7.

[32]E. L. Wheelwright and Bruce McFarlane, *The Chinese Road to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

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even at the risk of lower rates of growth. My own guess is, however, that without Mao, the Maoists will quickly be routed in any succession struggle. But such matters are obviously impossible to predict.

Whatever China has accomplished in the recent past and is likely to accomplish in the foreseeable future, its gains and the price paid for those gains result out of the dynamics of a revolution. Perhaps in some trivial sense, such as techniques of rice transplantation, China's experience can be utilized by other countries. At that level, some of the experience of all countries that are developing rapidly may be relevant to the others. But so far as crucial questions are concerned, such questions as the values of the Chinese elite, the basis of its legitimacy, its initial cohesion, its initial bond with the Chinese peasantry, and the distinctive institutions that have developed in China—all this cannot be understood without reference to the particular facts of the revolution.

Yet most developing countries now are not led by revolutionaries and will not be so led in the foreseeable future. These countries are more commonly led by army officers, reformists, organization men, or other types of leaders whose values and social bases will not permit them to move in the direction of leveling egalitarianism and austerity. Such elites are often not sufficiently picturesque or charismatic to capture the imagination of certain American intellectuals or the American mass media. But at least some of these leaders have taken steps—or can be expected to take steps—to initiate some modest, incremental reforms of the gross inequities in their countries and to achieve slow but steady growth that may improve the lot of the masses.

Nor is China's revolutionary heritage the only facet of the Chinese experience that may not be exportable to other developing countries. Among some observers there is the misleading tendency to believe that the problems of all underdeveloped countries are the same. In fact, China's problems are quite unusual. China's basic problem is that it has an enormous population pressing on a limited amount of arable land. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not a common problem. There are only eight countries in the world with more than 1,000 people per square mile of cropland. This list includes China and some other countries, largely in the Far East. In most African, Latin-American, and Middle Eastern countries, pressures on the land are much lighter. In China, these enormous pressures on the land have probably been responsible historically for the development both of certain values and of institutions, particularly the extraordinary amount of social discipline and gift for organization that has frequently been remarked upon by foreigners. The intensification of these pressures in recent years has undoubtedly forced the Chinese Communists into experimentation with new techniques of rural organization such as the communes, techniques designed to maximize organizational resources for further intensification of agriculture. But in underdeveloped countries where pressures on the land are (or were) much lighter—as in many Latin-American countries where more than 50 percent of the people live in urban areas—the Chinese experience with intensification of agriculture, and the organizational concomitants of that, would seem to be irrelevant.

Similarly, some of the ideas of Mao about revolution and modernization may prove to be more limited in their application than many contend. The emphasis on equitable, balanced development giving high priority to the countryside is a Maoist idea that *is* relevant to other developing countries, as I have suggested. However, many other of Mao's ideas may be shallow or inaccurate. For example, what Benjamin Schwartz calls Mao's Baconian-pragmatic view of science—learning by doing and by observing "concrete facts"— is a simplistic interpretation of what modern science is all about.

"Truth" may in fact be discovered in libraries or in laboratories. It is, of course, possible, as Mao contends, that intellectuals may lose their connection with "life" and degenerate into scholasticism; but there is the equal danger, as Schwartz says, that "practical" revolutionary politicians may also lose their

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connection with reality.[33] Indeed, much of the widespread admiration for Mao's latter-day version of Rousseau's notion of the "general will" obscures the problem of how it is that the supreme leader comes always to recognize and reflect the general will in a society that does not allow anyone to criticize him freely. In any case, it would seem that the best way to guarantee against intellectual scholasticism is not by forcing all intellectuals to adhere to a rigid mold of so-called practicality, but to foster a climate in which there is a genuinely free interplay of ideas, including ideas different from those of the leader.

Along the same line, if Mao fears that a "new class" is emerging in China that may deprive the country of the fruits of revolution, the answer to this may be not an increase in ideological remolding, attacks on "bureaucracy," and all the rest of Mao's ideology, which rests on the notion of a preestablished harmony between leaders and followers, but rather in the creation of political machinery to check the bureaucracy and make it more accountable. For example, the Praxis group in Yugoslavia recommends an institutionalization of opposition tendencies or groups within the ruling Communist party. In this way, different groups within the single Party could compete against each other and prevent bureaucratic domination by any one group. Within the Italian Communist party, factions have been institutionalized to the extent where competing groups are allowed to provide alternative programs to the Party membership for their approval or disapproval. There are, in short, many ways, even within the severe confines of a one-party system, to prevent bureaucratic degeneration and to keep the Party leaders in touch with "life itself." But to proceed along such a course implies a realization that not only the "bureaucratic" leaders of the Party but the leader himself may occasionally be fallible and out of touch with reality. This is a fact that does not yet seem to have dawned on Chairman Mao.

[33]Benjamin Schwartz, "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung," *New York Review of Books*, February 8, 1973.

Also, there are some things the Chinese do that other developing countries either cannot or will not do because of the costs involved. China can try to solve its problem of the educated unemployed, for example, by dispatching some 8–15 million youths to the countryside where they are expected to remain for the rest of their lives. India cannot replicate such a "model" even if its leaders were so inclined, nor are many of us likely to believe that it should.

The extraordinary Chinese Communist penetration of society through thought control, small study groups, rectification campaigns, and neighborhood associations that institutionalize the practice of poking into one's neighbor's business are techniques that ensure a high degree of compliance with the state's programs—but they are not policies that most other developing countries can or want to emulate. I gather from talks I have had with intellectuals and members of the elite in other developing countries that, while they respect Chinese Communism for the new discipline it has introduced in China, they are very reluctant to emulate it. Indeed, this seems to be characteristic of many of the most enthusiastic promoters of the Chinese Revolution in the West. And such intellectuals as the Chinese novelist Han Suyin preach the virtues of the Chinese Revolution for the Chinese living in China, but *they* choose to live abroad.

In attempting to debunk some of the romantic myths prevalent about China today I take no especial pleasure. I do not presume to pass judgment on the totality of the Chinese Revolution itself, and I do not intend to deny many of the impressive achievements of that revolution. Different judgments about the Chinese Revolution are possible even when all the myths have been dispelled. All that I have sought to demonstrate here is that the Chinese path to modernization is not a panacea, that it involves a variety of costs, human and economic, and that it cannot be replicated. It also seems necessary to insist that one can praise some of the specific achievements of the Chinese Revolution without praising the system to which that revolution has given birth.

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Finally, there is an even deeper and more perplexing matter. Undoubtedly different judgments about the Chinese Revolution are determined to some extent by different estimates of the likely future of that revolution, which is not yet over. The romantics think it likely that China will succeed in establishing a socialist society that is decentralized, debureaucratized, and egalitarian. Such a view seems to me extraordinarily optimistic. Another benign possibility is that the new social classes emerging from the process of industrialization itself—specialists, managers, technocrats, in a word, the new Chinese middle class—will create pressures for a more liberal variety of communism. But such groups have not been able to play much of a liberalizing role even in Communist states with more Western traditions such as Russia.

It is also possible that certain groups within the ruling party itself—groups I have identified as having "Bukharinite" tendencies—will win out in the succession struggle following Mao's death, introduce economic reforms of the Hungarian or Yugoslav variety, and develop a more liberal brand of communism. But it seems to me equally likely that after Mao's death there will be a wholesale purge of the radical populists and an increase in the repressive apparatus of the state. It is even possible to imagine the emergence of a Chinese "Stalinism." There are several reasons for such pessimism.

After Mao's death, the "new class" in China—the Party apparat and the military commanders who even now play an increasingly large role—is likely to prefer "law and order" to the kind of frenetic, ideologically inspired upheavals characteristic of the Maoist era. To preserve order, and to legitimize its own special privileges, it will be able to draw on what the distinguished Sinologist Etienne Balasz has called the most "deep-seated and alarming tendencies" in the 2,000-year-old Chinese imperial tradition, tendencies that he describes as "totalitarian, state-centered and bureaucratic." The imperial state was "totalitarian" in the sense that the state had complete control over all activities of social life, that there was a secret police atmosphere of mutual suspicion, that in the eyes of the authorities every accused person was assumed to be guilty, that terror was instilled by the principle of collective responsibility, and that reasons of state always took priority over the rights of the individual, the inevitable corollary being that an official in his capacity as representative of the state was sacrosanct. All of these tendencies were reenforced by a Confucian ideology preaching virtues perfectly suited to the hierarchical state: respect, humility, docility, obedience, submission, and subordination to authority. To any attentive reader of the Chinese press during the past two decades, and to any perceptive visitor to the mainland, it is obvious that such tendencies are still deeply rooted.

Viewed in this historical perspective, the significance of the populistic, participatory, and egalitarian ethic preached by Mao lies in its efforts to combat both the "new class" and the deep-rooted totalitarian characteristics of Chinese society.

But while it may yet be premature to make a final judgment as to the success of this Maoist enterprise, I am inclined to believe it has failed. It has failed because Mao overemphasized the possiblity of changing social values through education and propaganda and underemphasized the need to combat authoritarian tendencies by developing institutions that could check the abuse of power and privilege. Thus, just as Lenin paved the way for Stalin without having intended to do so, so Mao may have set the stage for a Chinese Stalin.

Given the horrendous difficulties yet to be faced in the process of industrialization, the "totalitarian" traditions of the imperial state, the increasingly large role of a conservative military, and the absence of an individualistic, religious, or legal tradition legitimizing dissent from the state, the prospects for a Chinese Stalinism are unfortunately all too good. Such an evolution could produce rapid economic development but it could also lead to a society that resembles Marx's "Oriental Despotism" more than the Paris Commune. At such a point, those who now romanticize China will find that their God too has failed. □

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Octavio Paz

Thinking Back to the Student Revolt

The following essay forms the bulk of the Introduction Octavio Paz, the distinguished Mexican poet and essayist, has written for Elena Poniatowska's Massacre in Mexico, *a book to be published this spring by Richard Seaver/Viking, copyright© 1975 by the Viking Press, Inc.* — ED.

The record of the Mexican Student Movement of 1968 tells a story of buoyant collective fervor that soon takes on darker overtones; the wave of hope and generous idealism generated by these youngsters breaks against the wall of sheer power, and the government unleashes its murderous forces of violence: the story ends in a bloodbath. The students were seeking a public dialogue with those in power, and these powers responded with the sort of violence that silences every last voice raised in protest. Why? What were the reasons behind this massacre? Mexicans have been asking themselves this question since October 1968. Only when it is answered will the country recover its confidence in its leaders and in its institutions. And only then will it recover its self-confidence.

As with all historical events, the story of what took place in 1968 in Mexico is a tangled web of ambiguous facts and enigmatic meanings. These events really happened, but their reality does not have the same texture as everyday reality. Nor does it have the fantastic self-consistency of an imaginary reality such as we find in works of fiction. What these events represent is the contradictory reality of history—the most puzzling and the most elusive reality of all. The attitude of the student leaders and that of the government, for instance—to cite just two examples. From the very beginning the students demonstrated a remarkable talent for political action. Their immediate discovery of direct democracy as a method of bringing new life to the movement while at the same time keeping it in close touch with its primordial source, the Mexican people as a whole; their insistence on holding a public dialogue with the government, in a country accustomed to wheeling and dealing between various power figures behind the scenes and secret string-pulling by corrupt, conniving leaders in high government circles; the modest and moderate nature of the students' demands, which might be summed up in the word *democratization,* a heartfelt aspiration of the Mexican people ever since 1910—all of this was evidence both of the students' maturity and of their instinctive political wisdom. But while these virtues and talents were quite obvious on the tactical level, they seem to evaporate from the moment that we hear the students begin to ponder the perspectives that lie ahead for the movement, its goals, and its import within the twofold context of the history of Mexico and the current world situation. In place of tactical and strategic realism, what we find at this juncture are

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empty formulas, rigid programs, dogmatic oversimplifications, vacuous high-flown phrases and slogans.

Almost all these young people thought that they were participating in a movement that in reality was quite different from the one that they were actually participating in. It was as though the Mexico of 1968 were a metaphor of the Paris Commune or the attack on the Winter Palace: Mexico was Mexico, and yet also another time and another place—another reality. The theatrical drama that they were writing in the pages of history was not the same one that they were reading. Their acts were real; their interpretations were imaginary. A number of them were persuaded that there was a direct connection between the railway workers' movement in 1958 and their own movement ten years later; but they thereby failed to see the difference in objectives and tactics and above all the different class structures involved in the two movements, and hence did not appreciate the entirely different significance of these two episodes. Others were quite certain that the middle-class student movement would be followed by worker and peasant movements: history as a relay race. But the Mexican working class failed to snatch up the torch held out to them: it proved as indifferent as the working classes in the countries of the West and in the United States to similar appeals and similar hopes of changing the system.

The attitude of the Mexican government was even more disconcerting—and even less forgivable. It proved to be unbelievably blind and deaf. But both its blindness and its deafness stemmed from its inability to face up to what was happening. It was not that our government officials were blind and deaf; it was simply that they refused to see or to listen. In their eyes, acknowledging the mere existence of the student movement would have been tantamount to self-betrayal. The Mexican political system is founded on a single implicit, immutable belief: the President of the Mexican Republic and the official government Party are the incarnation of the *whole* of Mexico. Accustomed as they are to delivering only monologues, intoxicated by a lofty rhetoric that envelops them like a cloud, our presidents and leaders find it well-nigh impossible to believe that aspirations and opinions that are different from their own even exist. It is they who are the past, the present, and the future of Mexico. The Institutional Revolutionary party is not a majority political party: it is Unanimity itself. The President is not only the highest political authority: he is the incarnation of all of Mexican history, Power itself in the form of a magic substance passed on from generation to generation in unbroken succession, from the first *Tlaotoni* down through the Spanish viceroys to each president as he takes office. Unlike the Hispanic and Latin-American pattern of dictatorship by *caudillos,* Mexican authoritarianism is legalistic, and the roots of this legalism are religious in nature. This is the real explanation of the terrible violence visited upon the students. The military attack on them was not only a political act; it also assumed the quasi-religious form of *chastisement from on high.* Divine vengeance. Exemplary punishment. The morality of a wrathful God the Father Almighty. This attitude has profound historical roots; its origins lie in the country's Aztec and colonial past. It can be traced back to a kind of petrification of the public image of the head of the nation, who ceases to be a mere man and becomes an idol to be worshiped. It is yet another expression of the *machismo,* and above all of the pre-eminence of the *father* in the Mexican family and in Mexican society. . . . In a word, in the Mexico of 1968, men once again made history with their eyes blindfolded.

I have always considered it necessary to look back to our colonial history in order to have even a partial understanding of the Mexico of today. By so doing, we will not, of course, find the answer to all our questions. But since the world of New Spain is the immediate antecedent of the world we live in today, our colonial past enables us to establish certain

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parallels with our present. In the case of the events of 1968, how can we help but be reminded of the so-called Disturbances of 1692? The similarities between these two chapters in our history are, as we shall see, no less significant than their differences.

The end of the 17th century was a relatively felicitous era in our country's history. While Spain was falling into a more and more profound political and social torpor that was to last for nearly two centuries, New Spain was prospering. For the most part, peace reigned throughout this immense territory, with only sporadic disturbances in the provinces and occasional uprisings by brave Indians in the far north of the country, which was still not completely under the control of the authorities in the capital. Thanks to the remarkable development of agriculture, and even more particularly of mining, a class of wealthy "creoles" (that is to say, descendents of Spaniards who had been born in Mexico) had come into being and was flourishing. An ambitious, enterprising, devoutly religious class eager to flaunt its prosperity: thanks to its generous contributions, splendid civic and religious buildings were erected, lining the streets of every city in the country. This colonial culture reached its apogee in the second half of the 17th century, and among the many remarkable talents it produced were two outstanding figures: Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, a poetess whose genius is recognized the world over, and the historian and mathematician Carlos de Singuenza y Góngora. It is not surprising that the inhabitants of New Spain should regard Mexico City as "the head and capital of the American continent," as Singuenza y Góngora himself described it, and call it, out of a sense of pride not unlike that of Bostonians a century and a half later, "the new Rome." Foreigners were equally impressed by the city, and even as late as at the dawn of the 19th century Baron Alexander von Humboldt wrote, "... no city on the New Continent, including those in the United States, possesses scientific centers as large as those in Mexico ... or as many beautiful buildings, which would not look at all out of place in the most elegant streets of Paris, Berlin, or Saint Petersburg." Creole society saw its own splendor and solidity reflected in its churches and palaces: gold altars and gilded salons, heavy cement foundations, and walls of stone. This society nonetheless turned out to be more fragile than the monuments it erected.

In 1692 a shortage of corn caused an uprising among the common people—Indians, mestizos, and even impoverished creoles—and for the first time in its colonial history Mexico City was the scene of serious disturbances as the poorer classes rioted in the streets. This act of bold defiance took the government by surprise, for it was not accustomed to seeing its authority challenged. The people raided the storehouses, poured into the main square of the city, burned the official archives, and threatened to set fire to the very seat of Spanish colonial power, the Viceroy's palace. The rioting had turned into something more than a protest against the scarcity of corn and taken on subversive political overtones. Once the authorities had recovered from their initial shock, they unleashed pitiless forces of repression that cast a dark shadow over the waning years of the 17th century in Mexico. The golden dream of the Viceroyalty ended in a sudden blaze of fire; in its glaring light colonial society discovered its other half, its hidden face: an Indian, mestizo face, an angry, blood-spattered face. Heretofore, civil disturbances had been limited to local rebellions in the provinces, and the uprisings in the north were seditious acts by tribes not yet subjugated, not yet evangelized and converted to Christianity. The riots in Mexico City, however, revealed a rift that ran through the very heart of Mexican society. The testimony of Singuenza y Góngora, who witnessed these disturbances, is as impressive as Elena Poniatowska's!

> Hordes of men came rushing down that street where I was standing (and down all the others that led into the public squares). The Spaniards had unsheathed their swords, but they stopped in their tracks for the same reason that kept me standing there as though rooted to the spot: because the blacks, the mulattos, and all the raggle-taggle plebes were shouting: "Death to the Viceroy and all his henchmen!" And the

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Indians: "Death to the Spaniards who are eating up our corn!" And exhorting each other to bravely enter the fray, since there was no Cortez on the scene this time to conquer them, they stormed into the plaza to join the others and throw rocks. "Hey, you sisters!" the Indian women shouted to each other in their own tongue, "let's join in this battle with happy hearts, and God willing, we'll be rid of the Spaniards, so it doesn't matter at all if we die without making a last confession. This is our country, isn't it? So what are these Spaniards doing here anyway?"

Almost all historians regard these riots of the year 1692 as a forerunner of the battles for independence a hundred years later. I do not know, however, whether anyone has noted one thing that to me is the most characteristic feature of this entire chapter in our history. The uprising of 1692 was a rebellion against the power of the Viceroy and Spanish domination; this revolt, however, was not really a revolutionary act, but an instinctive explosion. Its negation contained no element of affirmation. It would be fruitless to study this revolt in depth in the hope of discovering any sort of idea on the part of these rebels as to what Mexican society should be like once the power of the Viceroyalty had been done away with. A return to the world antedating the Spanish Conquest was impossible: it had been completely destroyed, along with its princes and its priests, its gods and its pyramids. Another world had been built upon its ruins: those rebelling against the Viceroy shouted their protests in Spanish, and worshiped the same God as their oppressors. None of the principles, neither of the two universalisms—the Spanish Empire and Roman Catholicism—that had served as the cornerstone of colonial society could serve as a principle of reform. Colonial society suddenly found itself trapped in a blind alley: there was no solution available within the religious, philosophical, and political constructs that served as its foundation. There was an irreconcilable contradiction between the Catholic-monarchic universalism and the particularism of the Indians and mestizos who had risen up in rebellion. Or to put it more precisely: the solution lay not *within but without* the ideology of New Spain. Yet another century was to go by before Mexicans would begin a slow, hesitant, timid search for the principles of another sort of universalism and attempt to apply these principles to our reality—with very little success, moreover.* These principles borrowed from abroad were those of the Enlightenment as they had taken shape in the two revolutions that served as a model for the independence movements in Spanish America: the French and American Revolutions.

There are unquestionably certain similarities between the disturbances in Mexico in 1968 and those in 1692. In both cases there was a sudden awakening from a dream, from the illusion of genuine prosperity and social harmony. Around 1950 the groups holding the reins of power in the economic and political sphere—including the majority of technicians and many intellectuals—began to feel a certain sense of self-satisfaction about the progress that had been made since the consolidation of the post-Revolutionary regime (1930): political

*The difficulty that the Hispanic and Lusitanian countries have experienced and are continuing to experience in their effort to adopt democratic principles and adapt them to their own situation ought to be the central concern of historical and social studies in Latin America, Spain, and Portugal. But this has not been the case at all, and however incredible it may seem, we still do not know why democratic institutions have not proved viable in the majority of our countries. There is a great deal of talk about our economic underdevelopment, and in recent years this underdevelopment and our dependence have been used as convenient excuses for all our failings and shortcomings. I do not deny that underdevelopment and dependence do indeed exist in our countries, but I also note that very few people have troubled to ponder the question as to whether or not there is any relation between this underdevelopment and our political life. The modernity of a country cannot be measured solely, or even primarily, in terms of the number of factories and machines it possesses. The most essential criterion is the degree of development of intellectual and political criticism. Doubtless the poverty of our scientific and philosophical tradition has the same origin as our shallow democratic tradition. Our history is as rife with *caudillos* as the waters of the Gulf of Mexico are infested with sharks.

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stability; uninterrupted economic development despite a high rate of population growth; impressive completed public-works projects; the birth of a sizable middle class; the increased number of jobholders and the rise in the standard of living of the working class; and finally, as in the 17th century, an overall atmosphere of peace and calm, as though each and every sector of the population were in perfect agreement, from labor leaders to bankers and members of the higher echelons of the institutionalized Revolution to the procounsuls of the big international corporations. In 1690, creole society saw itself reflected in its baroque palaces, its convents, and its private schools; in 1960, the post-Revolutionary society saw its image in its factories, its ranches, its Hollywood-style mansions, and its colossal monuments commemorating glorious Revolutionary victories and Revolutionary heroes. It would be unfair, however, to compare the baroque art of the 17th century, which even in its most deliriously extravagant flights of fancy was an exquisite art, with the megalomaniacal style of post-Revolutionary Mexico, conceived and executed in the very best tradition of Stalinist art. There was no lack of praise of our country on the part of foreigners. The most resounding tribute paid us was that by President Kennedy, who unhesitatingly proclaimed that the Mexican regime was a model for all of Latin America. The heirs of our revolutionaries had at last received Washington's benediction. But it represented a posthumuous triumph for the Mexican Revolution. In reality, our poor Revolution had long since been the victim of a twofold takeover: it had been co-opted politically by the official government Party, a bureaucracy that is similar in more than one respect to the Communist bureaucracies of Eastern Europe, and it had been co-opted economically and socially by a financial oligarchy that had intimate ties to huge American corporations.

In 1968 this apparent consensus fell to pieces, and the other face of Mexico was suddenly revealed: a generation of angry young men and women and a middle class bitterly opposed to the political system that had ruled the country for 40 years. The disturbances of 1968 suddenly brought to light the deep split within that area of Mexican society that might be described as the developed sector, within that predominantly urban sector, that is to say, which includes almost half the population of the country and in the last few decades has undergone a more and more rapid progress of modernization. But the crisis within the Mexico that is modern and developed assumed even more dramatic and crucial proportions when the student movement bared what lay concealed behind it: the other Mexico, the Mexico in rags and tatters, the millions of desperately poor peasants and the masses of the underemployed who emigrate to the cities and become the new nomads of our day—nomads wandering about the urban desert.

As the uprising in 1692, the 1968 movement lacked any sort of precisely defined ideology. Unlike the uprising in 1692, it was not a movement of the lower classes but of students, the middle class, and intellectual groups. As in 1692, though for different reasons, it was a direct expression of the general dissatisfaction of the country as a whole. A deep dissatisfaction in the face of the paralysis of the political system that had taken root after the violent phase of the Mexican Revolution had to come to an end (the PRI was founded in 1929); and a deep dissatisfaction as well at the turn taken by the social program of the revolutionaries, which had degenerated into a policy of "development" that had benefited only a small minority. This is why the summons to "democratize" the country immediately gained the support of the majority of the population belonging to the urban sector. As in 1692—and again for very different reasons—it was political demands that became the prime concern. But it is that very fact which betrays the major difference between the disturbances of 1692 and those of 1968: whereas the principles on which colonial society was based could provide no answer to the crisis of 1692, the principles on which present-day Mexican society is founded are capable of providing, if not a solution, at least the beginning of a

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solution, to our problems. "Democratization" is far from being the final solution, naturally, but it is the right path to follow in order to examine our problems in public, discuss them, propose solutions to them, and organize ourselves politically so as to ensure that these solutions are effectively implemented. Those who are impatient must be reminded what development in the form of a sort of forced march imposed on a people by bureaucratic socialism has meant in the past and continues to mean today: such artificially speeded-up development has been achieved only at the cost of immeasurable physical suffering and moral degradation. The creation of a democratic tradition in Mexico is just as important and just as urgent a problem as economic development and the struggle to achieve genuine equality.

In 1968 the Mexican political system was plunged into crisis. Five years have since gone by, and we still have not succeeded in creating an independent democratic movement that can offer any real solutions for the enormous problems confronting our country. The spontaneous and healthy negation of 1968 has not been followed by any kind of affirmation. We have proved incapable of drawing up a coherent and viable program of reforms and of creating a national organization. The truth of the matter is that the primary beneficiary of the events of 1968, and very nearly the only beneficiary, has been the regime itself, which in the last few years has embarked upon a program of reforms aimed at liberalizing it. It would be morally wrong to ignore these reforms or minimize their importance; but at the same time it would be an untruth to maintain that they are all that is required. No, the real remedy is not to be found in a reform from the top downward, but rather from the bottom upward, a reform strongly backed by an *independent* popular movement. What must be done is to create an alternative altogether different from the PRI, something that thus far the traditional opposition parties in our country have been unable to accomplish. An intellectual paralysis has overtaken the Mexican left, at present the prisoner of simplistic formulas and an authoritarian ideology that is even more pernicious than the bureaucratic sclerosis of the PRI and the system that concentrates political power in the hands of a president who is a mere party appointee. As for the right: for a long time now the Mexican bourgeoisie has had no ideas—only self-interests. For all these reasons, the "democratization" that the students were seeking in 1968 continues to be a legitimate demand and a pressing task. It is absolutely essential for any attempt at genuine reform in Mexico. Democracy may be roughly defined as that free arena in which criticism takes place. But criticism of others must be accompanied by self-criticism. To communicate with others, we must first learn to communicate with ourselves. Those groups that are eager for change in Mexico should begin by taking steps in the direction of their own democratization, that is to say, making free criticism and debate the practice within their own organizations. And what is more: they should examine their own consciences and criticize their own attitudes and ideologies. There are hosts of arrogant theologians and stubborn fanatics among us: their dogmas are as resistant to change as stone. The intellectual regeneration of the left will be possible only if it sets aside many of its ironclad formulas and humbly *listens* to what Mexico is really saying—what our past history and our present are saying. If it does so, it will regain its political imagination. If not, will our country be obliged to wait, as in 1692, for yet another century?

Translated by HELEN R. LANE □

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Steven Lukes

Socialism and Equality

> ... there is now, with the existence of a large amount of sociological research on inequality of opportunity and inequality of result, and with the resurgence of interest among moral philosophers in inequality, as manifested in John Rawls's work, the possibility of serious examination of social ideals and social reality in this area.
>
> — JAMES S. COLEMAN[1]

Professor Coleman's remarks raise three questions. First, what are the "social ideals" of equality? What forms of inequality are undesirable and what forms of equality desirable, and on what grounds? Second, what are the "social realities" of inequality? What is the upshot of all the research into inequality in contemporary societies? And third, what bearing does the answer to the second question have on that to the first? How does social reality affect social ideals? What is desirable, in the light of the actual, and what appears possible? The relevance of these questions to the subject of this essay needs no explanation. The ideal of equality has always been central to the socialist tradition: thus Professor Taylor specifies "greater equality in the conditions of life" as the first goal of "any socialist in a Western country today."[2] In assessing the contemporary viability of the socialist idea, then, the three questions raised above demand to be faced: first, why is "greater equality in the conditions of life" desirable?[3] Second, how unequal are such conditions in contemporary industrial societies, capitalist and state socialist, and what explains these inequalities? And third, are these inequalities ineradicable, or eradicable only at an unacceptable cost? Clearly, I cannot begin to answer these momentous questions here. What I shall try to do is to offer some suggestions as to how they might be answered. Concerning the first (philosophical) question, I shall seek to suggest a modified Kantian ethical basis for the social, political, and economic equalities socialists have traditionally sought to establish. As for the second (sociological) question, I shall briefly sketch some of the evidence about actual inequalities and the range of explanations for them. And with regard to the third question I shall briefly consider a number of arguments for the inevitability of inequality. Having done these things, it will be clear to even the most sympathetic reader that everything remains to be done.

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[1]James S. Coleman, "Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Results," *Harvard Educational Review*, 43 (February 1973), p. 137.

[2]Charles Taylor, "Socialism and Weltanschauung," *The Socialist Idea* (see special note on this page).

[3]Though equality is an objective central to socialism, socialists have not, in general, been very explicit about its content or the values on which it rests. I have (perhaps surprisingly) found the ideas of certain English egalitarians and socialists (Arnold, Morris, Tawney, Cole, Orwell) especially helpful.

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The Social Ideals of Equality

THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY has been made to seem absurd in either of two opposing ways. It has been interpreted as based either on the principle of absolute and unconditional equality—"treat everyone equally in every respect"—or else on the empty formal principle, "treat people equally unless there are relevant or sufficient reasons for treating them unequally." In fact, few serious thinkers, let alone socialists, have advocated the former,[4] and all the interesting forms of egalitarianism have put content into the latter in two ways: negatively, by ruling out certain sorts of reasons as justifications for treating people unequally; and positively, by advancing, or presupposing, a set of reasons for treating them equally.

Historically, the fight for equality has taken the form of attacking specific inequalities and their alleged justifications: inequalities of privilege and power—legal and political, then social and economic—have been attacked as unjustifiable, because arbitrary, capricious, or irrational. For example, it has been suggested that inequalities are unjustifiable unless they can be shown to satisfy one or more of the following criteria: (1) merit or deserts; (2) need; (3) social benefit (and on such a basis it would be hard to justify the present extreme inequality of inherited wealth in Britain).[5] But, quite apart from the difficulty of interpreting these criteria, especially the last, such an approach always presupposes a view of what is justifiable, that is, what are relevant and sufficient sorts of reasons for unequal treatment, and over this individuals, classes, and cultures conflict. What, then, of the positive way?

One influential argument for treating people equally—and in particular for according them equal income and wealth—is the utilitarian argument for attaining the maximum aggregate satisfaction, on the assumption of diminishing marginal utility: as Dalton put it, an "unequal distribution of a given amount of purchasing power among a given number of people is ... likely to be a wasteful distribution from the point of view of economic welfare."[6] In their recent important study of inequality, Christopher Jencks and his associates state their position as follows:

> We begin with the premise that every individual's happiness is of equal value. From this it is a short step to Bentham's dictum that society should be organized so as to provide the greatest good for the greatest number. In addition, we assume that the law of diminishing returns applies to most of the good things in life. In economic terms this means that people with low incomes value extra income more than people with high incomes. It follows that if we want to maximize the satisfaction of the population, the best way to divide any given amount of money is to make everyone's income the same. Income disparities (except those based on variations in "need") will always reduce overall satisfaction, because individuals with low incomes will lose more than individuals with high incomes gain.[7]

But this assumption is questionable. Why assume that a given amount of purchasing power yields equal utility for everyone (assuming one could make the interpersonal comparison), and why assume that it diminishes as income or wealth increases?

In any case, egalitarians and socialists have not rested their case on this precarious basis alone: there is an alternative tradition of thought on the subject, of which Rousseau is the classical figure and Rawls the major contemporary exponent, which offers an alternative interpretation of equality and which appeals to deeper values than the utilitarian. This interpretation may be called the principle

[4]Babeuf came perhaps the nearest to doing so, proclaiming, "Let there be no other difference between people than that of age or sex. Since all have the same needs and the same faculties, let them henceforth have the same education and the same diet. They are content with the same sun and the same air for all; why should not the same portion and the same quality of nourishment suffice for each of them?" *Manifeste des égaux* [1796] in M. Leroy, ed., *Les Précurseurs français du socialisme de Condorcet à Proudhon* (Paris: Editions du temps présent, 1948), pp. 67–68 (trans. S. Lukes).

[5]See A. B. Atkinson, *Unequal Shares: Wealth in Britain* (London: Allen Lane and Penguin, 1972), pp. 80 ff.

[6]H. Dalton, *Some Aspects of Inequality of Incomes in Modern Communities* (London: Routledge, 1925), cited in *ibid.*, p. 84.

[7]Christopher Jencks *et al.*, *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effects of Family and Schooling in America* (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 1974), pp. 9–10.

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of equality of consideration or respect. In this view, all human beings have certain basic features that entitle them to be considered or respected as equals, and this is seen as implying practical policies for implementing substantial political, social, and economic equality.[8]

What, then, are the basic features of human beings that command equal consideration or respect? For Christians the answer is that they are all children of God, for Kant that they are rational wills and thus members of the Kingdom of Ends, for classical liberals that they share "common rights to which they are called by nature,"[9] for many socialists and anarchists that they share a "common humanity." These are all transcendental answers, whether religious or secular. Others speak of man's "inherent dignity," "intrinsic or infinite value," or "human worth."

But in all these cases, no *independent* reasons are given for respecting people equally—or at least none that would convince a skeptic disposed to do so unequally, according to, say, birth or merit. But it is arguable that there are a number of empirical features that could provide such reasons, to which, throughout their history, egalitarian doctrines have, implicitly or explicitly, appealed. On the one hand, there are basic human needs—minimally, the means to life and health—without which they could not function in a recognizably human manner. On the other hand, there are certain basic capacities (of which more below), characteristic of human beings, whose realization is essential to their enjoyment of freedom. It may be objected that, since people have these needs and capacities to different degrees, they are therefore worthy of unequal respect. But to this it may be replied that it is the existence of the needs and capacities, not the degree to which the former are met and the latter realized or realizable, that elicits the respect, and that respecting persons precisely consists in doing all that is necessary and possible to satisfy their basic needs and to maintain and enhance their basic capacities (and to discriminate between them in this regard is to fail to show them equal respect).

The principle of equal respect for needs tells against all humanly alterable economic and social arrangements that discriminate between individuals' access to the means of sustenance and health (and it is not irrelevant in contemporary Britain, where there are still marked class differences in the risks of death and infant mortality). But "need" is a concept to which appeal cannot be made beyond this basic (if rising) minimum level: beyond that point, it becomes a question of individuals' entitlement to the means of realizing certain basic capacities. Three such capacities appear to be of particular significance.

There is, first, the capacity of human beings to form intentions and purposes, to become aware of alternatives and choose between them, and to acquire control over their own behavior by becoming conscious of the forces determining it, both internally, as with unconscious desires and motives, and externally, as with the pressures exerted by the norms they follow or the roles they fill. In other words, human beings have the capacity to act with relative autonomy and to be or become relatively self-determining, to become conscious of the forces determining or affecting them, and either consciously to submit to them or become independent of them. Obviously, not all exercise this capacity to an equal degree, but all, except the mentally defective or deranged, possess it.

Second, human beings have the capacity to think thoughts, perform actions, develop involvements, and engage in relationships to which they attach value but which require a certain area of noninterference in order to have that value. Enjoyments and delights of all kinds, intellectual and artistic activities, love and friendship are examples: all these require a space free and secure from external invasion or surveillance in order to flourish. There is, of course, considerable room for differences

[8]The argument that follows, spelling out the principle of equal respect, is taken from the present author's *Individualism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), Part III.

[9]Condorcet, *Sketch for the Progress of the Human Mind* [1793], transl. June Barraclough (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955), p. 184.

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about which of these activities and relationships are of most value and about what kind of value they have, and indeed about which of them people should be left alone to engage in. But what seems indisputable is that there is a range of such activities and relationships, in some of which all persons have the capacity to engage and to which they attach value.

Third, human beings have the capacity for self-development. By this I mean that everyone has the capacity to develop in himself some characteristic human excellence or excellences—whether intellectual, aesthetic or moral, theoretical or practical, personal or public, and so on. Obviously, not everyone will be able to develop any given excellence to the same degree—and perhaps, *pace* Marx, not all will be able to develop them in a many-sided, all-round fashion. But all human beings share the capacity to realize potentialities that are worthy of admiration. What counts as worthy of admiration will be subject to moral disagreement and cultural variation, but it is arguable that there is a delimited range of human excellences that are intrinsically admirable, though the forms they take differ from society to society, and that all human beings are capable of achieving some of them to some degree.

I have argued that these three characteristics of persons are at least part of the ground on which we accord them respect. What, then, does that respect consist of? The unsurprising answer is that, whatever else it involves, respecting them involves treating them as (actually or potentially) autonomous, as requiring a free and secure space for the pursuit of valued activities and relationships, and as capable of self-development. That answer has, given certain further assumptions, far-reaching social, economic, and political implications, and points toward a society with substantially reduced inequalities, both of material and symbolic rewards and of political power.

WHAT, we may ask, constitutes a denial of such respect? We fail to respect someone by denying his autonomy, not only when we control or dominate his will, but also when we unreasonably restrict the range of alternatives between which he can choose. Such control and restriction is as likely to be social and economic as political, and as typical of the work situation and the family and of opportunities for education and employment as of the relation between the state and the citizen. In this sense, Tawney saw a central aim of "measures correcting inequalities or neutralizing their effects" as increasing "the range of alternatives open to ordinary men, and the capacity of the latter to follow their own preferences in choosing between them."[10]

But we also cease to respect someone when we fail to treat him as an agent and a chooser, as a self from which actions and choices emanate, when we see him and consequently treat him, not as a person, but as merely the bearer of a title or the occupant of a role, or as merely a means to securing a certain end, or, worst of all, as merely an object. We deny his status as an autonomous person to the extent that we allow our attitudes to him to be dictated solely by some contingent and socially defined attribute of him, such as his "merit" or success or occupational role or place in the social order—or what Tawney called "the tedious vulgarities of income and social position."[11] This denial of autonomy was what William Godwin had in mind when he urged universal and equal political participation on the grounds that "Each man will thus be inspired with a consciousness of his own importance, and the slavish feelings that shrink up the soul in the presence of an imagined superior will be unknown."[12] It is what William Morris meant when he wrote of socialism as a "condition of equality" in which a man "would no longer take his position as the dweller in such and such a place, or the filler of such and such an office, or (as now) the owner of such and such property, but as being

[10]R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, 4th edition, 1952 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931), p. 260.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 153.
[12]William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its influence on Morals and Happiness* [1793], 3rd edition, vol. 1 (London, 1798) pp. 214–15.

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such and such a man."[13] It is what Tawney intended when he wrote of an egalitarian society as one in which "money and position count for less, and the quality of human personalities for more,"[14] and what George Orwell was thinking of when he wrote of "breathing the air of equality" in revolutionary Spain, with "no boss-class, no menial-class, no beggars, no prostitutes, no lawyers, no priests, no boot-licking, no cap-touching."[15] Respecting persons in this way, as Bernard Williams has well put it, implies that they be "abstracted from certain conspicuous structures of inequality" in which they are found and seen, "not merely under professional, social, or technical titles, but with consideration of their own views and purposes," as "conscious beings who necessarily have intentions and purposes and see what they are doing in a certain light."[16]

But more is involved in respecting autonomy than looking behind the surface of socially defined titles or labels and seeing the world (and the labels) from the agent's point of view. Social existence in part determines consciousness; and the most insidious and decisive way of denying the autonomy of persons is to diminish or restrict their opportunity to increase their consciousness of their situation and activities. It is for this reason that respecting autonomy points toward a "single-status society" and away from the ideal of a stable hierarchy, since

> what keeps stable hierarchies together is the idea of necessity, that it is somehow foreordained or inevitable that there should be these orders; and this idea of necessity must be eventually undermined by the growth of people's reflective consciousness about their role, still more when it is combined with the thought that what they and others have always thought about their roles in the social system was the product of the social system itself.[17]

Second, one manifestly fails to respect someone if one invades his private space and interferes, without good reason, with his valued activities and relationships (and above all with his inner self). Examples of where it can be justifiable so to interfere are in cases, say, of imprisonment or conscription during wartime—where it may be claimed that there is "good reason" for interference and thus no denial of respect insofar as they are necessary infringements of a person's freedom, either to preserve the freedom of others, or his own and others' in the long run, or as the only way of realizing other cherished values. But, in the absence of these justifications, such an invasion or interference is clearly a denial of human respect. It is easy to think of extreme forms of such a denial, as in the prison camps described by Solzhenitsyn or in the total institutions described by Erving Goffman. But less extreme forms result from inequalities of power and privilege in all contemporary societies. Liberals characteristically attack such invasions of liberty, especially in nonliberal societies, when they take the form of political authoritarianism, bureaucratic tyranny, social pressures to conformity, religious and racial discrimination. But interference with valued activities and relationships occurs in other ways to which liberals are less sensitive—through class discrimination, remediable economic deprivation and insecurity, and what Hayek has called the "hard discipline of the market,"[18] where nominally equal economic and social rights are unequally operative because of unequal but equalizable conditions and opportunities.

Finally, one also importantly fails to respect someone if one limits or restricts his opportunities to realize his capacities of self-development. It is the systematic and cumulative denial of such opportunities to the less favored citizens of stratified societies, both capitalist

[13]William Morris, *Letters on Socialism* [1888] (privately printed, London, 1894), Letter I, p. 5.
[14]*Op. cit.*, p. 254.
[15]George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1938, and Penguin, 1962) p. 66.
[16]Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality" in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., *Philosophy, Politics and Society: Second Series* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 117, 118.
[17]*Ibid.*, pp. 119–20.
[18]Friedrich A. Hayek, *Individualism, True and False* (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co., and Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), p. 24.

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and state socialist, that constitutes perhaps the strongest argument against the structured inequalities they exhibit. That argument really has two parts.

The first part is simply an argument against discrimination, against the failure to "bring the means of a good life within the reach of all."[19] Thus the principal argument against a discriminatory educational system is not that it creates social inequality (which, as Jencks shows, it scarcely does, serving "primarily to legitimize inequality, not to create it,"[20]) but rather that it blocks the self-development of the less favored and thereby fails to respect them. Again, where it is possible to make certain types of work more challenging and require a greater development of skill or talent or responsibility, it is a denial of human respect to confine workers within menial, one-sided, and tedious tasks. Furthermore, workers—and citizens of political society as a whole—are denied respect to the degree to which they are denied possibilities of real participation in the formulation and taking of major decisions affecting them, for they are thereby denied the opportunity to develop the human excellence of active self-government celebrated by Rousseau and John Stuart Mill and central to the various forms of classical democratic theory.

The second part of this argument against structured inequalities is that they provide an unfavorable climate for the self-development of ordinary people. The assumption that this is so was well expressed by Matthew Arnold, who claimed that for

> the common bulk of mankind ... to live in a society of equals tends in general to make a man's spirits expand, and his faculties work easily and actively; while, to live in a society of superiors, although it may occasionally be a very good discipline, yet in general tends to tame the spirits and to make the play of the faculties less secure and active.[21]

Tawney made the same assumption, arguing that "individual differences, which are a source of social energy, are more likely to ripen and find expression if social inequalities are, as far as practicable, diminished."[22] Individuals, Tawney argued

> differ profoundly ... in capacity and character but they are equally entitled as human beings to consideration and respect, and ... the well-being of a society is likely to be increased if it so plans its organization that, whether their powers are great or small, all its members may be equally enabled to make the best of such powers as they possess.[23]

His case was that establishing "the largest possible measure of equality of environment, and circumstance, and opportunity," was a precondition for ensuring "that these diversities of gifts may come to fruition."[24]

I have argued, then, that certain basic human needs and capacities provide at least part of the ground for equality of respect, and give some content to that notion of "respect," and I have further suggested that a society practicing equal respect would be one in which there were no barriers to reciprocal relations between relatively autonomous persons, who see each other and themselves as such, who are equally free from political control, social pressure, and economic deprivation and insecurity to engage in valued pursuits, and who have equal access to the means of self-development. Such a society would not be marked by inequalities of power and privilege (which is not to say that a society without such inequalities would necessarily practice equal respect).

However, I should conclude this section by noting an important tension between the notion of equality of respect, as discussed here, and that of "equality of opportunity," as normally understood. In the context of public debate, especially about education, this latter principle is *not* generally taken to refer to equality of opportunity to develop individual powers or gifts, but rather equality of opportunity to achieve scarce social rewards. Thus under-

[19] Tawney, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 135.
[21] Matthew Arnold, "Democracy" [1861] in Lionel Trilling, ed., *The Portable Matthew Arnold* (New York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 442–43.
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 49.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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stood, it comes into conflict with equal respect, since it focuses attention upon forms of differentiation and grading, which carry status and prestige. It endorses and serves to perpetuate those very structures of inequality, characterized by competition and emulation, of which equality of respect makes light—and, practiced seriously, it would abolish. The distinction was well drawn by Tawney when he contrasted "the claim for an open road to individual advancement" with the desire "to narrow the space between valley and peak."[25] The former aspiration has, of course, a central place in the history of socialism: it represents the meritocratic policy of widening the social base of recruitment to privileged positions, which has always been the central plank of social democracy. C.A.R. Crosland wrote:

> The essential thing is that every citizen should have an equal chance—that is his basic democratic right; but provided the start is fair, let there be the maximum scope for individual self-advancement. There would then be nothing improper in either a high continuous status ladder ... or even a distinct class stratification ... since opportunities for attaining the highest status or the topmost stratum would be genuinely equal. Indeed the continuous traffic up and down would inevitably make society more mobile and dynamic, and so less class-bound.[26]

By contrast, the egalitarian socialist focuses on equalizing the rewards and privileges attached to different positions, not on widening the competition for them. In fact, of course, these two strands are often intertwined in socialist theory and pratice. But, although there are well-known arguments (an example of which we shall consider) to the effect that unequal rewards, together with equal opportunity to reap them, have essential economic and social functions, they are in tension with the social, political, and economic implications of the principle of equal respect, which, as we have seen, points toward greater equality in the conditions of life, that is, of wealth, income, status, and power.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[26] C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (London: Cape, 1956), pp. 150–51.

The Realities of Inequality

CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES manifest structured inequalities of such conditions, and of much else besides, such as access to education, social services and other public benefits, economic security, promotion prospects, etc. Some patterns of inequality appear to be common to all such societies, both capitalist and state socialist, others to the one system or the other, yet others to particular countries. But three myths, prevalent in recent times, are belied by the evidence. The first is that of "convergence," according to "the logic of industrialism." This is misleading insofar as it suggests a continuing trend in the development of industrial societies toward greater overall economic equality, toward an ever-increasing consistency of stratification systems around the occupational order (e.g., toward the congruence of middle incomes and middle-class life-style and status), and toward a uniform pattern of social mobility.[27] The second is that "affluence" in capitalist societies has eroded inequalities of income, wealth, and security of life and that the power of private capital has been tamed, from within by the "managerial revolution" and the divorce between ownership and control, and from without by the growth of the state and/or a pluralistic diffusion of power among competing interest groups. The third myth is the official Communist (especially Soviet) interpretation of state socialist societies, which, while acknowledging the existence of nonantagonistic classes (working class and peasantry) and the stratum of the intelligentsia—and the existence of inequalities of income, consumption goods, education, etc., between rural and urban population and between occupational strata—maintains that these inequalities are in the process of continuing decline (the so-called process of *sblizhenie*, or "drawing together"), denies that there is a hierarchy of status, and is silent about the hierarchy of power.

[27] See J. H. Goldthorpe, "Social Stratification in Industrial Society," reprinted in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective*, 2nd edition, (London: Routledge, 1967).

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Of the patterns of inequality common to industrial societies, it appears broadly true to say that, in contrast with traditional or non-industrial societies, "the occupational order comes increasingly to be the primary source of symbolic as well as material advantages"[28]: thus

> The occupational structure in modern industrial society not only constitutes an important foundation for the main dimensions of social stratification, but also serves as the connecting link between different institutions and spheres of social life, and therein lies its great significance. The hierarchy of prestige strata and the hierarchy of economic classes have their roots in the occupational structure; so does the hierarchy of political power and authority, for political authority in modern society is largely exercised as a full-time occupation. ...[29]

As for income, there appears to be a remarkable similarity in capitalist and Communist societies in the structure of earnings—more precisely, in the distribution of pre-tax money wages or salaries of fully employed male adult workers in all industries but farming.[30] There is a broad relationship between the hierarchy of skills and knowledge demanded by occupations on the one hand, and the hierarchy of material rewards on the other (though there is a narrower range of differentials under command than market economies), and, related to this, there are certain more specific trends: high rewards accruing to those in management and the technically highly qualified and skilled, and a relative decline in the rewards of clerical work. As for status inequality (allowing for the "softness" of the data and their paucity for socialist systems, except Poland), various studies suggest a common structure of occupational prestige. For example, according to Sarapata, the correlation between the occupational prestige hierarchies of Poland and the U.S. is 0.882, Poland and England 0.862 and Poland and West Germany 0.879.[31] As for inequalities of power, apart from the obvious differences, parallels can be seen in the differential distribution of power and authority (whether in the form of legal ownership or directive control) within "imperatively co-ordinated associations," such as the industrial enterprise; conversely, a tendency toward political pluralism, albeit of a highly restricted and managed type, has been observed in Communist systems.[32]

Of the inequalities characteristic of capitalism, the most obvious is that of wealth. It has been justly said that "capitalism produces extremely rich people with a great deal of capital, and this is the most striking difference between the two systems."[33] Moreover, such capital "means so much more than the income it provides: security, diminished pressure to save and (in very large quantities) political power."[34] The most recent study of the subject, in Britain,[35] estimates that the top 5 percent of wealth-holders own between one-half and three-quarters of the total personal wealth. There has, it is true, been a long-term trend toward a greater spread of such wealth, but this has mainly been from the top 1 percent to the next 2–5 percent (i.e., to relatives and others), as a defense against taxation.[36] It has been estimated that, equally divided, the yield from private property would substantially change the overall income distribution, providing a married couple with something over £9.00 a week.[37] Similar (though less extreme) concentrations of property ownership are found in other capitalist countries. Its impact is con-

[28]Frank Parkin, *Class, Inequality and Political Order* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1971), p. 39.
[29]P. M. Blau and O. D. Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 7.
[30]See H. F. Lydall, *The Structure of Earnings* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
[31]Cited in David Lane, *The End of Inequality? Stratification under State Socialism* (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 81.
[32]See, e.g. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
[33]P. J. D. Wiles and S. Markowski, "Income Distribution under Communism and Capitalism: Some Facts about Poland, the U.K., the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R." *Soviet Studies*, 22 (1971), p. 344.
[34]*Ibid.*, p. 353.
[35]Atkinson, *op. cit.*
[36]See John Westergaard and Henrietta Resler, *Class in Contemporary Britain* (London: Heinemann, forthcoming).
[37]Atkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–38.

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siderable because it "leads to unequal incomes, and concentrates control over the economy in a few hands."[38] This is

> accentuated by the fact that the very rich tend to hold their wealth in the form of company shares and real property yielding a higher return than the assets typically owned by small savers. The concentration of share ownership is even greater than that in the distribution of wealth as a whole, which is important since shares convey not only income but also rights of control, and even allowing for the increasing power of corporation managers these still remain of considerable significance.[39]

As for income inequality, after a temporary narrowing in the 1940s, it has remained relatively fixed and in some cases somewhat widened—both before direct taxation and (as far as one can estimate) after it. Overall taxation appears to be almost neutral in relation to income and in certain cases (the U.S., West Germany) directly regressive, while redistribution through the welfare state, although it obviously aids the poor more than the rich in relative terms, is paid for by wage-earners themselves, and is mainly "horizontal" rather than "vertical"—i.e., it takes the form of a "life-cycle" transfer *within* social classes; moreover, these welfare facilities often tend to favor more privileged groups.[40] In general, the social democratic "welfare approach" brings about little disturbance of the stratification system[41]—and some have claimed that there is increasing inequality at its base, with the growth of an underclass of unemployed and unemployables.[42] In capitalist societies that stratification system exhibits a cleavage between the manual and nonmanual categories of occupation—not merely with respect to income (here, indeed, there is substantial overlap), but with respect to a whole range of privileges and advantages: white-collar workers have strikingly better sick pay and pension schemes, holidays and other fringe benefits, life-cycle promotion and career opportunities, long-term economic stability (including for many guaranteed salary increases), working environment, freedom of movement and from supervision, etc. Nonmanual workers "even when they diverge are more like one another than they are like manual workers" and "the big divide still comes between manual workers on the one hand and nonmanual grades on the other."[43] As for status inequality, such evidence as exists appears to point away from the thesis of an accommodative *embourgeoisement* of affluent workers and increasingly toward different forms of polarization between what Kerr terms "the managers" and the "managed."[44]

Inequalities of political power in capitalist societies are of course manifest in the inequalities already considered, since these represent the power of the dominant class to command a disproportionate share of rewards and privileges *vis-à-vis* the subordinate class. A full consideration of this topic would also involve an examination of all the means available to the former to preserve its rewards and privileges; not only within governmental institutions, but within the administrative service, the educational system, industry, the law, mass communications, etc.; not only through coercive power but also through "the mobilization of bias," operating anonymously through the structure of institutions (especially private property and the market), the rituals of social and political life, and ideological assumptions.[45]

THE INEQUALITIES typical of state socialist societies display a different pattern. Property, in the sense of legal ownership, is, of course, largely absent: as Lane writes, "the really

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 251.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[40] See Westergaard and Resler, *op. cit.*, and Parkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 125–26.
[41] Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[42] See Goldthorpe, *art. cit.*, p. 653.
[43] D. Wedderburn and C. Craig, "Relative Deprivation in Work," paper presented at the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Exeter, 1969), cited in Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[44] C. Kerr *et al.*, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).
[45] See Westergaard and Resler, *op. cit.* and the present author's *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974), and "Political Ritual and Social Integration," *Sociology* (forthcoming).

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significant difference in the system of social stratification compared to Western industrial societies is the absence of a private propertied class possessing great concentrations of wealth."[46] On the other hand, following Djilas, one can argue that the white-collar intelligentsia, and the *apparatchiki* above all, exercise rights of control over the use and products of collective property and expropriate surplus value from the subordinate class. On the other hand, there is no direct inheritance of such rights, as with private property, although there is evidence of *de facto* inheritance of educational privileges. The analogy between "legal" and "sociological" ownership cannot be taken too far, but clearly there is a considerable hierarchy of monetary privilege and power based upon such authority roles and above all upon party membership. With respect to income inequality, this has gone through a number of phases in all socialist regimes. The general pattern is this: a highly egalitarian stage of "socialist reconstruction," followed by a substantial widening of differentials (most pronounced in the U.S.S.R. with Stalin's attacks on "equality mongering") in order to increase material incentives, followed by a subsequent move toward greater equality.[47]

The current picture is one of a substantially narrower range of money incomes in socialist than in capitalist societies: thus, for example, the ratio of the lowest wage to the average in the U.S.S.R. is 60:112.6, and even the most extreme estimate of the total range is substantially less than what is widely accepted as true of the U.S.[48] Moreover, apart from Yugoslavia, there is no structural unemployment. The stratification system has a different pattern from that in capitalist systems: social strata are distinguished by money incomes, consumption patterns, styles of life, education, use of the social services, housing, "cultural level," but there appears to be no major "break" or "big divide," as under capitalism, between the manual and the nonmanual strata. As Parkin suggests, in many state socialist societies highly skilled or craft manual workers enjoy a higher position in the scale of material and status rewards, and promotion prospects, than do lower white-collar employees.[49] Thus, for example, in both Poland and Yugoslavia skilled manual positions have higher occupational prestige than do lower routine white-collar positions. Parkin suggests that the overall reward hierarchy is as follows: "(1) White-collar intelligentsia (i.e., professional, managerial and administrative positions), (2) Skilled manual positions, (3) Lower or unqualified white-collar positions, (4) Unskilled manual positions," and that the major break lies between the skilled and the unskilled.[50] Thus "the most obvious break in the reward hierarchy occurs along the line separating the qualified professional, managerial and technical positions from the rest of the occupational order."[51] Thus the status hierarchy does not appear to reflect and reinforce a dichotomous class structure on the Western capitalist model (though Machonin provides conflicting evidence on this point from Czechoslovakia).[52] Clearly, however, the most significant contrast between the systems lies in the hierarchy of political power. Here, despite the pluralistic tendencies identified by certain Western observers, the explicitly hierarchical, monistic, and all-pervasive structure of party control, increasingly manned by the white-collar intelligentsia, is altogether distinctive.

Finally, brief mention should be made of inequalities characteristic of particular societies within these two broad systems. Thus, with respect to income inequality, the U.K. is more equal than the U.S.,[53] and Norway is substan-

[46]Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
[47]See Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 144 and his article, "Class Stratification in Socialist Societies," *British Journal of Sociology*, December 1969.
[48]Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–74.
[49]Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
[50]Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 147, cf. Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[51]Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
[52]P. Machonin, "Social Stratification in Contemporary Czechoslovakia," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (1970), pp. 725–41. For an English summary of Machonin and his associates' full-scale study of this subject, see Ernest Gellner, "The Pluralist Anti-levelers of Prague," *European Journal of Sociology*, 12 (1971), pp. 312–25, and *Dissent*, Summer 1972.
[53]Wiles and Markowski, *art. cit.*, p. 344.

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tially more equal still, while the U.S.S.R. has carried income equalization very far within the socialist bloc, especially through the redistributive effects of collective consumption,[54] whereas Yugoslavia has seen a marked widening of the span of incomes and life-chances, with the introduction of "market socialism," as to a lesser extent did Czechoslovakia in the later 1960s. Other peculiarities relate to racial, religious, and linguistic factors (the U.S., Northern Ireland, Canada), where inconsistencies between income and status hierarchies are to be seen, and long-range historical factors, as for example in Britain, where the stratification takes a distinctive form and the concentration of wealth is especially high.[55]

The explanation of inequality can be approached in either of two ways. On the one hand, one may seek to explain why individuals attain different positions, rewards and privileges; on the other hand, one may seek to account for the allocation of rewards and privileges to different social positions. The first approach implies a focus upon inequality of opportunity among persons; the second upon inequality of reward among occupational positions. In the foregoing, I have implicitly concentrated on the second question and I have also implicitly suggested a range of explanations for inequality at different levels. Some such explanations will be historically and geographically specific. Examples are, say, the particular circumstances explaining the exceptionally high status of Poland's intelligentsia,[56] or the cultural factors in ethnically or religiously divided communities or the long-range historical factors referred to above. Other factors explaining the differences between income distributions in different countries, and in the same country over time, are the activities of the central government and local authorities in allocating taxes and distributing benefits, the control of entry into occupations by professional associations and unions, national rates of economic growth, level of unemployment, etc. Other explanations will be at the level of the economic system, and will focus primarily on the institution of private property, and all that protects and legitimates it, under capitalism; and on political intervention, allocating rewards and privileges, in accordance with the ruling elite's policy objectives, under state socialism. However, at the next level, the constraints operating on both systems come into view: the division of labor under advanced industrialism, it has been argued, creates a certain role structure inevitably accompanied by differentials of material reward, status, and power, which are in turn perpetuated by the nuclear family.[57] Some writers have sought explanations of inequality at a higher level still: according to them social inequalities arise from the functional prerequisites or basic features of all human societies, or, more universally still, from the genetic, biological, or psychological differentiation of human nature itself.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] See Atkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 77, and Lydall, *op. cit.*

[56] See Michalina Vaughan, "Poland," in Margaret Scotford Archer and Salvador Giner (eds.), *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971).

The Realizability of Equality

THIS LEADS US naturally to the question of the alleged inevitability of inequality. There are a number of such arguments (of which I shall cite some typical contemporary examples), ranging from the "hard" to the "soft." The hardest are those that appeal to biological and psychological data, which, it is argued, set sharp limits to the possibility of implementing egalitarian social ideals: "biology," writes Eysenck, "sets an absolute barrier to egalitarianism."[58] Then there are sociological arguments that maintain inequalities are functional to, or inherent in, all possible social systems—or less strongly, in all industrial societies. Finally, there are arguments of a different order, which seek to show that the cost of implementing equality in contemporary societies are unacceptably high, because they conflict with other values.

[57] Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–37.

[58] H. J. Eysenck, *The Inequality of Man* (London: Temple Smith, 1973), p. 224.

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The hard-line approach to the realizability of equality is currently taken by various participants in the contemporary debate about genetics, environment, and intelligence. Professors Jensen, Herrnstein, and Eysenck assert that "intelligence" is mainly determined by heredity—specifically that about 80 percent of the variance in IQ scores is genetically determined. Eysenck urges "recognition of man's biological nature, and the genetically determined inequality inevitably associated with his derivation."[59] Social class is "determined quite strongly by IQ," and educational attainment depends "closely" on IQ: "talent, merit, ability" are "largely innate factors."[60] Eysenck maintains that "regression to the mean" through social mobility and the redistribution of genes prevents social classes from calcifying into hereditary castes, and he concludes that a "society which would come as near to our egalitarian desires as is biologically attainable would give the greatest scope possible to this social mobility."[61] Herrnstein,[62] by contrast, ignores "regression to the mean" and stresses the process of "assortative mating" between partners of similar IQ levels, and he foresees a future in which, as the environment becomes more favorable to the development of intelligence, social mobility increases, and technological advance sets a higher premium on intelligence, social classes will become ever more castelike, stratifying society into a hereditary meritocracy. Finally, Jensen, observing that some racial groups, especially American whites and blacks, differ markedly in their distribution of IQ scores (the mean IQ differing from 10 to 15 points), concludes that, since no known environmental factors can explain such differences, their explanation must be largely genetic. In his latest book, he affirms the hypothesis that "something between one-half and three-fourths of the average IQ difference between American Negroes and whites is attributable to genetic factors, and the remainder to environmental factors and their interaction with the genetic differences."[63] He attaches much importance to this conclusion, since he believes that IQ is a major determinant of success in our society.

These claims obviously cannot be adequately considered here, but a few remarks are worth making. First the estimate of 80 percent genetic determination of IQ is controversial. Others suggest a substantially lower figure. According to Jencks it is something like 45 percent: Jencks and his colleagues estimate that "genotype explains about 45 percent of the variance in IQ scores, that environment explains about 35 percent, and that the correlation between genotype and environment explains the remaining 20 percent."[64] Moreover the evidence with respect to genetic determination is far less univocal than these writers imply: "different methods of estimating the heritability of test scores yield drastically different results" and "studies of different populations yield somewhat different results."[65] Again, children's test scores are not immune to considerable improvement by effecting changes in their environment. Eysenck suggests that "Clearly [*sic*] the whole course of development of a child's intellectual capabilities is largely laid down genetically,"[66] yet this is strikingly contradicted by a number of twin and adoption studies.[67] Second, psychologists notoriously differ about what IQ tests measure: some, such as Jensen, Herrnstein, and Eysenck, believe it measures some basic property of the intellect; others believe that intelligence is multidimensional, that it cannot be measured by a single number, and (according to many authorities) that that number in any case measures educationally and culturally specific aptitudes with limited wider applicability. Third, and related to this last point, it

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 159, 224.
[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 224.
[62] R. Herrnstein, *IQ in the Meritocracy* (London: Allen Lane, and Penguin, 1973).
[63] Arthur R. Jensen, *Educability and Group Differences* (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 363.
[64] Jencks, *op. cit.*, p. 315.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[66] *Op. cit.*, p. 111.
[67] See Jencks, *op. cit.*, Appendix A.

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has been established (at least for the U.S.) that (1) social class is not, *pace* Eysenck, "determined strongly" by IQ; (2) educational attainment depends less on IQ than on family background; and (3) IQ is not a major determinant of economic and social success.[68] Fourth, the difference in average IQ-test performance between blacks and whites is consistent with all three of the following hypotheses: that it is explained by genes, by environment, and by both.[69] Moreover it appears indisputable that present data and techniques cannot resolve this issue. It certainly has not been established that one can extrapolate from genetic determinants of differences within a population to explain mean differences between populations. And it is worth observing that, in any case, genetic differences within races are far greater than those between them, accounting for 60–70 percent of all human genetic variation. In general, it appears entirely reasonable to conclude with Jencks that it is "wrong to argue that genetic inequality dictates a hierarchical society."[70] This is so even if Jensen should turn out to be nearer the truth than Jencks, and heredity does substantially constrain the maximum achievable by different individuals in the best of all possible environments. For, as we have argued, the principle of equal respect requires, in Tawney's words, that society's organization be planned so that "whether their powers are great or small, all its members may be equally enabled to make the best of such powers as they possess." Since this requires the equalization of rewards and privileges, biological differences would correlate with social positions but not with unequal rewards and privileges attaching to those positions.

Sociological arguments for the inevitability of inequality are of two broad types. One is that inequalities are functionally necessary for any society, the other that they are inherent in the very nature of social life. A much-discussed example of the former is the so-called functionalist theory of stratification; an interesting instance of the latter is furnished by Ralf Dahrendorf.

Davis and Moore's "functionalist theory of stratification" seeks to demonstrate "the universal necessity which calls forth stratification in any social system."[71] It advances the following propositions:

1. Certain positions in any society are functionally more important than others.

2. Adequate performance in these positions requires appropriate talents and training.

3. Some such talents are scarce in any population.

4. It is necessary (a) to induce those with the requisite talents to undergo the sacrifice of acquiring the appropriate training; (b) to attract them to the functionally important positions; and (c) to motivate them to perform in these positions adequately.

5. To achieve these objectives, differential incentives must be attached to the posts in question—and these may be classified into those things which contribute to (i) "sustenance and comfort"; (ii) "humor and diversion"; and (iii) "self-respect and ego expansion."[72]

6. These differential incentives (unequal rewards) constitute social inequality, which, in securing that the most talented individuals occupy and adequately perform in the functionally important positions, fulfills a necessary function in any society: "Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons."[73]

CONTROVERSY over this theory has raged for well over two decades,[74] and it is fair to say that the balance of the argument has largely lain with the theory's critics. There is the evident difficulty of identifying the "functionally

[68] See Jencks, *op. cit.*
[69] *Ibid.*, Chapter 3, Part II.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[71] K. Davis and W. E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification" in Bendix and Lipset, *Class Status and Power* (see n. 27), p. 47.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[74] See G. A. Huaco, "The Functionalist Theory of Stratification: Two Decades of Controversy," *Inquiry*, 9 (Fall 1966), pp. 215–40.

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important'' positions, as distinct from those that a given society values as important (bankers or miners? elementary or university teachers?) and the dubious assumption that training for these positions is sacrificial (especially since there would, presumably, be no material loss in an egalitarian society). Also, it ignores the point that a stratified society itself restricts the availability of talent, and the further point that an advanced industrial society is in principle able substantially to increase the availability of talent and training. A further weakness of the theory is its assumption that unequal rewards (defined in a most culture-specific way) are the only possible means of mobilizing qualified individuals into adequately performing important jobs. It leaves out of account the intrinsic benefits of different positions, in relation to the expectations, aptitudes, and aspirations of different individuals (potential surgeons being anyway attracted by practicing surgery and potential carpenters by carpentry); and it fails in general to consider functional alternatives to a system of unequal rewards—such as intrinsic job satisfaction, the desire for knowledge, skills, and authority, an ethos of social or public service and a diminution of acquisitiveness and status-seeking, the use of negotiation, persuasion or direct planning, changes in the organization of work and decision-making, and so on. Finally, to the extent to which the thesis does remain valid, at least for contemporary industrial societies—that is, insofar as unequal rewards are needed so that certain jobs are adequately filled—this in no way implies a societywide system of structured social inequality, linking wealth, income, status, and power (indeed, it would probably imply the reverse); nor is it plausible to suggest that the range and scope of actual inequalities, such as those surveyed in the previous section of this essay, can be explained in this beneficently functional manner. It is, incidentally, noteworthy that liberal reformers in East European countries have used arguments analogous to Davis's and Moore's to justify the widening of income differentials (as did Stalin in the 1930s). But the Davis–Moore theory does not specify any particular range of inequality as functionally necessary—or rather, it all too easily serves to justify any such range which its proponents may seek to defend or establish.

Dahrendorf's theory seeks to demonstrate that ''inequalities among men follow from the very concept of societies as moral communities ... the idea of a society in which all distinctions of rank between men are abolished transcends what is sociologically possible and has its place in the sphere of poetic imagination alone.''[75] The thesis is essentially this: that ''(1) every society is a moral community, and therefore recognises norms which regulate the conduct of its members; and (2) there have to be sanctions connected with these norms which guarantee their obligatory character by acting as rewards for conformism and penalties for deviance,''[76] from which Dahrendorf concludes that ''the sanctioning of human behaviour in terms of social norms necessarily creates a system of inequality of rank and that social stratification is therefore an immediate result of the control of social behaviour by positive and negative sanctions.''[77] But the conclusion does not follow from the premises. It does not follow from the mere existence of social norms and the fact that their enforcement discriminates against those who do not or cannot (because of their social position) conform to them that a societywide system of inequality and ''rank order of social status'' are ''bound to emerge.''[78] Dahrendorf slides unaccountably from the undoubted truth that within groups norms are enforced that discriminate against certain persons and positions (he cites the example of gossiping neighbors making the professional woman an outsider) to the unsupported claim that, within society as a whole, a system of inequality between groups and positions is inevitable. To support that claim he would need to show the necessity of societywide norms whose enforcement neces-

[75] Ralf Dahrendorf, ''On the Origin of Social Inequality,'' in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., *Philosophy, Politics and Society: Second Series* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 107.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

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sarily discriminates between persons and social positions, and this he fails to do. Nothing he says rules out the empirical possibility of a society containing a plurality of norms, each conferring and withholding status and prestige (so that gossiping neighbors look down on professional women, and vice versa), without themselves being ranked within a single system of inequality or stratification.

Finally, I turn to the argument that inequality is eradicable only at an unacceptable cost. This argument has been voiced in many forms, by those both friendly and hostile to socialism. A forceful contemporary formulation is that of Frank Parkin, who argues that

> A political system which guarantees constitutional rights for groups to organise in defence of their interests is almost bound to favour the privileged at the expense of the disprivileged. The former will always have greater organising capacities and facilities than the latter, such that the competition for rewards between different classes is never an equal contest. This is not merely because the dominant class can more easily be mobilized in defence of its interests, but also because it has access to the all-important means of social control, both coercive and normative. Given this fundamental class inequality in the social and economic order, a pluralist or democratic political structure works to the advantage of the dominant class.[79]

What this argument perhaps suggests, Parkin writes, is that

> socialist egalitarianism is not readily compatible with a pluralist political order of the classic western type. Egalitarianism seems to require a political system in which the state is able continually to hold in check those social and occupational groups which, by virtue of their skills or education or personal attributes, might otherwise attempt to stake claims to a disproportionate share of society's rewards. The most effective way of holding such groups in check is by denying them the right to organise politically or in other ways to undermine social equality.[80]

But historical experience of this approach has been pretty uniform: gross abuses of constitutional rights, terrorism and coercion, and, even when these latter are relaxed, the continuance of party control over all areas of social life, including literature and the arts. As Parkin observes,

> The fact that the humanistic ideals central to the socialist tradition have found little, if any, expression in the European socialist states highlights an unresolved dilemma; namely, whether it is possible to establish the political conditions for egalitarianism while also guaranteeing civil rights to all citizens within a system of "socialist legality."[81]

Conclusions

FORTUNATELY, this is not the place to enter into the whole question of the "socialist transition." I merely wish to conclude this essay with three brief observations. The first is that the massive inequalities of power and privilege outlined in the second part are, for many socialists, intolerable mainly because they violate something like the principle of equal respect delineated in the first part—a principle that derives from liberal premises, but takes them seriously. The second is that the arguments for the unrealizability of equality considered in the third part all fail to show that these inequalities are ineradicable, whether on psychological or sociological grounds. And the third is that the argument that the costs of implementing equality are too high is the most crucial facing any socialist today. And it is perhaps the inclination to see the accumulated weight of historical evidence for the apparent need to pay such costs—from the rise of Stalin to the fall of Allende—as a challenge rather than as a source of despair that is, in the end, the distinguishing mark of an egalitarian socialist. □

[79] Parkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 181–82.
[80] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

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Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Ten Years Later:

Perspectives on the Woman's Movement

The current woman's movement is unique in the American experience. This movement, multidimensional in character, is striking toward change in the structure of our major institutions, in the quality and content of our culture, and at the level of interpersonal dynamics. Not even a decade old, it has permeated the fabric of modern life.

Women, forever intimate and integrated with men, have been subservient to them, to a greater or lesser extent, in all societies. The women's movement is without precedent because of the special ambivalences that mark the relationship of women to men—the components of attraction and withdrawal; love and hate; need and distaste—which have not been characteristic of other subordinate groups. Furthermore, through the current movement women have sought to do more than demand greater access to the resources of society; they have wanted redefinition of who they are and what they are worth both in private relationships and in public ones.

It is difficult to analyze the extent of these changes within American society. One can look at the data—statistics that indicate rates of change in terms of numbers of women who now work in fields they never worked in before; numbers of women entering business and professional schools. Such changes are extensive if one measures what has happened since the beginning of the woman's movement in the mid-60s. But statistics do not indicate the cause of change, or whether it is rooted or ephemeral.

Because more has happened to alter the position of women in the past ten years than for a score of decades before, I think it is safe to assume that the woman's movement was the driving force. Neither past changes in the economy nor the two world wars, which utilized womanpower as never before, caused real alterations in women's roles. Although "the pill" surely made a large difference, contraception was widely used prior to its invention, and fertility, which increased or decreased according to the impact of other experiences, showed in general a downward trend.

Although millions of women had left home to take jobs during World War II, traditional ideology convinced them to yield these jobs to male veterans after the war. And while there is some debate as to whether women left factory jobs voluntarily or were laid off because of low seniority, veterans' job priorities, and the closing of war-producing factories, women did not assert their "right" to jobs previously defined as men's work. They were also persuaded that their first commitment was to the home, whether or not they worked. Myth conquered reality, and few recognized that a growing proportion of the labor force—close to one-third and increasing every year—were women. "Should or could women work?" was the eternal debate, while in fact women were working.

Most social commentators agree that Betty Friedan's book *The Feminine Mystique* provided the ideological underpinning for a woman's movement.

In writing *The Feminine Mystique*, Friedan became a Tom Paine for women. It was an

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analytic book, and it had popular appeal. In it Friedan sketched the problems women faced in a society that judged itself by the degree of equality it offered its citizens while excluding women from that judgment. The problems of black people were obvious to all—even to those who chose not to do anything about them. But whether women had a problem, or how important it was, seemed unclear to women themselves.

Friedan's book described a malaise, "the problem that had no name." She gave form to women's distress, and provided sound social structural reasons for it. She indicated how women's powerlessness drove them to lives of vicarious fulfillment, and how as consumers but not producers they were playing a frustrating role, but one necessary for the continuation of the economic system.

Friedan translated ideas into action when she organized the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966, and ever since she has been at the forefront of the enterprise, from the organization of the Women's Political Caucus to the first women's bank, and currently the Economic Think Tank on Women.

Friedan does not follow any "great man" model of leadership. Lacking both conventional charisma of person and the charisma of family or office, but with a compelling intensity, she became a person with a message to be reckoned with, at a time when conditions in the economy and the ideological structure of the society were ripe for change.

We have no model of leadership for women; there is only the model of the ideal woman whose qualities of dedication to demure service and soft nurturance are inconsistent with the demands of a leader's office. Men might fight for liberty, but women were to defend only the sanctity of the home and morality; liberty, with its connotations of self-realization, was not deemed her province.

While Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and others who organized the first woman's rights conference in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848 were regarded as revolutionaries and insurrectionists, Friedan has drawn fire from both the Left and the Right—accused both of middle-class reformism and disruption of the family. Part of the attack is directed at the alleged impropriety of her personal style and appearance.

How curious that not only is the leader of the woman's movement judged by how well she fits the acceptable modes for a proper lady, but so too is the *movement itself*! Polls indicate a growing sentiment in support of more equality for women, but they show that women not associated with women's groups do not care to be thought of as "women's lib" types. In fact, a current poll by the Roper organization shows that 57 percent of the women questioned favored efforts to strengthen their status, an increase over the figures reported in 1971 and 1972 by Louis Harris, in which 40 percent and 48 percent expressed support. But in 1972, 49 percent were still unsympathetic with efforts of women's liberation groups.

Perhaps it is characteristic of subjugated groups to become convinced that they have little right to question the views of their "betters." It has certainly been true of women, who, in public debate and in philosophical and psychoanalytic tracts, have accepted such definitions and the rationales supporting them. The antiegalitarian views—the Old and New Testaments; the writings of Nietzsche, Freud, and even of political theorists such as Jefferson—have gained popular support through time while competing views—those of John Stuart Mill, Charlotte Gilmans Perkins, and later Karen Horney—did not.

I suggest that this is not because the competing ideas were less philosophically or scientifically sound, but because the gatekeeping, both formal and informal, of the males in power created support for the explanations they preferred. Furthermore, the longer these views were supported and adopted by a majority of people, the more "normal" they appeared to be.

The change of the feminist movement at the turn of the century from a radical ideology demanding change throughout society to one of relative moderation was probably caused by the powerlessness of women. Earlier, just

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getting the vote had been dismissed by Elizabeth Cady Stanton as "not even half a loaf; . . . only a crust, a crumb."

Getting the vote did not even put women into the *political* mainstream. Aside from pressure in the 1920s, which led to protective work legislation, women did not create focused political interest or do much lobbying. Under pressure from the Catholic bishops, Congress had by 1929 cut appropriations for the Women's Bureau and the Children's Bureau. The vote became like money in the bank that its owners were afraid to spend even as it lost value through inflation. At most, women's suffrage may have put a brake on the further enactment of regressive legislation.

If women were not exercising political power, they were moving into the labor market in increasing numbers and played active nontraditional worker roles during the two world wars. A general movement toward mass primary and secondary education, and then toward higher education for many students, meant that women were no longer confined to the home. The home may have been where their heart was, or was expected to be, but their feet were often off and running.

Yet each bit of advancement was met with severe opposition. Educating women or opening opportunities to work have not necessarily been indicators of public sentiment supporting women's *rights* to equality. What made the women's movement in the U.S. unique was that changes in behavior and attitudes were demanded, not only in the society but in personal life as well.

In that way American women were more avant-garde than their sisters in the East European countries. We know that Soviet women physicians (75 percent of all doctors) must also perform household duties unassisted by husbands, and without the mechanical aids available to American housewives. The Soviet grandmother is the chief child-care institution in that country, as she is still in Italy, France, Germany, and, to some extent, in the United States. Child care and housework still seem to be assigned to women universally, and this checks their ability to assume commanding positions in other areas of life, even where they constitute dominant numbers. In all countries, and in the "socialist" ones too, despite the ideological claims of writers from Engels to Mao, entrenched habits of mind linked with the vested interests of men in power have kept women assigned to roles men don't respect or wish to perform.[1] In no country has women's equality yet been accomplished, or has there been complete reevaluation of modes of thought that define women's capacities and roles.

To return to the American situation: in initiating a new woman's movement in 1966, Betty Friedan took a step that was to raise the consciousness of millions of American women and result in the formation of thousands of groups, both formal and informal. Moving swiftly, organizations such as NOW and WEAL (Women's Equity Action League) sought to implement the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This act, intended to stop discrimination against minorities, was amended to include sex in a last-minute effort by Representative Howard W. Smith (D. Va.) who thought the added word might send the entire act to defeat. Not only did the act pass, it provided the major foundation for movement activity. The combination of law and the organization of women was powerful. There were other allies. The Equal Economic Opportunities Commission (EEOC), which before had handled only cases of discrimination against minority people, established guidelines for compliance with Civil Rights Act provisions relating to women. It was the EEOC and a number of feminist lawyers who took on the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the largest employer of women in the world, and won a landmark agreement forcing AT&T to provide goals and timetables for the hiring and promotion of

[1] I can only refer to the situation in China tentatively because there have been no large-scale studies of change in the role of women there and we are largely dependent on the reports of travelers for information.

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women and minorities. AT&T was also forced to pay $15 million in back pay to persons who had been denied promotion because of discrimination and $23 million in immediate annual pay increases to women and minority males who were deemed underpaid in their job classifications.

The EEOC action against AT&T not only demonstrated that women had power if they cared to use it, but that there was support for their position in and out of government. Contrary to critics who labeled the women's movement an enterprise of privileged white middle-class women, the AT&T case proved that women working for women were working for women at all levels of the socioeconomic pyramid. It showed that women were oppressed as a class and that legislation giving middle-class women an opportunity to be hired as lawyers also gave lower-income women the opportunity to be promoted as supervisors in factories and businesses.

Middle-class women had louder voices than lower-income ones; perhaps because their aspirations were spurred by rising opportunities they were more discontented. Many of the women most involved in "causes" were drawn from those who had been active in the civil rights movement or had been student activists. In the late 1960s these women started realizing the extent to which they themselves were victims of discrimination. Assigned to the kitchen to cook for striking students in Columbia University; hooted off the platform at the SDS national convention for introducing women's liberation resolutions; mocked by Stokely Carmichael in his classic remark that the only position for women in the movement was "prone"—young women, finding themselves somehow excluded from all social reform programs, sought focus for their rights.

Splinter groups broke away from NOW in the late 1960s over issues of radical politics and on the role of lesbians in the movement. As Friedan was asking for women to be "in equal partnership with men," some women's groups were campaigning for separatism. A few groups argued that women should join together in their own communities, away from man, the enemy. Lesbianism, in this context, was seen politically as a way of life for women who could express their sexuality apart from men. In fact, sexuality and sexual activity became targets of attack. Beliefs concerning women's sexuality had long been used to legitimate their second-class status. Biology, it turned out, was more politics than science. New freedoms in sexual morality, which gave women permission to discard the ideal of chastity, had their repressive side. Young men expected them to be more available sexually outside of marriage and the women felt a compulsion to comply. There were no longer unequal costs to women for having sexual relationships, and some were beginning to initiate them, but sexual equality, women soon found out, was not necessarily linked to equality in other spheres.

Although sexual mores had been changing toward greater liberality since the Victorian period, the talk about sex still seemed radical to many Americans. It was one thing to be for equal pay for equal work. It was another thing to be in on the discussion about the "big O." Women's liberationists campaigned for the clitoral orgasm as Freud, in his way, had campaigned for the vaginal orgasm. Women were insisting on their right to orgasm in reaction to older claims that women weren't as capable of sexual fulfillment as men. Here, as in other spheres, new freedoms created backlash. It was claimed that men not only disliked all this talk about sexual rights for women, but were "turning off" and becoming impotent in response to these sexually emancipated women. All changes in the direction of emancipation effected by the women's movement could expect to be sabotaged in newer and more subtle ways.

Before the modern woman's movement existed, Philip Wylie was complaining that "Momism" was killing the manhood of American men, and indeed there was a spate of scientific studies that "proved" mothers were responsible for traits ranging from juvenile delinquency and homosexuality to aggressive achievement motivation. Now American women were reminded of their responsibility

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for maintaining the intensity of sexual drives in men. So vulnerable were men, it was claimed, their very sexuality was dependent on women's submissive behavior. Science also provided a number of studies to back up that notion and showed case after case where female animals had to present themselves submissively to males in order for sex to work.

Intellectual and political arguments over sexual capacity, sexual etiquette, and sexual "rights" were fought in the laboratory, movement meetings, the media, and in the bedroom. But it was clear that whatever truths were discovered, their interpretation could be used to serve any side of an issue. Science, like alcohol, can apparently make people sexier by loosening their inhibitions, or frigid by depressing them. Science had still not provided the answer to who was fit to make decisions in society.

The women's movement meanwhile was working steadily and expanded into academic and professional organizations of all types. Formally excluded from male societies, women sometimes had formed separate professional associations (which had low prestige and little power) or served peripherally in service roles in the "integrated" organizations. In the past six or seven years, however, these major associations have had to cope with emergent women's caucuses, which pressed for representation in decision-making committees and offices. (A recent count showed women's units within 67 professional organizations as diverse as the Society for Cell Biologists and the American Management Assocation.) These organized professional women were instrumental in increasing the representation of women in professional and graduate schools.

As women became more vocal in these male domains, they also insisted that sexism was embodied in the work of the professions and that it be identified and routed out. Thus women in medicine urged more respect for women as patients and the more serious study of diseases associated with their sex. There was pressure for demystification of the male medical establishment by feminists and young male physicians who had become alert to the problems of minority groups in getting good medical care. Many women had felt physicians often treated them as hypochondriacal half-wits whose gynecological pains seemed less worthy of medical concern than pains associated with more androgenous zones of the body. Young feminists formed self-help clinics and recruited sympathetic women doctors, although there were few to choose from. Quotas on women in medical schools, like those in law and business schools, had been kept at a fairly constant 3–10 percent from the first opening of the doors to women until the late 1960s. Feminists also analyzed medical texts in current use and exposed stereotyped characterizations of women's psychological makeup which had no basis in reality,[2] in the same way they monitored the media and schoolchildren's texts for stereotyping of women in classic housewife roles.

In law, a number of vigorous women students' associations were formed. Slowly, the barriers to admission of women eased. That change did not come about by feminist effort alone. The movement was gaining strength in a context of concern with civil rights and it was also the time of debate over the Vietnam war. Women found it easier to get into law schools, not because the doors were opened in immediate accord with their demands, but because there were fewer male applicants (draft exemptions were not granted for law school). Furthermore, young women were beginning to feel that by going to law school they could "be something"—a lawyer—an experience few could have had after earning a degree in history or literature.

[2]Diana Scully and Pauline Bart, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Orifice: Women in Gynecology Textbooks," in Joan Huber, ed. *Changing Women in a Changing Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 283–88. Consider these examples: "the traits that compose the core of the female personality are feminine narcissism, masochism, and passivity"; and "sexual pleasure is entirely secondary [to the urge of motherhood] . . . sexual pleasure is entirely absent or secondary."

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Young women lawyers (as well as interested male researchers) learned that in a number of states women offenders were likely to receive stiffer sentences than men for the same crimes, because women's criminality was perceived as more threatening to the moral structure of society than men's. The attitudes of judges and other lawyers toward women clients and attorneys became the target of feminist attack.

Still there was evidence that in some professions the study of women or problems relating to women was not considered as serious as study of other problems. Family matters, or any areas related too closely to women, have always been at a disadvantage in the prestige structure of the professions; to be a marriage and divorce lawyer always meant to be less of a lawyer, as to be a family sociologist meant to be of lower rank than a sociologist of organizations.

Certainly, word was spreading throughout the U.S. Although much media news about women's endeavors to improve their situation was tinged with derision and humor, and often only the dramatic and radical activities gained attention (picketing and those oft-cited but infrequent bra-burning demonstrations), women throughout America were reporting that they were reassessing their roles as housewives and mothers. They were becoming sensitive to the discrimination they were facing in getting jobs, getting credit, the dependency problems they had in marriage and the disorienting anomie that divorce created in their lives. Consciousness-raising groups started in suburban neighborhoods with middle-aged women following the models set by young, college-aged women in urban centers. In fact, college-aged women, infused with a sense of the waste they saw as the tragedy of their mothers' lives, seemed to be turning more toward planning careers that could be held (still in conjunction with marriage) throughout life.

Women not counted among the many thousands in feminist organizations were nevertheless following feminist principles even as they rejected the "taint" of identification with the movement. A 1974 poll reported that almost half (46 percent) the women polled in a national sample preferred a marriage "where husband and wife share responsibilities more—both work, both share homemaking and childcare responsibilities."

Still, large questions remain. The great fear of feminists is that the movement's apparent great strides will turn out to be token changes or the result of fads. There are also fears of the repercussions that may result from entrance of very large numbers of women into professions where they were virtually absent before. Now that many law schools have classes that are nearly half female, the question remains whether substantial numbers will be able to get jobs. Law firms often were pleased to hire a few exceptionally able women attorneys; and the few women engineers who graduated in the early 1970s can pick and choose among companies looking for minority recruits. But feminists are aware that affirmative-action programs in these organizations are the motivating factor in their hiring and not a sudden appreciation of women's talents.

Increasingly tight economic conditions create another source of trouble. Employers may feel freer to retreat to older hiring practices, especially when their token group has been completed. In 1970, 65 percent of American women polled by Gallup believed they got as good a break in life as men, and the 1974 Roper poll reported that three out of four women interviewed said that being a woman has not prevented them from doing the things they wanted to do in life. There is always the chance that having won more equality in a few areas, as women did at the time they won the vote, they may lower their guard and their militancy.

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It is too early to be certain of the lasting consequences of the women's movement. We can, however, sketch some areas of major change and others where change is significant but countered by other conditions.

• Item: While women have increased their percentages in law (from 3 percent to 4.9 percent between 1960 and 1970) and medicine (from 7 percent to 9 percent), this has not substantially affected the generally unchanging sex-division of labor. There continue to be tendencies toward creating boundaries between "men's work" and "women's work."

• Item: While more women are now getting jobs in the male-dominated professions, they are still being directed into types of work considered "suitable" for women, and avoiding, or being kept out of, male preserves. In the legal profession, for example, women could only find work in the trusts and estates divisions of large firms, or had specialities in divorce, child custody, and real-estate work in smaller firms. Today women lawyers are "choosing" specialities that seem largely the same or their equivalent. For example, newly created women's firms are dealing with "women's matters" (such as sex discrimination and rape as well as divorce) and thus come to be professional ghettos.

The "ghetto" phenomenon is manifested in other ways. Many new women professors in law schools are asked to teach "women and the law" courses and find they are often lecturing mainly to women.

• Item: More women have entered graduate schools of business administration and are then getting management trainee positions in government and business. But it is clear that many of them are made assistants to senior executives, or administrative assistants in charge of personnel or affirmative-action programs. Although these are "management" positions (and thus count on the charts monitored by government agencies) and pay executive-level salaries, these jobs are not on the track to high administrative offices. Women, like blacks, are given separate work, apparently equal to male executive jobs but unequal in career potential.

• Item: Many more women seem to be running for political office. Those who are elected are highly visible and some (Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm) have spectacular images. An important qualitative change over the past is that a growing number of women in political life seem to have made their mark without attachment to a male politician. It was not so in the past. Becoming a widow of a congressman or senator was a common route for women in American legislative life. Yet Ella Grasso, just elected governor in Connecticut, or Congresswomen Bella Abzug, Shirley Chisholm, and Elizabeth Holtzman of New York, and Yvonne Braithewaite of California all seem to be their "own women."

• Item: The woman's movement gained strength during a time of high employment and a vigorous economy. There is great fear that a depression would destroy the now uneasy balance between the feminists and the gatekeepers of the opportunity structure. Young men, now seen as more egalitarian than their elders, may become more conservative as they face the competition of increasing numbers of women for a limited supply of jobs. At the level of middle management, men express fears that they are increasingly deprived of chances for upward mobility because blacks and women are favored for promotions. The statistics do not substantiate these fears, but it is certainly possible they may be realized as more women become trained.

• Item: Women are going to work at all levels of the economic pyramid, and married women, even with preschool children, have become more firmly attached to the labor force. The number of working mothers whose youngest child is in the age group from three to five rose by 13.2 percent since 1960; it is now 38.3 percent of employed women. Those with children under three went up to 29.4 percent.

An increasing number of female heads of households, both black and white, have no choice but to work. And as inflation puts a greater strain on family incomes, it creates a

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need for both spouses to work. Currently 56 percent of husband-wife families are multiple-worker families, an increase over the present 47 percent of 1963.

All of these factors create new conditions for the playing-out of the ambiguous commitment Americans have to women's equality. Clearly, backlash is mobilizing in many forms. Employers are protesting the economic costs of special training for women. (The whole notion of the need for special training may be a bugaboo. It seems clear that women need jobs more than training, especially because most work is learned on the job.) Many groups are protesting what they regard as preferential treatment for designated minorities. The reaction of some Jewish groups against quotas (e.g., the DeFunis case) speaks to the sensitivity caused by competition between minority groups for a limited number of places.

There is also the insidious backlash many women are experiencing in their personal relations with men. Although most men today find it necessary to indicate a commitment to the ideals of equality, the translation of it into their personal lives is difficult and often cumbersome. Marriages seem ever more fragile under the new assaults of the incongruent needs for autonomy and privacy, for rest and support on the part of both partners.

Any set of freedoms creates problems of disharmonies between the rights and needs of the individuals involved. Not only the men, the women, too, tire of the battle and may retreat into traditional models of marriage to reestablish equilibrium in their lives. But even this is often no solution because neither partner is really convinced of the ideological worthiness of the compromise.

All movements need momentum, and an ever-militant corps who will unceasingly maintain pressure. Many women are consolidating the gains they have achieved in the struggle for equality by uncovering myths, by advancing in their work, without letting a sense of defeat stop their efforts. But there is often little time for movement activity if they have a job and are also doing the dishes and being the mothers in a society still unresponsive to the needs of women for household assistance and child care.

Furthermore, there is some indication that attention directed toward improving the status of women is now being diverted into other realms. Energy and the economy have the headlines. With a sense that enough has been done, government and the private sector may lean back and lessen their efforts.

There is indication that the issues of women's equality is still a joke at high levels. Witness President Gerald Ford's first address to a joint session of Congress on August 12, and his egregious assertion that he would be "the President of black, brown, red and white Americans, of old and young, of women's liberationists and male chauvinists and all the rest of us in between. . . ." But consider the uproar he would have generated had he asserted he fell somewhere "between" the racists and egalitarians. The next day, his wife, when questioned on her views of women's liberation apparently felt it a thorny issue, and only committed herself as far as "equal pay and equal opportunity" were concerned.

The achievements of the women's movement are not a joke, nor are those women who are committed to winning full equality. The swiftness with which they have advanced probably acts in their favor. Many remember the quality of life and work before (was it only ten years ago?), and none will forget the hard work that went into changing them. None will easily let the new freedoms slip away. Today there is enough organizational structure in local communities and nationally, in business and the professions, to keep movement projects going and recruit new adherents. A major recession would hurt everyone and probably minority groups most, but this society's general acceptance of the idea of equality will make it difficult substantially to undo the work of these past ten years. □

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Henry Pachter

Orthodox Heretic, Romantic Stalinist

On the 90th Birthday of George Lukács

This April Georg Lukács would be 90 years old. When he died, four years ago, he was eulogized for a number of conflicting reasons:

• To some, he was the guardian of orthodox Marxism and the only disciple who had ever dared to compose a complete "system," including the volumes the master had not gotten around to write: a massive *Ontology,* an equally comprehensive *Aesthetics,* and the adumbration of an Ethics, which only his death prevented from growing to similar dimensions.

• But others remembered him as the iconoclast who, 50 years earlier, published a fiery book, *History and Class Consciousness,*[1] which had proclaimed precisely the opposite: that Marx had never *intended* a system, that the very idea of a system is repugnant to the spirit of dialectics, and that to be an orthodox Marxist one need not subscribe to any particular proposition in *Das Kapital* as long as one follows the Method of revolutionary dialectics.

• The Lukács, however, whom the obituarists praised most was a scholar who had made important contributions to the sociology of knowledge and especially of literature and who had written sensitively on the theory of aesthetics. His life's work, one critic felt, was "a continuous meditation on the narrative, its basic structure, its relationship to the reality it expresses and its epistemological value."[2] Another had paid him the dubious compliment that "Lukács is actually a more bourgeois and academic humanist" than "the Luxemburgs and Trotskys, far more imposing figures."[3] With Lukács, most commentators believed, Western intellectuals might hold a "dialogue"—provided there were any who could match his vast erudition or the breadth of his concerns.

For numbered notes, see p. 187.

The Quest

THE QUESTION is not: Which was the "real" Lukács?—but: How were these three characters related to each other at different times? To answer it, we need a minimum of biographical data. György von Lukács, born in Budapest, was the son of an influential Jewish banker who had been knighted by the Hapsburg emperor. The family must have been everything he hated; sensitive and intelligent, he was alienated threefold from everything "real" by his race and religion, his language and nationality, his class and education. Liberalism was no answer to his problem of identity. The mainstream of Western culture at the turn of the century passed elsewhere. Lukács went to Berlin and Heidelberg as a dandy and aesthete, a brilliant adept of the exquisite circle of Max Weber and Emil Lask; he was attracted to the fashionable "vitalism" of Wilhelm Dilthey's school and communicated with disciples of the esoteric Stefan George, too.

These friends may have fortified his own

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neo-Platonic belief that "in the aesthetic sphere one might attain contact with ultimate reality through an act of intuition."[4] Their romantic protest may have been intended first as a reaction against materialism, capitalism, and bureaucracy, but it led to the irrationalistic and antirationalistic ideologies of nationalism and Nazism, which Lukács was to fight so bitterly in his later days. Some have wondered whether these censorious and frequently unfair attacks on idealists, subjectivists, and positivists may not conceal guilty memories of those early associations.[5]

The intellectuals wanted to oppose *Geist* (spirit) to gold. But when the First World War broke out, it was precisely the European *Geist* that broke down. Classical or neo-Romantic culture offered no shelter from the in-rushing age of the barbarians; on the contrary, in that war it was enlisted on both sides. In despair, Lukács wrote a parable, *The Theory of the Novel*.[6] Under the guise of a somewhat pedantic analysis of various literary genres, the book proclaimed that modern man had forfeited his heritage: authentic cultures can produce myths and therefore leave epics as a residue; modern culture was able to produce only a poor substitute, the novel, and even that had by now sunk to the level of psychology and naturalistic description, reveling in the sensuous experience of matter instead of placing man in his universe. Wars are no longer fought by heroes, and the novel is no longer carried by characters that typify man's eternal nature.

This, of course, was not a matter of taste, or of losing some embellishment of life. It was the loss of something that had been central to *Geist:* "The novel is the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God." Along with the radical Left, Lukács concluded that this wretched middle-class world was doomed. His eschatological mood drew him to the Russian Revolution: once again the Light was coming from the East and, incidentally, Lukács was preparing a *Habilitationsschrift* on Dostoevsky. He joined the Hungarian Communist party and took part in its unhappy venture, the seizure of power in 1919.

(A story Lukács wrote in 1912 clearly shows the influence of Weber's and Simmel's ideas on alienation: "The work grew out of life, but has grown far away from it. It originated in man, but is inhuman, indeed antihuman." Both his anticapitalistic yearning and his search for a return from alienation were characteristic of Max Weber's circle in Heidelberg; what Marianne Weber called Lukács's "eschatological hopes" continued long into his Marxist period.)

The Spirit was pressing to be realized in the world, but did not know how to become praxis. In the Preface to *History and Class Consciousness* (hereafter quoted as *H&CC*), a veritable *Apologia pro vita sua,* Lukács soberly states that then neither he nor his fellow revolutionaries had yet understood the workings and meaning of a social revolution. They were enthusiasts who went to war against the old world and would hardly ask the Hungarian peasants what they wanted. When he opened an Institute for Historical Materialism, Lukács announced that a new epoch in History had begun in which even the laws that Karl Marx had discovered would be abolished.[7] The revolution was beaten, and Lukács fled to Vienna.

In a similar situation Marx had decided that "the next revolution is as certain as the next depression." Such an easy answer no longer was possible for Lukács. His studies with Georg Simmel and Max Weber had revealed the coming of an iron age where bureaucracy and purposeful rationality would rule human behavior, and where all thinking, even that which seems intended to oppose the system, would reflect that structure. Humans have to see themselves as functioning parts of the system; their lives have not only been demystified but "objectified." The world has been forsaken once again, but this time in a more serious way.[8] Thought itself is a prisoner of the system; the workers, with their trade unions and their parties, do not overthrow it but—through their activities—help it to survive. A new variant of the discredited pauperization theory emerges: Even if the workers are not actually getting poorer, they are becoming poorer in spirit.

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Lukács had at first sympathized with syndicalist ideas and with Rosa Luxemburg's spontaneity theory. These assumed that in daily combat the proletariat acquires more and more "class consciousness," culminating in the moment of revolution.[9] Now Lukács saw that this pattern of revolution was true only for the bourgeoisie, whose economic power and social position were increasing long before it achieved political recognition. The proletariat, by contrast, is being pushed farther and farther away from the revolution, right up to the moment where its utter despair must reverse the situation. No act that is not directly related to that point of reversal can be called revolutionary, and "class consciousness" cannot be defined in terms of an ever-growing awareness but only as that "moment."

We notice here both the heritage of Kierkegaard and Lukács's own independent discovery of Lenin's theory of the party.[10] All gradualist, meliorist tactics are called "passive;" all apocalyptic, millennary hopes, whether of the anarchist type or Lukács's own previous ecstasies, are "abstract;" even Rosa Luxemburg, with her utopian hope of spontaneous creativity in class war, was a revolutionary "merely subjectively." Only the consciously directed effort of a disciplined party, guided by a correct theory, can crystallize the revolutionary energies during a period between revolutions. This is the famous "unity of theory and praxis." (In 1924, when Lukács wrote his brief monograph on Lenin, this theory of the avant-garde was still linked intimately with the hope of an early renewal of the revolutionary élan. He then quoted Lenin as saying: "Anybody who accepts the Bolshevik principle of party organization must believe that we live in a time of proletarian revolution.")

I have mentioned Kierkegaard, but I should now trace the ideology back to St. Augustine: the City of God is the Church; between revolutions, the revolutionary idea can live only in the Party. In the Party resides Hegel's World Spirit or the "identical subject-object" for which the romantic aesthete had been yearning and which he now finds embodied in an institution. The Party is not just an *instrument* of class war, necessary as that may be; it is above all the *incarnation of class consciousness itself*—"the tangible embodiment of proletarian class consciousness," he says in *Lenin,* after quoting the Communist Manifesto.

Lukács's development to Leninism can be followed in the sequence of essays he collected in *H&CC,* notably "Rosa Luxemburg," "Organization," and "Illegality." But the central piece is the famous essay "Reification," which maintained the old concern: that the Whole Man should be liberated from all estrangement (alienation *and* objectification); only, now the medium of that liberation is no longer aesthetic intuition but the action of the Party, the identical subject-object. *H&CC* was *The Theory of the Novel* turned political. I shall argue, therefore, that the caesura in Lukács's development did not occur when he joined the Communist party but much later, when he revoked the reification essay.

The Frozen Flame

IT IS DIFFICULT to describe today the electrifying effect Lukács's book had on an intellectual vanguard back in 1923. (Perhaps one might compare it to the impact, more than a generation later, of Sartre or Marcuse on a wider audience.) While academic teachers had spoken with resignation of the gap between humanity's yearnings and its chances of fulfillment, of the split between ethics and knowledge, or of the tragic conflict between essence and existence, Lukács proclaimed that theory and praxis form an indissolvable unity, that doing and knowing are one, that action can lead to salvation, that it is in the grasp of human reason to perceive the transition from "is" to "ought."

To a generation that had come out of the post-World-War-I revolutions somewhat numbed, this was an exciting promise. It was as though a new Prometheus had stolen the fire from Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Mind* (written under similar circumstances) and transplanted it into our century. In this fire the dirty reality of class war was being purified

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and transformed into the gold of intellectual aspirations: Communism, Lukács said, was not simply the substitution of the law of the market by a more intelligent or even more humane distribution system but the liberation of the Whole Man from alienation and solitude. These ideas profoundly influenced the thinking of the Frankfurt School and its friends—Erich Fromm, Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, George Lichtheim, Jürgen Habermas—and through them, a generation later, the New Left in Europe and even in the United States.

No doubt Lukács was right when (in the Preface of 1967) he claimed that "a whole host of good [people] were won over to Marxism because the problem of alienation had been taken up by a Communist." Moreover, the publication of Marx's *Early Manuscripts* in 1932 proved that Lukács had been right: they showed that for the founder of Marxism the proletarian revolution had been more than the emancipation of the workers—it was the emancipation of philosophy and of man himself. Rarely has a scholar's reconstruction of a lost text been so strikingly vindicated.[11]

But meanwhile Lukács had repudiated his own book. It is not true that he was forced to do so; Karl Korsch, who had simultaneously published the same views, never repudiated them. At that time, debates in the Communist movement were still lively; an adverse review in *Under the Banner of Marxism* did not yet make a martyr. Nor did the Comintern condemn a book because its content was unacceptable; books were condemned when they were written by the wrong authors, and it so happened that in the Hungarian refugee squabbles Lukács supported a faction that was out of favor in Moscow. When the Comintern leadership changed and his own faction was in sympathy with the new line, Lukács repeated his act of self-criticism; moreover, he criticized his romantic past in the guise of a study on Moses Hess,[12] the companion of Marx's Feuerbachian youth. For in the meantime he had changed over from the Communist ultra-Left to the Communist Right and had accepted Stalinism. Therefore it is not surprising that the new Preface of 1967, reiterating the recantation once more, warns a new generation of romantic revolutionaries not to be tempted by the enthusiastic errors of the author's flaming youth: "I am afraid my book became famous for the wrong reasons."

The Preface notably lists two "fundamental errors" in *H&CC:* in 1923 Lukács had denied "dialectics in nature," and he had failed to distinguish between "alienation"—the specific estrangement of the worker from his product—and "objectification," the general category of things as they appear to us. The latter is, according to Hegel, a necessary condition of progress and civilization; much as enthusiastic intellectuals would like to abolish it, this source of their *Weltschmerz* is likely to stay with humanity. Only alienation, a specific mode of capitalistic production, will be overcome by the socialist revolution.

It is obvious that the two kinds of "errors" are related. Even in a socialist society man will be subject to general laws that govern his necessary dialogue with nature; moreover, in the Soviet Union all energies had to be bent to the increase of production. Iron laws were governing and are still governing the accumulation of socialist capital: this is the only excuse for a rate of exploitation that exceeds those in the Western capitalist countries. If that system was to be maintained, the revolutionary process had to be declared closed: once the Soviet system had been established, it had to be a self-contained unit in which no further dialectics took place.

Here is the point where Lukács turns orthodox. His Leninist surrender to the Party, which terminated his independence as a revolutionary thinker, paralleled his turn to right-wing realism in defense of the Soviet Union and all its institutions and policies. In fact, with revolution in the West far away, the twin existence of the Party and of the Soviet Union now was substituted for the quest of the identical subject-object, or was passed off for its realization. Hence the necessity of a "system," the way every church has its theology.

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Lukács had fallen into the trap that Marx had accused Hegel of having set for himself. Lukács mistook for consummated that which, in *H&CC*, he had announced as purpose: "As soon as mankind has understood and restructured its existence, truth acquires a wholly new aspect. When theory and practice are united, it becomes possible to change reality." The revolution Lenin had accomplished was unique and irreversible, comparable to Kierkegaard's "leap." The practical command of ethics now was to side with the Soviet Union. The point was not whether a little more or a little less freedom was enjoyed there by individual proletarians but that the whole metaphysical entity had made that leap into the realm of freedom.

THIS LEADS to a number of consequences. Class war had been transferred to the international theater. Class consciousness meant to support the Soviet Union; to be outside the Communist party meant to be deprived of class consciousness and even of "history." Lukács deplored the "fate" of Korsch, who had thought he knew better than the Party and was expelled, and thereby deprived of history. Lukács, by contrast, bought his "entry ticket" to further political activity (the Preface of 1967 candidly admits) by recanting.

Another consequence was that "a good Communist could not tolerate any criticism of the Soviet government"—not only in the hour of greatest danger, as when it was "facing Hitler"; such a pragmatic argument might still be understandable,[13] although it does not gibe with the judgment, made in the same essay, that the Hitler-Stalin Pact was a "tactically correct decision." But there was also the deeper, metaphysical argument of "historical necessity." Remembering the flimsy justifications for the operation of the guillotine in 1793, Lukács also had no illusions about the charges in the Moscow mock trials of 1937. But since Stalin was at the head of the Soviet state, he had *the historical duty to destroy the opposition.*[14] It is hard to say what one should admire more: the candor, the naiveté, or the *esprit de système*.

According to Marx, cognition follows existence: Lukács's transformation called for a change in his understanding of the proletariat's role. Its consciousness had been usurped by the Party; but it still was supposed to be the substratum of man's creative potentialities. This was now separated from its revolutionary function as a class outside society that is forced to subvert it and therefore is able to disperse its mystifications, and labor is hypostasized into "work" as a metaphysical "foundation"—a veritable ideology such as the young Lukács had denounced. Although the Hegelian and Marxian dialectics excludes an ontology and epistemology separated from logic, Lukács did write an "Ontology" at the end of his life, just as he then recognized the "dialectics in nature." With a generous sprinkling of isolated Marx quotations, he thus created a system, a veritable *summa* of Marxist philosophy, where that which is superstructure—most ironically—is mistaken for the base (see my essay "The Right to Be Lazy," in DISSENT, 20th Anniversary issue, Spring 1974).

Teacher of Taste

THE TRANSFIGURATION from a St. John to a St. Augustine and from a St. Augustine to a St. Thomas is imperceptible to its victim. He need change only a few words. He can transform an appeal to the master's spirit into canonical quotations—and there is no Marxist worse afflicted with quotomania than Lukács. Yet, he was simply too intelligent and too well trained in dialectics to be able to fool himself. With all his dialectical skill he could not banish those "wrong reasons" that he had conjured up and that came to pursue him like Peer Gynt's "imagined sins." Neither the Party nor the Soviet government was that identical subject-object he craved to see, and the suppressed yearning found its natural outlet in a return to his first love—literature.

There is a line running from the German classics through Lukács's early work and right into the monumental *Aesthetics* of his old age:

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in the realm of "beautiful appearances" man experiences a liberating communion with truth.[15] Empathy was certainly no substitute for reason in Lukács's philosophy; but his works of literary criticism imply his conviction that the artist's intuition offers direct access to that truth and harmony that eluded him in the realm of politics. Twice at critical moments in his life, he tells us in his autobiography,[16] he forsook politics for literature: the first time after his efforts to reform the Hungarian Communist party in exile had failed, the second time after the abortive Hungarian revolution of 1956. He also says, there and elsewhere, that he used literary criticism to smuggle intellectual contraband into Stalin's barbarous empire.

It is here that a humanist Lukács seems to emerge: neither a rigid doctrinaire nor a flaming rebel—but a sensitive man of letters who fought valiantly to preserve good taste in the midst of totalitarian horrors; who recognized the great value of the classical (bourgeois) traditions and the permanence of their examples even for Marxists; who detested the colorless, schematic productions of "socialist realism," rejected agitprop art, and felt brutalized by the Five-Year Plan on the cultural front.

Since Lukács was convinced that good literature is essential for both a struggling proletariat and a socialist state, he appointed himself a teacher of taste in communism. Style carries a message, too, and it must be commensurate with content. The great writers of bourgeois realism from Walter Scott and Balzac (he thought they were in the same class) to Tolstoy and Thomas Mann were his models; they knew how to construct a story, and they knew how man stands in his world. Alas, contemporary Soviet writers did not know how to build full-blown characters, and contemporary bourgeois writers were concerned with all sorts of conceits rather than with substance. Their literature does not afford us the kind of insight that satisfies Lukács's craving for truth and harmony. In contrast, he preached the style of classical "realism" that alone, in his view, is revolutionary: it shows the world in the right relationship to man; it deals with man on the human scale.[17]

Throughout his life Lukács differed with other socialist critics like Plekhanov who grudgingly acknowledge the genius of a Dostoevsky and add a sigh of regret that such a great writer could not have been at least a little "progressive." Lukács is immune to such temptations; his judgments are incorruptible. In an article on Dostoevsky, he comes to grips with the problem boldly: literature supports the proletariat's struggle not by narrow partisanship or correct ideology but by teaching the reader how to face a reality beyond appearances, by presenting him with type-characters who make the working of society transparent. Armed with such insight, the reader then will be able to rebel against false pretenses and inauthenticity in bourgeois society ("*das Verzerrende und Falsche in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*"). Great art restores the genuine and harmonious relations between people because it restores harmony to man: "This dream [of the golden age] is the real, authentic core of Dostoevsky's utopias, a state of the world in which people can know and love each other and civilization is no longer a hindrance to the development of man's soul."[18]

This sounds almost like the young Lukács, author of *Die Seele und die Formen,* where art is presented as a special form of knowing eternal truths, and it corresponds with the intention of his late *Aesthetics,* where art appears as the way of realizing that evasive unity of fact and value, knowledge and practice, object and subject, all coinciding at the act of creation. Thus at the end of his long life, after a diversion into politics that failed twice, Lukács seems to have returned to his original position—whether neo-Kantian, Fichtean, or Hegelian is not important here[19]—that art offered a solution to his existential problem. The original title of this work—*The Uniqueness of the Realm of Beauty*—reminds us of Friedrich Schiller and points to Marcuse. "In Art, Thought materializes itself and matter is not determined in any extraneous way but exists freely....

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Nature and Freedom, Senses and Reason find their right and gratification as one."[20]

In his *Aesthetics,* Lukács assumes a special "realm" where art permits cognition in its own peculiar manner. This was truly a paradoxical way to end his philosophical career. Having devoted a lifetime to the fight against philosophies of "passivity," he ends by accepting a practice that is entirely theoretical contemplation. Having meant to "realize philosophy" in the world, he now is seen striving to save it from the world's harsh demands. How different had things been 50 years earlier, *when the word was pressing to realize itself in the flesh,* and the deed was the answer to the question of philosophy. We have seen how after the defeat the idea was crystallized and preserved in the Party; now it lives on in art and literature and, to be precise: in classical literature, in the exemplary, the model, the ideal. To the end of his life, beneath all the Marxist jargon, Lukács remained an idealist. As his beloved Novalis said: *Philosophy is really homesickness.*

This insight permits us to measure the extent of Lukács's failure. The Faustian moment, which he tried to catch in *H&CC,* passed him by;[21] the unity of theory and practice eluded him. It was a failure that happens only to those who have tried for the highest goal. The respect owed to such an endeavor also forces us to consider the seriousness of the substitute goal. The literary criticism of his later years did matter to Lukács. On its success depended the realization of what the Revolution had promised and so far had failed to deliver.

Literature as Political Weapon

THIS SOUNDS almost trivial, but it is the essence of Lukács's thinking in his last years: his loyalty to the Bolshevik conception of the revolution and to the Soviet Union through 50 years would be vindicated if Soviet culture were to produce a Tolstoy rather than a Semyonov. It was with genuine joy, therefore, that he hailed the appearance of Solzhenitsyn as the "harbinger of a new socialist literature"[22]—although he had serious reservations about Solzhenitsyn's *narodnik* philosophy. Interestingly, Lukács also had artistic reservations about Solzhenitsyn: "What is not realized in literary terms does not exist."

Lukács's involvement with literature was not an evasive action. He considered his ideas on style a guarantee that socialism would survive the Stalinist distortion. As a student of Georg Simmel and Max Weber, he was aware of the universal trend toward technocracy. He saw the age of the barbarians coming, and he prepared a time capsule for the survivors: the message was humanist letters. Art "discovers the path of humanity"; artistic resolution is "imperturbable faith in the progress of mankind and nation."[23]

The same reasoning applied even more strongly to the Nazi regime. "At a time when German criticism led a servile and insignificant existence, Lukács's work stood prominent."[24] What a moving sight: while the Nazi barbarians were booting down German culture, a frail Hungarian Jew, an exile sitting in a Moscow library, tries to rescue Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, and Hölderlin for future generations of Germans![25] Or: that same Western Communist, not too sure that he will survive the purges, writes lovingly about the Russian character of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, while Stalin's flunkeys are scribbling poems on the beauties of the tractor.[26]

It will simply not do to dismiss Lukács's literary criticism written in the Stalin period as "exercises in party regularity" or "crap."[27] On the contrary: these exercises are adroit maneuvers in a literary guerrilla war. The obvious flaws in these essays often betray the contrivance. In order to pass his beloved "classical realists" through the censorship office, for instance, Lukács must touch them up a little with proletarian rouge: thus, the last act of Faust II is said to be a criticism of capitalism! Nonsense; but maybe it will help keep Faust in the libraries while Ilya Ehrenburg is raging against everything German. An innocuous poem of Goethe's is said to refer to

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the Peasant War; King Lear is interpreted as a drama dealing with the dissolution of the feudal family. There is more of this "crap," and the better it achieved its purpose at the time of writing, the less can the unedited work be used as a guide to literature for the uninitiated reader.

I wish that were all. One might readily forgive Lukács an occasional boost for a mediocre writer who was a fellow traveler.[28] One might even understand why he forgot to mention the Dreyfus case in an article celebrating the centenary memorial for Zola—the year happened to be 1940, when Hitler was Stalin's ally.[29] But Lukács never was to disclose, later on, which passages in his voluminous writings had been "admission tickets." I suppose he no longer knew when he had been tacking; he had adopted the language of the dictatorship, his style had become dry and brittle, his thinking dogmatic and bureaucratic. He even made elementary mistakes unbecoming the great scholar he was.*

Critic and Polyhistor

AT THIS POINT, the price of tacking grew exceedingly high. Lukács had to defend modern realism against the Nazis *and* the Stalinists, excluding on one side romantic idealism and irrationalism, on the other positivist naturalism. This could be done only by applying a strict canon of aesthetics that excluded almost all experimenting and in particular the literary avant-garde, which Lukács himself, together with Ernst Bloch and others, had sponsored in the early 1920s. One should think that a Marxist critic would rejoice when a bourgeois writer like Kafka willy-nilly describes the disintegration of his world or his person; or that he would encourage a critical-satirical writer like Brecht when his allegorical plays take capitalist society apart. Far from it; Lukács deplores both as unconstructive and decadent. Their works may urge us to ask where we are going, but they do not show the transcendence that matters to Lukács.

In his critique of modern writing, Lukács tried to reconcile his increasing conservatism with the revolutionary stance of his youth. But more was at stake for him: the coherence of a world in which the revolution was possible. Thus in the programmatic *Realism in Our Time* (1956) he charges that Proust "separates time from objective reality, transforming the inner world into a sinister flux." He objected to modern art for the same reason that caused Lenin to condemn modern philosophy. Just as his political decision had frozen all revolutionary dynamism into the order of the Party, and just as his revolutionary dialectic was being frozen into a dialectical system, so he did not

*I will cite only a few examples; I hope they will not be interpreted as nit-picking, for I mean to ask why a man like Lukács had to forget what he knew. *Balzac and French Realism*,[30] his much-admired book, begins as follows: "*The Peasants*.—In this novel, the greatest (*bedeutendste*) of his maturity, Balzac wanted to write the tragedy of the doomed landed aristocracy." Nonsense: the "doomed landlord" is a Napoleonic general whose father was an upholsterer and who is constantly referred to as a "*roturier*" (bourgeois), whereas his prosperous neighbors belong to the old aristocracy, and the peasants, as we should expect from Balzac's imagination, support these traditional nobles against the upstart intruder. Yet to fit an admiring passage in Marx's letters, they have to be representatives of "capitalism."

In that same work Lukács remarks that *Don Quixote* is "a story of lost illusions ... The nascent bourgeoisie destroys the illusions of the still lingering feudal class." Miguel Unamuno confuted *this* delusion in 1914, and it can generally be said that whenever Lukács does not invent an idea he is usually 40 years behind in scholarship. In Ibsen's *Rosmersholm*, Rebecca has allowed her rival to go mad "in slow, imperceptible steps," and the tragedy reaches its climax when Rebecca realizes she is a murderer; Lukács decrees that this is no drama since no precipitous action is shown. He totally fails to see that the drama is in the revelation (as in, say, *Oedipus*). This time it is not the schematism of Marx but of Aristotle that stands in the way of Lukács's perception.

He also fails to see that Hebbel's *Judith* is a psychological drama whose theme is familiar to the post-World-War-II audience from Sartre's *Dirty Hands* or *Hiroshima Mon Amour*: Judith goes out to seduce Holofernes, the enemy general, and to kill him in order to save her people; but she is attracted by his ferocity and kills him in a rage of offended womanhood. Lukács thinks the playwright should have allowed her to kill in cold blood so as to keep the tragedy "pure" and without "accident." The last psychologist Lukács had read was Pavlov, and the Comintern vocabulary lacked the word ambivalence.[31]

These examples must suffice here to show that from the late 1930s on Lukács was writing below the level of his intellectual eminence and that these works cannot serve as a guide either to literary appreciation or to Marxist analysis, or to the significance of Lukács's work.

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judge that revolutionary literature must be experimental or avant-gardist. One knows that the symbolist writers, who had enthusiastically greeted the revolution in 1917, were increasingly unhappy in Stalin's Russia. Lukács, who supported the idea of "socialist realism" (though not its stupid application by illiterate culture czars), felt that avant-garde expressionism and futurism sanctioned individualistic, irrational, petty-bourgeois sentiments that threatened the Five-Year Plan in Russia and helped fascism abroad. He launched a literary offensive against Brecht, Bloch, and expressionism in general.[32]

The methodological error Lukács made in his sociology of literature is surprising. He assigns one style to a class at a particular period. But, in reality, creative artists react to their environment in highly differentiated ways. Although it is true that Marinetti and Benn were militarists, Barlach and Chagall religious, Nolde and Céline anti-Semitic, still, the majority of the avant-garde artists, especially in countries where the bourgeoisie was nationalistic, sympathized with the Left. Aragon, Éluard, Brecht, Gide, Malraux were Communists at least in the 1930s. Only a sycophantic *esprit de système,* an Aristotelian anxiety about the "correct" rules can label a style as petty-bourgeois without even a hint of analysis. Moreover, the sociological function of a style may change, or be ambivalent. Ernst Bloch suggested vainly that criteria that helped to understand Balzac and early 19th-century literature might not apply to contemporary works. Lukács did not understand what Bloch called the "utopian potential" of modern art. One looks in vain for Mauriac, Martin du Gard, Melville, Dreiser, Malraux, Gide, Joyce, Proust, Musil, Broch, Hesse in *The Historical Novel,* a book that praises many second-rate writers.

Lukács willfully shut himself off from modern literature. He simply had no ear for Brecht, Kafka or Beckett, for poetry or music. Even after he had admitted Kafka's power of expression, he kept insisting: but it's wrong to have such fantasies. It was rumored, however, that Lukács, on emerging from Dracula's castle in deepest Transylvania (where he had been interned after the 1956 revolt), was overheard murmuring: "Maybe Kafka was a realist, after all." *Se non è vero è bene trovato.*

Lukács stated that modern art justifies uncontrolled demonism and gives recognition to the irrational. He came down severely on his former friends, the German neo-Romantics. Intensely aware of their fascination,[33] he traced the protofascist ideas back to their vitalist sources. Incidentally, it can be shown that even in his romantic beginnings Lukács had never made concessions to irrationalism.[34] Yet with equal zeal he opposed "positivism"—the very opposite of irrationalism. In *The Destruction of Reason,*[35] he attacked the modern sciences with ultra-Leninist fervor: he called Wittgenstein a brother-in-arms of Heidegger; he charged that John Dewey considered changes in the social environment impossible; he accused Bertrand Russell and Herbert Marcuse, of all people, of spreading imperialist and religious propaganda. He regarded atomic science and biology as conspiracies to promote such vicious aberrations as positivism and irrationalism.

One knows the allergy of neo-Marxists to positivism; it was Lenin's bugbear and it can provoke a member of the Frankfurt School to write a sentence that is comprehensible at first reading. The reason is obvious: positivism destroys the metaphysical certainty that gives the master of the dialectical method inside knowledge of the World Spirit's next move. It sets up the specialized sciences to rule on problem-solving procedures in the several fields of human endeavor and thereby withdraws from a polyhistor such as Hegel or Lukács the right to make pronouncements on matters outside their own field—and "reading outside his field" is the classical definition of the intellectual.

Perhaps the key to the riddle of Lukács can be found in the absurd grouping of positivism and irrationalism. It is characteristic of sectar-

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ians and paranoids that they see all their enemies as clever disguises of one and the same—and dialectics is very helpful in establishing that, too. In Lukács's case the *esprit de système* imposed its operating code almost automatically: he was forced to prove that his rigid canon applied to all fields and all questions; he was forced to take in more and more territory and expand his pronouncements into areas where he had no expertise. And not only would the system have to explain the phenomena of the outside world; it also had to fit the conditions under which it had been conceived: *Lukács had to build his own tower of orthodoxy into the ramparts of Stalin's fortress.* The young Lukács had praised Marx for using the science of his contemporaries and developing his own truth through immanent criticism of their findings. The older Lukács does not relate to the science of his contemporaries as Marx related to those of his time; he rejected them as vulgar epigones and as products of a continuous decline from the heights that had once been reached in Hegel, Ricardo, Balzac, and Darwin. What is not classical has no right to be. After noting that Marx was able to learn from Darwin and Morgan, he says: "Nothing similar is happening today."[36]

The Historical Hero

IT IS A MISCONCEPTION that a Communist who cares for literature must be a *revisionist.* Nothing could be farther from the truth. Lukács has never said so himself; on the contrary, on numerous occasions he has warned the Communists that "right deviations" and "revisionism" are—in typical Comintern language—"the main enemy." Even in those famous "Blum Theses" of 1928, which he has quoted as proof of his independence, he rejected the slogan "democracy against fascism" in favor of Stalin's watchword: "No pact with pseudo-oppositions (against Horthy); fight against social democracy as mainstay of fascism."[37] As late as in 1962, he called "revisionism the greatest danger" and expressed a fear that Communists abroad might interpret Khrushchev's "coexistence" slogan as a serious goal instead of a tactical maneuver.[38]

Was Lukács at least an anti-Stalinist? In that same article he pleaded that one should not forget Stalin's merits. He asserted that all through the late 1920s and the 1930s and up to 1948–49, Stalin had been right "tactically as well as theoretically against all oppositions"—but that then unfortunately "he mistook tactical necessities for theoretical truths and thereby degraded Marxism into an ideology." *Not Stalin's crimes were his crime but his philosophical myopia; not his system was at fault but a personal failing.*

It was not until Khrushchev gave the signal that Lukács joined the de-Stalinizers, and then he boasted: "I can truthfully say that I was objectively [!] an enemy of Stalin's methods even at the time when I still believed myself to be his follower."[39] Stalin was a historical necessity in his time; now the time for critique had come. In the light of his own self-evaluations, Lukács was never a "revisionist." He never stopped being a disciple of Hegel—who saw Napoleon as "the World Spirit on a white horse."

But the public function of a thinker often differs from his private, narrow world. Lukács has passed for a revisionist not only because his early works have stimulated revisionist thinking but because repeatedly—however much against his wish and will—he clashed with the Soviet authorities. After a vain attempt to coexist with Matyas Rákosi, Stalin's henchman, he joined Imre Nagy's insurgent government in 1956, albeit reluctantly, and left it before the end of its heroic stand. He was temporarily interned and suspended from the Party for ten years. His late works have been savagely criticized in the East European press. His impressive collected works (*Gesamtausgabe*) in 16 volumes had to appear in West Germany. After his death his disciples were suspended from the University of Budapest; they can neither teach nor do research—and yet, Agnes Heller, his favorite, has repudiated his early masterwork.[40]

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Yet, if Western scholars hoped for a "dialogue," Lukács made it clear that it would not be a two-way communication. In his opinion, Western theory was so far gone in its decadence that he expected his partners to capitulate, and he never accepted coexistence in the area of ideology. On the contrary, the essence of his teaching was that class war is also an intellectual (*geistiger*) struggle. This part of his "idealistic" *H&CC* he never retracted.[41] He has fought a long, consistent, and often bitter fight against all humanist, existentialist,[42] and other "sentimental" or "revisionist" interpretations of Marx, against all attempts to link Marxism to Freudianism or to any other science.[43] He has rejected Gramsci, the Yugoslav Marxists, Erich Fromm, Leszek Kolakowski, and of course Marcuse. Nor have these figures found occasion to quote him. Naturally he also rejected Maoism as "subjectivist."

The Dialectical Paradox

FOR ALL THAT, the thought of the early Lukács remains as a leaven throughout the satellite countries—and there its study may be as dangerous as the study of the young Marx. In the West Lukács's work has given rise to a considerable body of academic scholarship, and many of his followers may feel that to teach Lukács means to do revolutionary work. They are tragically mistaken. To freeze dialectical thought into a teachable canon is the opposite of revolutionary action. In this respect the disciples suffer from the same misconception as their master did when he taught the proletarian writers "realism." With them, as with the early Lukács, cultural criticism has replaced the permanent revolution, and it is a strange irony that "bourgeois" teachers of English or of sociology should now mine the treasures of Lukács's system for textbook excerpts and ideas.

There are, however, other diggers at work. As the young Lukács found his way to the forgotten draft manuscripts of the young Marx, so the work of the young Lukács, disowned by the older Lukács, is now taken up by a generation of young critics who will forever love the search more than its fruits.[44] This was the message of *H&CC* back in 1923, and this message was a method. □

Notes

[1]Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* transl. Rodney Livingstone, with Lukács's new Preface to the 1967 edition (Cambridge: MIT Press paperback, 1972).

[2]Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and Form* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chap. 5: "The Case for Georg Lukács."

[3]Alfred Kazin, in the Introduction to Lukács's *Studies in European Realism* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964).

[4]George Lichtheim, *Georg Lukács* (New York: Viking, 1971). My hunch is that for Lukács, as for other Jewish intellectuals of his generation, Cabbalistic reminiscences took the shape of ultramodern philosophies.

[5]Morris Watnick in *Revisionism,* ed. Labedz (New York: Praeger, 1962); see especially Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1964).

[6]Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel,* with 1962 Preface, transl. Anna Bosteek (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971).

[7]*H&CC,* chap. 5. A similar claim was made when he returned to Hungary in 1947.

[8]Although Lukács has often been hailed as the founder of the "Sociology of Knowledge," it is fair to acknowledge his neo-Kantian sources. Emil Lask referred to Marx and Simmel as having studied *Verdinglichung* (reification), the hypostasizing of abstract concepts (such as Natural Law) as though they had a real, independent existence apart from the social-cultural realities they symbolize. Heinrich Rickert also condemned the illusion that "true history" can be written without "a definite idea of cultural values." On Lukács and Mannheim see Martin Jay in *Telos* 20. On reification see Heinrich Rickert, "Geschichtsphilosophie," and Emil Lask, "Rechtsphilosophie," both in Windelband, *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Festschrift für Kuno Fischer* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1905), vol. 2.

[9]The point is elaborated by both Watnick, l.c., and Andrew Arato in *Telos* 11, 1971: "Lukács's Theory of Reification."

[10]Although Lukács mentions the earlier debate in *Die Neue Zeit,* he does not seem to have known *What Is To Be Done?;* it had not yet been translated into German.

[11]It does not detract from Lukács's achievement if I note that he used Marx's "Introduction" of the now famous *Grundrisse,* which Kautsky had published as Introduction to *Critique of Political Economy* in 1902, and the *German Ideology,* which Bernstein had published in his *Dokumente des Sozialismus.* It is therefore not true that these two "reformists" were insensitive to the cultural and Hegelian side of Marx.

[12]English transl. in *Telos* 10; with *Der junge Hegel,* this is Marxist intellectual history at its best.

[13]Advanced in a letter to *Nuovi Argomenti,* 1962, #57.

[14]*Marxismus und Stalinismus* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1970).

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[15]"Man becomes truly himself when he creates his own world in the reflection in him of the world and makes it his own." Hegel, *Aesthetik* (Stuttgart, 1927) vol. 1, p. 477. Because of limited space I omit citations of the relevant passages from Friedrich Schiller.

[16]"My Road to Marx" in: *Marxismus und Stalinismus* (see note 14).

[17]Lukács, *Realism in Our Time* (New York: Mander, 1964).

[18]Lukács, *Der russische Realismus in der Weltliteratur* (Berlin [East]: Aufbau Verlag, 1952), p. 147.

[19]"*Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehungen in der Aesthetik*" in: *Logos* (1917!), pp. 1–19; see also *Die Seele und die Formen* (Berlin: Fleischel, 1911), and *Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen*, 2 vols. (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1963).

[20]Hegel, *Aesthetik*, vol. 1, p. 95.

[21]In *Goethe and His Age*, Lukács concludes that "in the world he knew [Goethe] could not see any objective social force able to fight Mephisto"[whom he had previously identified as representing capitalism].

[22]Lukács, *Solzhenitsyn* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971). He blames Solzhenitsyn for uncritically accepting the opinions of his protagonist, whom Lukács compares to the inarticulate peasant Platon Karatayev in *War and Peace*. The translator says "plebeian" and fails to point out that in the Soviet context "narodnik" is a grave accusation. It is ironical that in earlier essays Lukács himself had asked for "*Volkstümlichkeit*" (folkishness).

[23]"Balzac" (1940), in *European Realism* (see note 3).

[24]George Steiner, in the Preface to *Realism in Our Time* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964).

[25]Lukács, *Goethe and His Age*, transl. Robert Anchor (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969).

[26]Lukács, *Der russische Realismus in der Weltliteratur*. The Preface of 1946 fulminates against "counterrevolutionary calumniators who pretend that the new Russia has rejected classical Russian literature."

[27]George Lichtheim, *Georg Lukács*, l.c.

[28]E.g., Lion Feuchtwanger, a novelist then much in vogue, who asserted that the "confessions" in the Moscow Trials rang true.

[29]For connoisseurs, Lukács mentioned Voltaire's defense of Calas, to save his conscience! Incomprehensibly, this essay was printed unchanged in *postwar* East German editions (Aufbau Verlag, 1951); Dreyfus reappeared in a new edition, printed in 1963—but in West Germany!

[30]English transl. in *Studies in European Realism* (note 3).

[31]Both examples from Georg Lukács, *The Historical Novel*, transl. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell, Preface by Irving Howe (Boston: Beacon, 1962).

[32]"Grösse und Verfall des Expressionismus," in Fritz Raddatz, *Marxismus und Literatur* (Hamburg, 1969), vol. 2. Mr. Stephen Eric Bronner points out, in an unpublished summary of the *Expressionismus* debates, that Lukács was settling old accounts with Toller and others who had belonged to the Independent Social Democratic party. Ernst Bloch answered sharply in *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*. See Brecht's answers in his *Werke*, vols. 18 and 19.

[33]Watnick, *Revisionism*, l.c. (see note 5).

[34]Lukács, *Die Seele und die Formen* (see note 19).

[35]Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, his weakest work (see note 5).

[36]Lukács, *Marxismus und Stalinismus* (see note 14), p. 229.

[37]Lukács, *Tactics and Ethics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

[38]*Nuovi Argomenti*, 1962, #62.

[39]Lukács, *Marxismus und Stalinismus* (see note 14), p. 240.

[40]In *New Hungarian Quarterly*, 24 (Winter 1966), a magazine published in Budapest, she speaks of his "valid work since the 1930s," excluding *H&CC*.

[41]He did not think that Marxism needed any complement from modern sociology, psychology, or anthropology.

[42]Lukács's direct answer to Sartre in *Existentialisme ou Marxisme* (Paris, 1948) is surprisingly unphilosophical and weak. But that could not be otherwise, since only the standpoint of *H&CC* could have provided a satisfactory foundation.

[43]See note 36.

[44]In these works I certainly would include Lukács's pre-Marxist writings. For the significance of the early Lukács, see Judith Marcus-Tar, "Georg Lukács und *Der Tod in Venedig*," in *Weltwoche* (Zurich), July 2, 1971, p. 31. □

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Vladimir Medem

On Terror

Vladimir Medem was one of the major intellectual figures in the Bund, the Jewish socialist movement of Poland. Strong-willed and clear-minded, he was one of the first socialists in Europe to propose a principled criticism of the Bolshevik regime and its methods. In September 1918, in the Bund publication Lebensfragen *(Problems of Life), he wrote an article "On Terror," attacking the methods of the Lenin regime. We reprint this article in a slightly abridged form–its contemporary relevance need not be underlined.* – ED.

When Trotsky, in the first weeks of his regime, threatened opponents with an ingenious gadget that shortens a person "only by the length of a head," one may have dismissed the remark as a bad joke from a temperamental orator trying to cut the figure of a Robespierre. A few months passed and the tasteless joke became harsh reality, the difference being that, in "liberated" Russia, now instead of the chop of the bourgeois guillotine, "socialist" bullets whistle from Latvian rifles.

The system of ruthless persecution, doing away with freedoms and negating the achievements of the fledgling Russian democracy, has reached its logical consequence: a reign of mass terror, a governmental terror, broad and far-reaching, unknown in Russia since the dark days of Czar Ivan the Terrible.

A government that treads the path of terror signs its own death warrant. Terror has always been an indication of weakness and a source of future bankruptcy. Never in history has government terror yielded a definitive victory for the political system that depends upon it. "Blood," says Goethe's Mephistopheles, "is a unique sap." Blood gives birth to blood.

On the grave of every executed victim of government terror arise a hundred vengeance-seekers. Each shot sets in motion new waves among the sufferers. The terror-minded government grows increasingly isolated; its circle of support, narrower. It becomes demoralized: use of raw force decivilizes the holders of power.

A socialist government that uses mass terror is absurd: the very meaning of socialism connotes salvation for the overwhelming majority of a population. Socialism can be realized only by the people themselves. A socialism forced upon people—with rifles and machine guns, grenades and cannon, exclusive decrees and prisons—is no socialism. It is a ghastly misrepresentation of the term "socialism" and a perversion of its essence. Socialism is liberation. Slavery can never be a means to deliverance.

"But what can we do," the Bolsheviks claim, "the bourgeoisie are rebellious. Shall we let ourselves be guided by sentimental humanitarian-

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ism, put on white gloves and wait patiently till the bourgeoisie lovingly 'permits' us to realize our socialist ideal? Would that not be a utopian dream? Are we not obligated to sweep the obstruction from our path—sweep it away with weapons?"

The Bolsheviks answer their own question: "Yes, we must persecute the bourgeoisie and not await its popular demise." These are their words, but what are their actions? Against whom do they direct this merciless process of oppression?

Read through the material on Bolshevik deeds that we printed in our last three issues—material gathered not by sensation-seeking newsmen but by longtime, proven fighters for socialism, whose hearts tremble at the destruction of their lives' ideals. Read through the material carefully, word for word, and you will get a clear impression that it is not the laboring masses which employ such means but a group of bitter, confused usurpers fighting against the people.

Some bloody battle against the bourgeoisie! Is Spiridonova part of that bourgeoisie that must be exterminated? The same woman who sat at one table with Lenin—the party leader whom he proclaimed the "true representative of the poorest peasantry"? *

And Raphael Abramovitch, the left-wing Menshevik, who during the entire revolution fought against any coalition of workers with bourgeois parties—is he of the bourgeoisie?

Or the socialists who were thrown in jail, tried before "revolutionary tribunals," and stand threatened with a death sentence—are they of the bourgeoisie, just because they want to organize a conference of socialist workers? And the workers thrown out of the Soviets, deprived of voting rights because they are not Bolsheviks—are they of the bourgeoisie? And the Soviets themselves, which are, according to the Bolsheviks, the very embodiment of popular sovereignty—now they are hunted down by Bolshevik satraps, just because they do not agree to return a Bolshevik majority at elections. Are they, too, a bourgeois institution?

It is enough for us to pose such questions—answers are self-evident. Terror is used not against the bourgeoisie but against whatever does not carry the Bolshevik seal.

The Bolsheviks trifle with the meaning of "bourgeoisie." In their parlance the term loses any sense of relating to a specific social class; it becomes merely a label for non-Bolsheviks—even for tried and true proletarians. Since the Bolsheviks, even by their own admission, form only a small minority in Russia, the repressions of the government are directed against the large majority of the population.

Even were we to restrict the meaning of bourgeoisie to a pure usage, could members of that class really be wiped out? In Bolshevism's infancy it was customary to refer to a small band of giant capitalists who controlled the country's economy. According to this view, the revolution should have entailed just the arrest of three *minyanim* (quorums) of bankers. But even Lenin understood that this was a mistake: just a few months ago, in an informal talk, he declared the main enemy to be no longer the robber barons but the petty bourgeoisie. It turns out, though, that the latter comprises Russia's majority! Certainly, a political war can be waged against the petty bourgeoisie. Certainly, that class, under the increasing atmosphere of proletarianization, will become a minority sooner or later. One can oppress a huge economic class, but one cannot exterminate it, choking its members in blood through punitive expeditions.

THE MAIN POINT IS that rifles of hired Bolshevik soldiers are not directed at bourgeois millions but at workers, socialist proletarians. The day is not far off when we will see revolutionary tribunals in which the more kosher Bolsheviks will execute the more suspect; the circle of "kosher" or "authentic" socialists grows narrower. If today Lenin desires to shoot Abramovitch, who can tell that tomorrow he will not shoot Trotsky?

A socialist government that takes to mass terror signs its own death warrant.

Translated by GERSHON FREIDLIN □

* Maria Spiridonova, a leader of the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries (the Russian populist party), who had become a heroine in revolutionary circles because of the sufferings to which she had been subjected after she had assassinated a czarist general. —ED.

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Martin E. Spencer

Political Technicians, Corrupters of Democracy

The roots of Watergate, I would maintain, are to be found in an antidemocratic philosophy carried by a new political type I shall call the "political technicians." Their emergence can be laid to the weaknesses and decline of the regular party machinery—a decline resulting from the effects of the Pendelton Act, which removed a source of patronage from the control of party bosses and added to the disruption of the big-city ethnic-labor coalitions that had provided the power base for the machines. The upsurge of the reform movements in the Democratic party after the candidacies of Adlai Stevenson revealed the growing potency of "amateur" involvement in politics, and this tendency has increased. In recent years the influx of ideologically motivated "amateurs" in political campaigns has emphasized the feebleness of the regular party machinery, which is caused in part by the altered conditions for electoral success in an age of mass politics dominated by the mass media.

Beyond the local level, effective campaigning now requires access to the media, so the candidate can put forward his "image" among the electorate. This requires funds and the purchase of the talents of various media technicians who know how to package and "sell" a candidate—and the party organizations and party treasuries are insufficient for such campaigns. So the modern politician campaigning for state or national office requires his own organization to raise funds, conduct the campaign, "get out the vote." He requires the services of experts—public relations men, speech-writers, television directors, ad men, fund-raisers, and organizational technicians. These experts—the political technicians—are not people of the regular party, and this is crucial in shaping their political philosophy.

The personal campaign organization, dominated by the political technicians, has become a crucial factor in American politics. As the candidate assembles his apparatus, he calls on these technicians. They become his closest advisers, and they accompany him into the "corridors of power" if he is elected—e.g., Ehrlichmann, Haldeman, and Mitchell in the Nixon entourage. These political technicians may include pure organizational types, unconcerned with policy, and ideologues of the kind that accompanied George McGovern and Eugene McCarthy in their presidential campaigns. It is my argument that the amateur standing or ideological persuasion of the political technicians is less significant in shaping their distinctive, manipulative outlook than their position in the personal campaign organization. There are of course significant differences among these types—but it is decisive that they all receive their political experience in the campaign and not as members of the regular party apparatus.

Now these technicians indeed lack the experience of regular party activity. Party politics on the local level, especially the politics of machines, bends the politician into a bargaining posture toward his constituency, for the road to success requires that he render services in return for votes. This formula powered the old big-city machines in their halcyon days—they were the fount of favors, "loaves and fishes" generating political obligations harvested on election day. This relationship generates an attitude of *some* respect toward the public—although this may seem a curious way of speaking about the attitudes of machine politicians and "party hacks." This means, simply, that the practicing politician learns to take into account and even to fear public opinion. The "electorate" is an unpredictable, capricious monster to be placated with rewards. The politician learns to scent and serve this opinion—that's how he stays in office. And remember that the ordinary politician isn't a leader who can create a transcendent purpose out of public opinion. He merely caters to this opinion while trying to extract the maximum personal advantage from office. He may not set out to serve the "public interest," but he hastens to respond to interests that pressure him. He contrives "balanced tickets," secures advantages for his constituents, keeps his ear to the ground to discern distant swells of sentiment—for this is his political training.

The political technicians have no such training and therefore are ignorant of democratic politics. They have never run for office, have never cultivated the sense of responding to and serving a constituency. Their experience is centered on an entirely different axis, that of manipulation. They are technicians who seek to "create opinion." They believe politics is campaign organization—that the public will can be shaped and controlled by organization—"give me an apparatus and I will rule the world" might be their slogan.

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WHAT THEN IS THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE that shapes the world view of the technicians?

The loyalty of the political technicians adheres, not to a party or a principle, but to the leader in whose entourage they serve: they acquire power when their leader is elected to high office. The political philosophy of these men is based, first of all, on the psychological impact of electoral success. The thought that they have achieved office by their own efforts shapes their consciousness. This attitude was discernible in John Mitchell, a municipal bond lawyer who came to believe he was the fount of political wisdom after participating in Nixon's 1968 campaign. Flushed with victory, the political technician believes he is able to create power. He views the public as *an object of his craft*, not as a source of consent, which is the basis of the philosophy of liberal democracy. He believes that policy is created by elites such as himself and is then "sold" to the masses.

Although many of the political technicians are lawyers (e.g., Mitchell, Ehrlichmann, Haldeman), their philosophy does not include a respect for law. Since the basic idea is that legitimacy lies in their manipulative wisdom, they conceive of law in a purely instrumental sense. This attitude is like that of a corporation lawyer who considers the law as an instrument to be used in the service of corporate goals. For the political technician, the law can be bent or broken when it proves necessary. Here again the philosophy of the political technician is in exact opposition to the philosophy of liberal democracy.

The Philosophy of the technicians sees the state as a possession of a ruling technicist elite. The philosophy of corporate life is transposed to the political arena and as in a corporate struggle the victorious faction takes over the company, so here the structure of government is thought to pass into the hands of the winners. In its extreme form this attitude implies that the police and military departments of the state—the FBI, the CIA, the Army—become personal possessions of the executive to be used as he sees fit.

The technicist philosophy has obvious implications for the straightforward, honest conduct of government. Deceit and manipulation are not only acceptable but essential devices of government. Since the public is the object of control rather than the source of consent, a paternalistic policy of misrepresentation logically follows.

From the point of view of liberal democratic theory the media have both a right to inquire into the conduct of government and a responsibility to challenge the official version of events. If the government is seen as an instrument that exists to serve the people then it must justify any secrecy and the people must have access to knowledge about the state of society and government. An active press, in an adversary relationship with government, is the basic need of an "informed citizenry" that is the bedrock of liberal democracy. A government that accepts these ideals will also accept the adversary role of the press.

But in the world view of the political technician the media have no rights against the state. The basis of authority is the political technique and secret knowledge of the technicians that entitles them to manipulate the masses. The media must therefore become an auxiliary of government and aid the political technicians to control public opinion. There is no right to challenge, ferret and inquire, or criticize: in the technicist philosophy of government challenge and criticism are illegitimate and therefore merit punishment.

The technicist world view has curious, ironic consequences for the perception of politics. As it develops, the political technician, who prides himself on his political astuteness and realism, grows unable to understand the nature of politics. He tends to see politics as the mere manipulation of transient moods of mass sentiment and is therefore unable to understand the basic social and economic factors that underlie transformations of public opinion. Politics becomes a matter of "looking good." Because of this myopia the political technician will, in the final analysis, always be surprised by events, no matter how skillfully he rides the rapids of public opinion.

The structural conditions of American politics that breed the technicist outlook in the technicians has a similar impact on the men who run for office. The candidate cannot rely on the party to secure his election—i.e., the party lacks the power to confer office. So the candidate is thrown back upon his personal resources. He must gather funds, create a campaign organization, and he begins to feel that he creates his own victory. The conditions of mass politics—the appeal to an unseen audience by way of the media—require that he practice the public relations game of image manipulation. He thus comes to see himself as the source of politics. Along with his technicist staff, he falls victim to the arrogance of the technicist world view. There was evidence of this attitude in the presidential behavior of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Although the latter is by far the most striking case, it should be

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remembered that Kennedy was the creator of "managed news," and Johnson honed to a fine art the presidential pastime of experimenting with images.

I hold that an explanation of the Nixon presidency has little to do with the accidents of personality or with the "excessive growth" of presidential power. These men were corrupted, not by power, but by their philosophy of government and that philosophy was the product of their political experience, which in turn was shaped by the altered structure of American politics.

HOW IS THIS SITUATION to be corrected, if it can be corrected at all?

One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the widely lamented decline of liberalism. Although I have emphasized structural conditions, note should also be taken of cultural and ideological conditions—especially of the fashionable cynicism over liberal ideals. In contemporary America it is considered the height of political sophistication to excoriate American democracy. This widespread cynicism corrupts the vitality of liberal ideals, and it is consequently not surprising that political figures are less susceptible to their force. What is necessary is the vigorous reaffirmation of these ideals. Every instance of abuse of power should be publicly condemned. Only by the cultivation of moral outrage can these principles be maintained, and that is why those who have declaimed against the public concentration on Watergate are sorely off the mark. To pass quietly over Watergate is to certify the corruption that it represents; to demand the fullest public accounting of these events is to repair the damage to the fabric of civic morality.

As concerns a structural response to the abuse of presidential power the answer may lie in a parliamentary system. A presidential system offers plebiscitary possibilities and therein lies its danger. A parliamentary system demands strong and disciplined political parties—and this would go a long way to correcting the deficiences referred to above. It would eliminate the personal campaign organizations in which the technicians flourish, and it would require that the top political leadership of the nation be recruited from among the parliamentarians, i.e., men with training in the give-and-take of democratic politics. Such a system has its dangers, to be sure, as can be readily seen in the difficulties experienced by the West European nations presently suffering from "parliamentary cretinism." Given the different conditions of American politics, it may do better here.

In every era of sharp partisanship the opponents of a particular Administration have appealed to classical liberal theory in order to impose institutional restraints on presidential power. What they overlook is the necessity of a strong state structure for dealing with the problems of a complex society. It is not that power should be fragmented but that it should be made responsible. Institutional structural changes should aim at this end: that the conduct of politics in America breeds into its practitioners the ethos of liberal democracy and not the crypto-totalitarian creed of the political technicians. □

Marvin Caplan

What the Washington Labor Lobbyists Do

Here are some of the things one Washington labor lobbyist was trying to do in the final weeks of the 93rd Congress:

- help break the Senate filibuster that was killing the proposed Agency for Consumer Advocacy;
- save from extinction that last fine remnant of OEO's war on poverty—the community action programs;
- reestablish American commitment to the UN boycott of racist Rhodesia;
- block a bill that would make it almost impossible for minority groups and women to challenge the license renewals of radio and TV station-owners with discriminatory policies;
- protect school desegregation from any more "anti-busing" amendments.

To those who feel the American labor movement is hopelessly coopted by the Establishment, it may come as a surprise to learn that the Washington labor lobbyists regularly supply the muscle on Capitol Hill for most of the campaigns in support of civil rights and social welfare legislation.

The nucleus of the labor lobbyists is drawn from

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the AFL–CIO: a group of eight in the Legislative Department, headed by Andrew Biemiller, a former Wisconsin congressman, and a few more from the Federation's Industrial Union Department. They work closely with about 25 or 30 representatives of international unions affiliated with the Federation, with lobbyists for the UAW and, now that Arnold Miller is president, with representatives of the United Mine Workers. Within the Federation, there is an enclave of lobbyists for the building, construction, and maritime trades; their interests are generally parochial. The others are committed to the notion of the labor movement as an instrument for social change.

These are the men and women he has in mind, when Clarence Mitchell, director of the Washington office of the NAACP, says of the major civil rights laws enacted during his 30 years in Washington, "As a practical point, I don't see how we could've made it without labor." And these are the lobbyists whom Joe Rauh singles out. A founder of ADA, a group frequently at odds with sections of organized labor, he says, "I think labor is the major lobbying force in Washington for the public interest." But for labor, Rauh believes, such measures as federal aid to education and Medicare would not have been enacted. But for labor, he says, the deplorable nominations of Clement Haynsworth and J. Harrold Carswell to the U.S. Supreme Court might not have been defeated.

Sometimes the obverse is true. Labor will occasionally lose when it has to fight alone. A good example is labor's single-handed campaign in 1965 to get Congress to repeal Section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the section that sanctions state "right-to-work" laws. That campaign failed. One reason why, some labor lobbyists think, is that there was no *quid pro quo*; they got no help at all from the nonlabor groups they work with. But even on some matters of broader social import—such as food stamps (for students as well as for striking workers), increases in the federal minimum wage, occupational safety and health, protections and benefits for harvest hands in the sugar fields—a frequent complaint among labor lobbyists is that too many of the public interest groups fail to see the implications and give, at best, only minimal support.

Though labor and the public interest groups recognize their need for each other, their relationship vacillates from a warmly reciprocal one to uneasiness with suspicions on both sides. Because it must broaden the base of support for its interests, the AFL–CIO cooperates—generally on an informal basis—with *ad hoc* coalitions that spring up from time to time on such issues as federal aid to education, child care, housing, legal services, national health insurance, etc. Occasionally it gives financial help to some of the coalitions of outside groups and to a few civil rights lobbying organizations. The only coalition in which it participates formally is the 25-year-old Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. The UAW and some of the internationals tend to enter coalitions more readily.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS turn to labor for clout and skill. Leaving business representatives aside, there are very few lobbyists who really know their way around on Capitol Hill. Labor's are in demand. The movement's very expertness is both a strength and perhaps a limitation. Because of its superior skill, labor tends to look upon some of the public interest lobbyists as well-meaning amateurs. And while they need and seek labor's influence, some of these people feel labor's close working relationship with the sources of power in Congress makes it less zealous in tackling unpopular social issues.

Some of the public interest lobbyists are listened to in Congress for their special knowledge of technical legislation. But even among them, few work to understand the Hill in the way the best of the labor lobbyists do. There is not a representative of any religious denomination who exerts a comparable influence, with the possible exception of one or two of the Jewish or Catholic representatives, and none in civil rights except Clarence Mitchell.

Among public interest groups, Common Cause and Ralph Nader's organization are making their presence felt in Congress. the AFL–CIO works with Nader; and while its relations with Common Cause are rather strained these days, it will work with that organization where they agree on an issue. Yet the UAW works directly with Common Cause, and so do some of the AFL–CIO affiliates.

Two frequent criticisms of labor are aimed at its close relationship with congressional leaders and at its superpragmatism. According to this view, labor's lobbyists are so busy dealing with immediate issues that they take short views, pay too little attention to the good idea that may still be a long way down the road and, in legislative battles, avoid some of the socially worthy ones that look like "losers." But there are, even the critics concede, large exceptions to this last complaint; e.g., George Meany's insistence that his lobbyists go all out to

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defeat the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations, even though there seemed little likelihood of winning, because he believed both men would demean the Supreme Court.

Labor's access to congressional leadership, the second criticism runs, is generally so good, it tends to deal with the top brass and to ignore the lower ranks, particularly those liberals whose enthusiasms for hopeless causes will sometimes strike labor's people as "unprofessional." Because of these close alliances, the critics say, labor will trim its position on an issue—campaign-financing, for instance, or congressional reform. To this a labor lobbyist retorts, "Liberals get angry at our ties with the leadership. But on key issues, labor is counted on to pick up these 'establishment' votes. All too often, liberals can only lobby liberals who don't need to be lobbied. You can't have it both ways."

Another factor limiting labor's ability to respond to social problems is the obvious need to take into account the views of its own members. Given their broad-based and diverse constituencies, there are issues on which neither the AFL–CIO nor the major unions outside it can take positions without running a risk of provoking fights within the ranks. The three "a's," for instance—amnesty, acid, and abortion.

On issues of environment the AFL–CIO occasionally faces a conflict between ideological commitment and an overriding need to worry about unemployment. The Federation supported the Alaskan pipeline because jobs were involved. Jobs, or the threat of losing them, is the main reason why it supported building the Super-Sonic Transport and the Anti-Ballistic Missile. And again, it is the issue of jobs that had led the Federation to oppose cuts in defense-spending and to come out for limits on foreign trade.

On one occasion recently the rank and file pushed the Federation forward. The AFL–CIO opposed the Equal Rights Amendment for Women at the beginning of that fight—so, too, did some of the well-established national women's groups. Both they and the Federation feared the amendment would invalidate the system of protective laws for women they had worked so many years to get enacted. Two things finally changed the Federation's mind: the realization that strengthened federal anti-discrimination laws obviate the need for the state statutes; and pressure from women trade unionists. Now the AFL–CIO supports the ERA (the UAW always did), and in at least one state, Ohio, local labor leaders supplied the margin needed to get the amendment ratified.

Those who criticize the unions for their treatment of minorities ignore the fact that George Meany—and no comparable figure from the business community—came in person to Congress in 1963 to urge enactment of a federal equal employment law that he said would help the AFL–CIO fight racial discrimination within its locals. And the criticism of the AFL–CIO on issues of foreign policy often ignores its steadfast support of Israel through some of the recent shifts of the liberal position on that country.

Unnoticed by the press was a time, last summer, when labor made the difference in the Senate fight to block the addition to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of an "anti-busing" amendment that would have imposed possibly unconstitutional restraints upon the powers of the federal courts in school desegregation cases. The amendment was beaten back on several occasions by one or two votes. And labor supplied these votes.

It is such evidence of the labor movement's ability to swing the balance on a social issue that keeps alive, through exasperations and dissatisfactions, the ideal of a cooperative, mutually sustaining alliance.

Imperfect? Yes. Frustrating? More times than one likes to think. But given the meager and ragged forces that fight for the needs of the average citizen, there is not a public interest lobbyist in Washington who, if pressed, would not finally admit that labor's help is indispensable. □

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In the Magazines

The Devil and Leszek Kolakowski

"Does the doctrine of original sin present a truth accessible to natural reason unaided by revelation, or a truth known from revelation alone?"

Though it might sound strange in these pages, that, in his chosen idiom, is the question we should have to put to Leszek Kolakowski. His recent article, "Can the Devil be saved?" (*Encounter*, Fall 1974), deserves serious notice. Kolakowski, a Polish philosopher currently living as an exile, raises a question by no means unfamiliar in socialist writings—is maximalism counterproductive?—and gives the familiar social democratic answer—yes. More explicitly, Kolakowski argues that, given the recalcitrance of the social medium, maximalist programs can be realized only in appearance, and even that at an unacceptable cost in coercion. Socialists should keep the maximalist vision alive as a yardstick for their efforts, but they should expect only amelioration of particular conditions.

In itself, hardly a startling thesis. What is remarkable is that Kolakowski does not make the familiar point in the familiar socialist idiom. Instead, he chooses the idiom of Roman Catholic doctrinal theology. The exercise in translation is crucial. All too many Marxist theoreticians who, like Kolakowski, achieved stature as internal critics of Marxism in Eastern Europe disappeared into obscurity in the West because they could not become anything else. Though free from the constraints of East European regimes, they could not free themselves of East European conceptual conventions. Less obviously, that is often the failing of socialists in general. For us, too, it is crucially important to break free if we ever wish to speak to anyone besides each other. Kolakowski's exercise in doctrinal theology does what we all need to do: recognize that "problems of socialism" are but one rather parochial formulation of perennial human problems.

Specifically, Kolakowski poses the question of maximalism as the question of whether evil can ever be absorbed, or eradicated without remnant, by the good. The traditional Christian answer is rather more subtle than the various secular reformulations. On the one hand, as against the Manichean conception of evil as coprimeval with good, the Church insisted on the derivative nature of evil by stressing that the Fall is not identical with the Creation but subsequent to it; that evil came into the world through humans; or, as Kolakowski notes with Augustine, that evil is essentially a privation of good rather than a positive quality. On the other hand, as against the Pelagian contention that evil is entirely contingent and eradicable by human effort, the Church affirmed the perennial quality of evil *pro statu isto* ("in the present state"), between the Fall and the Last Judgment. Christians have traditionally held that evil is not rooted in the very essence of things and so can and must be struggled against, but that it is an inescapable characteristic of our present state, so that we should not expect the ultimate victory in this age.

Against this background Kolakowski points out what the Church has known since Chalcedon: that the very assertion of the primacy of good creates a temptation to dispense with the reality of evil even in the present state. One strategy is the neoplatonic contention that, colloquially speaking, evil is not all that bad. All things come from God and return in a cosmic harmony into him, enriching his perfection—even if from our finite perspective it is sometimes difficult to realize it. The other strategy is Pelagian: evil is really bad, but it can be eradicated

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by human will and effort, without remnant, and in the present age.

Both of these options—as Church fathers, councils, and Kolakowski realized—are destructive and rightly condemned by the Church as heretical. Theoretically, both options deny either the perfection or the omnipotence of God; practically, one leads to quietism, the other to tyranny. If evil is not really bad, we need not struggle against it—all we need is to approximate the divine perspective in which evil is but a paradoxical part of the perfection of the whole. Conversely, if evil is bad but eradicable, we need not only struggle against it, but to conquer it, destroy it without remnant, settling for nothing short of perfection. Since, however, humans are neither perfectly good nor perfectly wise, that quest for perfection can never proceed beyond the burning of the imperfect—*vide* the Inquisition and the Gulag. Thus Kolakowski returns to the orthodox position and concludes that we need a Church to remind us of the perennial and universal reality of evil (a task that he fears the Church will shun for the sake of popularity) as well as a socialist movement that will keep us from lapsing into quietism. The Church of Poland, I presume, will learn to live with Gierek, the Italian Communist party will make its peace with the Church, and, as the confrontation becomes a dialectic, the social change it brings about can become a synthesis.

It is at this point that the Kolakowski thesis, unexceptionable in its realism with respect to human fallibility, becomes somewhat disquieting. Given the division of labor it proposes, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the appropriate partner for the dialogue is not a party like the British Labour party, steeped in nonconformist Protestantism, but rather the Communist party and the Catholic church or, more specifically yet, the hard-liners in each. Kolakowski, though he identifies himself as a nonbeliever, in fact expresses a distinct preference for the most conservative trends in the Church. He is far more judicious about the Communist party—as an exmember, he knows from experience that, in order to engage in dialogue, the Party must be willing to admit at least a theoretical possibility of its own fallibility. Yet any practicing Church member can assure him that the same is true of the Church. A dialogue between the Stalinist wing of the Soviet CP and the most conservative Leonine wing of the Roman Catholic church might be dialectically neater, but it is not likely to be very productive. A genuine dialogue is far more likely between a John XXIII and an Alexander Dubcek, since both partners have to be able to admit their own fallibility.

IN THE KOLAKOWSKI SCHEMA, this should be assured by the recognition of original sin. It sounds reasonable: being fallible, we cannot be dogmatic: dissent might prove to be the truth. Yet deriving the need for freedom from human fallibility is the most disturbing element in the Kolakowski thesis. Granted, that has been the traditional position of the Church of Rome. Plurality of views is permissible when we do not know what is the truth. But once the truth had been found and stated by the Holy Father, speaking *ex cathedra,* with the prefix *Ipse dixit* and the conclusion *anathema sit,* there can be no more freedom. Once the truth is known, error can claim no rights, even though it might be tolerated on grounds of charity or social convenience. . . .

It is all too depressingly similar to the Communist position that the Party must support freedom under conditions of class struggle, before its victory, but that there can be no freedom for dissent after "the victorious workers' and peasants' revolution under the leadership of the most enlightened segment of the proletariat"—the Communist party. Again, when the truth has been found, error has no more rights. The recognition of human fallibility—original sin—is crucial to save us from hybris, but to justify freedom solely on grounds of human imperfection offers a perennial temptation to all who think that, in virtue of special grace or special gnosis, they have escaped that condition. Reaffirmation of

dissent

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original sin may be a short-term corrective, but at the same time it reaffirms that temptation.

Given our experience with intolerance, I think it imperative to recognize the universal, perennial reality of evil in all of us. But given our experience with self-appointed redeemers, it seems most precarious to derive justification for freedom from human imperfection. It would seem crucial to recognize that freedom is not a concession to human imperfection, in which guise even the Communist party is at times reluctantly willing to tolerate it, but rather that freedom itself is the perfection of being human. It is not simply a matter of tolerating freedom because the truth has not been found—or until it shall be found. Freedom is what being human is all about.

THIS, of course, runs smack against traditional Catholic dogma—and as Kolakowski amply demonstrates, there are parts of that dogma, specifically the doctrine of original sin, which we dare not jettison, lest we fall prey to hybris. This leads us to our original question: is the doctrine of original sin a truth accessible to unaided reason—or must it be revealed to us? If it is the latter, then the Kolakowski translation of the problem of maximalism into doctrinal terms would be an essential step in freeing socialist thought from its utopian bind; but this would also force us to treat freedom as a concession to human fallibility, to be tolerated only until the truth is revealed—as in the case of original sin—and so expose us to the millennial temptation.

This is why I think it crucial to argue, in Kolakowski's chosen idiom, that the doctrine of original sin presents a truth accessible to unaided natural reason. It is God's healing grace that must be (and, incidentally, has been) revealed. But the perennial reality of evil and the perennial value of freedom are truths our own reason can recognize.

Kolakowski's translation, of course, remains valuable. He is showing us the perennial human reality behind a parochial socialist formulation of a problem, and showing us a way out of our parochialism. Incidentally, he is also proving himself a major thinker in his own right, not only in the margins of East European scholasticism. We need translation. But I believe the translation we most need is not one from the formal doctrinal terms of one orthodoxy into those of another, but from the terms of doctrine into the terms of philosophy and, ultimately, into human experience.

ERAZIM KOHÁK □

Business Correspondence

Anyone writing to DISSENT about subscriptions, bundle orders, or other business matters is requested please not to address his letter to the Editor. Doing so will only delay reply. Please write either to the Business Manager or DISSENT.

In Praise of Index

I should like to bring to the attention of our readers one of the most valuable magazines in the world today, *Index,* a quarterly published in London, edited by Michael Scammell, and devoted entirely to articles and documentation concerning violations of human rights, artistic freedom, and freedom of speech and press in *all* countries. A sworn and systematic enemy of censorship, *Index* offers vast quantities of material each quarter on its chosen theme, and it does this with responsibility, accuracy, and verve.

Each time I read an issue, I feel tempted to reprint several of its articles in DISSENT, and only the problem of space prevents this. But the magazine is so valuable that it merits the support of all believers in freedom—freedom in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in Chile and Cuba, in China and Uruguay.

The subscription price is $8; American readers can subscribe by writing to INDEX, Post Office Box 746, Ansonia Station, New York, N.Y. 10023. If you can't do it yourself, urge your library to take *Index*. I met its editor last year, a lively fellow who has done a remarkable job, and from his account it's clear that even a few score additional subscriptions in the U.S. would help keep the project alive.

I. H. □

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Murray Hausknecht

Ideas and Power

THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL ELITE, by Charles Kadushin. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 395 pp. $8.95.

THE LONG DARK NIGHT OF THE SOUL: THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LEFT AND THE VIETNAM WAR, by Sandy Vogelgesang. New York: Harper & Row. 249 pp. $8.95

The systematic study of that amorphous category of people called intellectuals presents more than the usual problems of definition. An intuitive grasp of the distinctiveness of the social role is relatively easy; it is rather more difficult to specify the role in a way that unambiguously distinguishes it from other social roles. An easy distinction is that intellectuals are concerned primarily with "ideas," but does that mean that all college professors are also intellectuals? And how about the scientist or the journalist with an editorial-page column?

Legal scholars and jurists face similar problems in defining pornography. The difficulty of translating intuitive understanding into conventional legal definition led Justice Potter Stewart to confess that, while he cannot adequately define pornography, he can recognize it when he reads it. This recognition rule is implicit in many comments on intellectuals. Andrew M. Greeley, for example, states, without any definition, that "the stupidity of the intelligentsia dabbling in politics is unforgivable." He assumes we will know when we see one.

Pornography and intellectuals share another common feature: both are conventionally thought to have deleterious social consequences (*vide* Greeley on intellectuals). Recent systematic work on the effects of pornography suggests that it is relatively harmless, but the consequence of intellectual work is still an open question. (If Jimmy Walker's remark *à propos* the controversy over *Ulysses*, "No good girl was ever ruined by a book," is taken as a comment on both pornography and intellectuals he may still be proven as right about the latter as the former.)

Yet some agreement on the problem of definition is emerging. In his *Men of Ideas* Lewis Coser describes intellectuals as less concerned with concrete problems and answers than with penetrating a "more general realm of meanings and ideas." Their primary concern is with "the core values of the society"; they attempt "to provide moral standards and maintain meaningful general symbols ... jealous guardians of the moral standards that are too often ignored in the marketplace and the house of power." Because of their ability to "articulate interest and desire" better than others, intellectuals are "gatekeepers of ideas and fountainheads of ideologies." As such, their special vocation is a critical stance: "they are those who 'think otherwise,' the disturbers of intellectual peace."

In the course of his discussion Coser quotes Edward Shils, for whom intellectuals are those showing "an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe, and the rules which govern their society." In a recent review of a collection of Shils's essays on intellectuals Robert Nisbet maintains that historical experience suggests a need for reshaping the definition so that it "implies a political thrust, a kind of rootlessness, a view of knowledge as primarily a weapon, and a certain adversary position with respect to culture, convention, and tradition."

Built into this conception of the role is a set of contradictions. If the intellectual is seen against the

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ground of "the sacred" and "core values," he is a more unworldly figure than the individual who will "articulate interest and desire." The latter must inevitably be involved in the hurly-burly of the marketplace when he is not gliding through the corridors of power, and these involvements will offend those who prefer intellectuals to live at a greater distance from such profane concerns. For, if as a "fountainhead of ideologies" he is to be found loitering in the antechambers of the powerful, he cannot be a staunch defender of "moral standards," which are always under assault by his masters. On the other hand, if he restricts himself to thinking deeply in "the realm of meanings and ideas" or to reflections "about the nature of [the] universe, and the rules which govern ... society," he will be caught in the cross fire of those who bless him for being a "disturber of intellectual peace" and those who damn him for his "rootlessness" and contempt for the decencies of "culture, convention, and tradition." It may be as difficult to be an intellectual as to be a Jew.

BUT DEFINITIONS tell us nothing about the actual behavior of intellectuals at given times and places. The work of the Columbia University sociologist Charles Kadushin is an important and valuable attempt to do just that. Quoting both Coser and Shils along the way, Kadushin defines "an elite intellectual" as "one who is expert in dealing with high-quality ideas on questions of value and aesthetics and who communicates his judgments on these matters to a fairly general audience." The stress on communication with a "general audience" allows Kadushin to specify his universe of intellectuals as those who have written for 20 "prestigious journals" like the *New York Review, Ramparts, Commentary, Dissent, New Republic, Partisan Review, etc.* From among the most prolific contributors to these magazines he interviewed a sample of 110 writers: a mixed bag of humanities and social science professors, editorial and staff members of periodicals, and free-lance literary people including journalists, essayists, novelists, and poets. Naturally, the respondents are anonymous, but most of a previously published list of "most prestigious intellectuals" are represented in the sample. Using this clue and internal evidence, and applying the pornography "recognition rule," it is clear that Kadushin did talk to real, live intellectuals. These were interviewed about their views on the Vietnam war and other issues, and the usual statistics about their social characteristics were collected. Although this is empirical sociological research, Kadushin has chosen to report it as a "sociological history of leading American intellectuals of the late 1960s," and as such it will remain a valuable source, principally of intellectuals' opinions and attitudes toward the war.

Sandy Vogelgesang, who, according to the book-jacket copy, is "chairperson of the Secretary of State's Open Forum Panel, an in-house channel for new or dissenting views on U.S. policy within foreign affairs agencies," focuses her stimulating book entirely on reactions to the Vietnam War. Her conception of intellectuals is derived from the mainstream definition: "They are the men and women of ideas who explore and challenge the underlying values of society. Theirs is a normative function to prescribe what ought to be." The historical record shows that American intellectuals, especially the "cultural vanguard," have been leftist in orientation, and this justifies her relying on "an in-depth analysis of four publications of the leftist intelligentsia: *The New Republic, Partisan Review, Studies on the Left,* and *The New York Review*." Except for *Studies on the Left* the journals are also part of the basis of Kadushin's sample, so there is some overlap between the two sets of intellectuals. Yet Vogelgesang's is a narrower range of journals and more skewed to the Left. Hers is also the conventional historian's approach of analyzing the written word, while Kadushin ignores it almost entirely in favor of interview data. These differences in method partly account, no doubt, for some interesting differences in their reports.

Kadushin's theme is the absence of a radical orientation toward the war among elite intellectuals. Contrary to popular belief, intellectuals tended *not* to see the war as an inherent imperialistic concomitant of the economic and political structure of American society. Rather, they saw American involvement as a step-by-step series of policy blunders, and their opposition was not moral but pragmatic: "The war was a mistake because it could not be won." Of course, some were radical and others took purely moral positions, but it was the pragmatic rather than the moral, the liberal rather than the radical cast of attitude that prevailed. The gap between what was perceived to be the reaction of intellectuals, even by intellectuals themselves, and what the interview data revealed about the attitudes of leading intellectuals is symbolized by the figure of Noam Chomsky. The results of a question about which books and articles had the most influence on the respondents' *own* thinking on the war indicated that Chomsky's work ranked twelfth in actual influ-

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ence. But in response to a question about whose work they believed had the most influence in thinking about the war Chomsky's name led all the rest.

The pragmatic orientation would seem to make it easy for intellectuals to influence or, at least, approach the men of power, a notoriously pragmatic lot. But most intellectuals, Kadushin reports, were "wary" of any involvement with power. Although most thought the intellectual role required a critical stance, only a minority thought that it also meant an obligation to elaborate or support specific policy proposals. But even those who could overcome their reluctance to become involved were politically ineffective. Intellectuals only want to "talk to people at the top rather than assistants, legislative aides, and the like." Thus in addition to a reluctance to enter the house of power, there is a maladroitness in making friends and influencing the inhabitants.

A rather different picture emerges from Vogelgesang's analysis. She says of the teach-ins, "The stress on such considerations—the morality of U.S. policy, the moral imperative to protest or the immorality of silence and inaction—proved paramount in attracting leftist intellectuals to the peace movement." During the March on Washington in November 1965 Carl Oglesby's speech "signaled the ascendance of radicalism in the peace movement. Thereafter, emphasis was to rest on radical reconstruction of the American society." The radical opposition to the war gained continual strength, so that when the "Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority" was issued in the *New York Review*, "most intellectuals" responded to the "move from *dissent* to *resistance*" because "to resist was to take a moral stand. That, finally, was why most leftist intellectuals turned to resistance." But the response, she feels, indicated a lack of proportion that precluded the possibility of intellectuals becoming an effective political force. Effectiveness depends upon making contact with "established points of view" in an essentially "conservative and consensual society." The intellectuals ignored the mood of the society and failed "to maintain the necessary balance between the moral and the political .... Devotion to moral purity made many intellectuals shun political compromise."

Again, not all intellectuals took the same position. There were intellectuals, Vogelgesang points out, like those who wrote for *Dissent*, who argued against the simplicities of the moral purists and New Left radicals. Yet while she scrupulously draws our attention to these voices, they tend, in her description, to be drowned out by a larger chorus of moral absolutists.

As I have noted, some of the differences between Kadushin and Vogelgesang are artifacts of different methods. Yet the differences also probably reflect the basic structural ambivalence of the intellectual role. There is a possibility that intellectuals' responses to public issues are oscillating responses, and that Kadushin and Vogelgesang are picking up intellectuals at different moments.

In Kadushin's sample the moral and ideological impulse is subordinated to a reasoned, analytical appraisal of the war. This seemingly deliberate attempt to adopt the pragmatic orientations common to the marketplace and the house of power may be understood as a way of reaching out to the men of power. After all, what can be more persuasive than a demonstration, using the standards of the powerful, that the war is a failure? But, of course, actually to influence the course of events, more must be done than addressing elegantly reasoned arguments to "key decision-makers." It requires, as Kadushin points out, long, patient hours of talking to and cajoling legislative technicians and bureaucratic experts in (literally) the corridors of power. At this level, one has traveled a long way from the "more general realm of meanings and ideas." Since the latter realm is one's special responsibility, distancing oneself from the powerful and their retinues is almost a reflex action—a politically disabling reflex.

If the stance of Kadushin's sample of intellectuals is not atypical of intellectuals' behavior generally, neither is that of Vogelgesang's sample. For the intellectual is also the "guardian of moral standards," and therefore peculiarly susceptible to moral fervor and ideological fever. These are powerful stimuli and make it easy for the intellectual to find himself enlisted in the armies of the night and standing (literally) on the steps of the house of power demanding that his voice be heard. It is this moment in the intellectuals' response that Vogelgesang pins down. But just as Kadushin finds that some of his pragmatic respondents also stressed moral and ideological factors, she finds a strain of intellectuals who stress a more dispassionate approach.

These inherent contradictions in the role of the intellectual may explain why *la trahison des clercs* remains a persistent theme in discussions of intellectuals: the contradictions never allow the intellectual to satisfy anyone—perhaps, not even himself. □

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Richard Robbins

Custom of the Country

DIVORCED IN AMERICA, by Joseph Epstein. New York: E. P. Dutton. 318 pp. $8.95.

Divorce, middle-class American style in particular, is endlessly discussed and little understood. The divorce rate continues to rise (the remarriage rate as well); the statistics no longer surprise, let alone shock. Institutionalized divorce has reached the point where "getting divorced" seems to carry the same weight as "getting married"; only seems to, however.

For all the rhetoric on the death of the nuclear family, for all that a clean divorce may be preferable to a miserable marriage, for all the contemporary emphasis on one's personal right to opt out as freely as one enters in, some kind of family structure remains an essential linchpin between individual and society. Moreover, in each case of divorce, however necessary, some kind of intimate human relationship has collapsed. Neither sophistication about "amicable divorce," nor sociological analysis of divorce data by class, race, and religion, nor a critique of the idiocy called divorce law helps us to know the personal pain and confusion, along with the resiliency, that follows from "uncoupling." Ask the divorced themselves or the children of the divorced. Someone ought to write about American divorce as a peculiar institution, a mixture of private pain and public concern, where the court's award of custody leaves the father (or mother) free ... to cope.

Someone has. Joseph Epstein has written a wise, warm, and ruefully comic account of middle-class marriage and divorce "in an age of possibility." His honest and humane description of his own divorce and single parenthood (two sons, living with him) is woven into an analysis of the institutionalized mismanagement required for legal divorce. *Divorced in America* is aimed at a reader, the big-city professional like Epstein himself, who may be uneasy with a book of this sort. Intellectually, we are supposed to "take account" of Max Weber's nervous breakdown, or Norman Mailer's multiple marriages, but only as contributory to some larger argument about the economy or literature.

Yet, elsewhere, there are readily available encyclopedic discussions of the crisis of the Western family and the sociological ramifications of what Morton Hunt terms the Stations of Divorce. In fact, the only dispensable part in *Divorced in America* is the short Epilogue on the shattering of "The Dream of Family," where quotations from friends and enemies of the traditional family are cobbled together, with Epstein concluding, sensibly, that if divorce is frequently necessary and nearly always unpleasant, it is still possible to make the family dream real "and only those who have lived it know what an immense advantage it can be in an otherwise unconcerned world."

Indented sections on the unraveling of Epstein's own marriage are followed by a portrait of why marriage in general seems more and more troubled. Along the way low-keyed advice slips in, but derived from self-knowledge and reflective reading, not from those new authoritarians, the over-30-years-of-practical-experience-in-counseling-troubled-families-have-convinced-me-that specialists.

On the contradiction in marriage: "the only real preparation for marriage is marriage itself." On the dubious consequences of a healthy junking of old sex codes: "Alas ... instead of shedding guilt and developing inwardly, we have the bedroom olympics, with their accompanying tyranny of performance, unreal expectations, and misplaced salvationism." On realism, beyond the law's farcical search for "grounds": "You both had your cases, you both viewed yourselves as plaintiffs, but it all seemed pointless next to the major fact: feeling was dead and the marriage was done." On the secret everybody knows, the corruption built directly into legal divorce by the twin charades of "fault" and "consent": "What we have, then, is the bizarre legal spectacle of great numbers of people forced to break the law. ... A collusive divorce, after all, is nothing more than a divorce by consent (which the law expressly forbids) arrived at through collusion (which the law holds to be an impediment to divorce) to appear to be a divorce based upon marital misconduct (which the law accepts)."

On children and one's marriage, beyond technical custody: "In an odd way, those boys represented solace. Your sons being what they are, you could never fully regret your marriage, despite its dreary end. Without *it*, there would have been no *them*." On that American optimism now curiously applied to "creative divorce" or "successful divorce": "One might learn something, a good deal even, from having gone through a divorce, but it is finally

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a defeat which cannot be turned into a victory. . . . In divorce there are only smaller and larger disasters."

ONE COMES AWAY from this book with the feeling that in writing it Joseph Epstein undertook a therapy far more bracing than the conventional kind. Retracing one's own divorce while searching out other people's views on divorce in general must lead to a certain distance from the subject and thus to a final personal accounting, without rancor, of how and why it happened. At the same time, reflecting about divorce in general must lead to a tempered conclusion about the future of the nuclear family as an institution. Epstein obviously has achieved this sense of distance. And probably because of that, he remains, as he says, "a divorced man whose bias is on behalf of the nuclear family, a man who, despite all its flaws, really cannot imagine any other arrangement being any better." A tempered conclusion to an honest book, one that need not be ratified, personally or objectively, by a second volume, *Remarried in America*. □

Robert L. Hoffman

Kakania und Kultur

WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA, by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin. New York: Simon & Schuster, Touchstone Books. 314 pp. $3.95.

"A place where one would like to spend one's life, or at least a place where it would be smart to stay, even though one may not feel any particular inclination to be there"—thus was Wittgenstein's Vienna characterized by his contemporary, Robert Musil. It was the capital of "Kakania"—the name Musil coined for imperial Austria, signifying through word play both the realm's ambiguous political condition and also "Excrementia." "Yes," wrote Musil, "in spite of much that seems to point the other way, Kakania was perhaps a home for genius after all; and that, probably, was the ruin of it."

Genius was abundant in Vienna's last imperial years. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Musil, and their companions confronted Kakania with intense intellectual passion and diverse but related creative activity. They engaged as an essentially ethical dilemma the realities of a society where decay and vitality impressed themselves upon consciousness with extraordinary force.

But Wittgenstein journeyed to Trinity College, Cambridge, several worlds away, and became celebrated as a Cambridge philosopher of logic and language. After studying there in 1912–13, he served with the Austrian army in the war, working at the same time on a philosophical declaration. He completed it in 1918 and, believing that he had, quite literally, said all that could be said, discarded his philosophical vocation. The work was published, in both German and English, as the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* and in the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy it soon assumed the status of this century's most important philosophical work. For the logical positivism originating in postwar Vienna, it had comparable stature. In 1929 Wittgenstein returned to philosophy and Trinity, as a Fellow of the College and from 1939 on as a professor of philosophy at the University.

Did Cambridge or the philosophical profession comprehend him or what he intended his words to say? Janik and Toulmin say no, and the case they make in their book ought to convince most who read it. Analytic philosophers and logical positivists may derive great benefit from using Wittgenstein's writing as they please; but, by Janik and Toulmin's corollary to George Santayana's aphorism, those who are ignorant of the context of ideas are destined to misunderstand them.

THE BOOK would be important were it just a persuasive attempt to change the interpretation of a major thinker's work, but it is much more. For one thing, it is great fun to read, a marvelous excursion into the life of Kakania, of intellect, of ideas in vital interaction. The fun is coupled with the excitement of discovering

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through this adventure problems central to the experience of modern man, revealed in a light undimmed by academic games and aridity.

Janik and Toulmin begin by declaring that their "subject is a fourfold one—a book and its meaning; a man and his ideas; a culture and its preoccupations; a society and its problems," and their aim "to use each of our four topics as a mirror in which to reflect and to study all the others." This should be the approach to any substantial study of ideas, literature, or art: that it most often is not is a consequence not only of the limited vision and capacity of scholars and critics, but also of a process in modern culture against which Wittgenstein and many of his contemporaries reacted. Their reaction inspired the *Tractatus,* and this book in turn—a fine irony—induced a perfect example of the process that so disturbed them.

We develop powerful techniques for the expansion of knowledge and the rejection of incomplete, misconceived, and muddled attempts at understanding. Mastery of technique has yielded unchallengeable practical benefit, and it has made possible specializing and professionalizing intellectual efforts, without limit. The methodical employment of rational faculties provides the professional standards to determine what is worthy effort, as contribution to knowledge either for its own sake or for practical application.

The *Tractatus* is a generalized critique of language and its logic, demonstrating with precision just how language gets and conveys meaning. It proved to be just what philosophers wanted to become solidly professional, the rigorous method for clearing away confusion impeding the progressive development of their trade. The logic of the *Tractatus* made it possible to distinguish problems from nonproblems and philosophical achievement from muddleheadedness. It was the tool for every task, the means for uncovering in the morass of verbiage all truths that need knowing. And so Wittgenstein became the oracle of analytic philosophy, linguistic analysis, logical positivism, and the like.

He intended just the opposite, to determine with finality the limits of rational discourse and thereby to demonstrate that all that really matters lies *outside* those limits. In a letter quoted by Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein wrote:

> *The book's point is an ethical one.* . . . My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have *not* written. And *it is precisely this second part that is the important one.* My book draws the limits of the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing these limits.

There is no mystery here, despite the elliptical and aphoristic character of the *Tractatus,* which has so mystified its readers. We have only to examine Kakanian Vienna, the problems that preoccupied its intellectuals, and the ways they led each other to engage them. Repelled by the stultifying anachronism of the dying empire and the pretensions of a mean-spirited modernity, by artistic and intellectual activity vapid in its elaborations of past accomplishments and barren in its innovations, they evolved a clear pattern of response in which similar themes were repeatedly asserted and developed.

Whether in philosophy, fiction, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, or music the problem was one of language, of the nature and structure of communication, of the authenticity of expression—and of its contemporary gross inadequacy. Janik and Toulmin: "So the stage was set [in 1900] for a *philosophical* critique of language, given in completely general terms." Though they spoke in different vocabularies, verbal, visual, and musical, Wittgenstein's fellows drew upon the same leading ideas and upon each other for inspiration, and for each the purpose was explicitly conceived as ethical.

WITTGENSTEIN'S OWN CONCLUSIONS were congruent with those of his Kakanian contemporaries. Most simply stated, he found that in language we construct propositions, verbal representations corresponding in form to the facts whose essential elements are represented. We can analyze the logic of our propositions, and hence the logic of the facts represented. This makes scientific knowledge possible. But only *facts* can be represented—only they can be *said.* "Propositions," he asserted, "can express nothing that is *higher.*" Values, all that really matters in life, can not be represented. At best they can only be *shown,* indicated through poetic communications. We can see and respond to what is shown, but we cannot know it rationally. "What *can* be shown *cannot* be said."

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Wittgenstein's position reflects an attitude so common in modern culture that we have difficulty in perceiving it in all the varieties of ways it has been expressed. As reason's claims to potency have grown ever better established, men have reacted by seeing monsters born of reason. Abstractions become reified, and once reified they come to dominate the real substance from which they are drawn. Reason provides a powerful technique, and with the technique to do whatever is wanted, men no longer have need for feeling, at least in their active, socially functional roles. Lacking affect, they can no longer have any social relationships but formal or functional ones. Society and culture are atomized, devoid of spirit, with a vitality that is nothing but wheels madly turning while producing nothing worth desiring. Whether rich or poor, scorned or accorded high status, men are only mean creatures crushed by their own artifacts, material and intellectual.

This characterization of the reaction against modern culture can be applied to organicist conservatives and anarchists, neo-Marxists and fascists, surrealists and expressionists, political revolutionaries and apolitical intellectuals and aesthetes, to men of lustrous genius and to average men who only struggle to survive. Their vocabularies and foci of attention differ widely, and they can only see through their several glasses darkly. Most thinkers revolt against reason by rational means, and usually in the name of reason.

Intellectuals are familiar with the phenomenon. We have had a succession of fashionable ways of discussing and exploiting it, have accorded varied and changing levels of esteem to the different forms in which the reaction is expressed. It is too familiar to disentangle all the manifestations, except through occasional flashes of insight or through the studied and abstract analysis that loses the substance in its words. We are of course limited by our own rationality. We can be *shown* what disturbs our culture, and we can *see* it, but we need to *say* it, and that we cannot do.

Messrs. Janik and Toulmin show us much by departing only a little from conventional ways of saying things. Perhaps there is still hope for the power of rational intellect and its propositions. □

Devra Lee Davis

Is Patriarchy Inevitable?

THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRIARCHY, by Stephen Goldberg. New York: Morrow. 318 pp. $6.95 cloth, $2.95 paper.

This is a book about men as leaders, authority figures, and high-status persons in society. Reflecting the current vogue for the human zoo—which celebrates human capacities from love to murder as naturally dictated—it is a sexist book. It assumes that biological, sexual characteristics necessarily, or "inevitably," determine people's lives to such an extent that one can speak of male dominance and patriarchy as anthropological universals, chiefly reflecting hormonal distributions.

Goldberg acknowledges that "no one is born knowing how to fire a rifle or change a diaper." He adds, however, that people in fact learn these tasks,

> first because they must and second in order to function most efficiently. ... Every society accepts the existence of these feelings [of male dominance] and conforms to their existence by socializing children accordingly, because every society must. ... Societies conform their institutions and socialization to the sexual directions set by physiological differentiation.

Given such determinist notions, one is hard pressed to criticize *any* existing social phenomenon. If something exists for a group of people and appears, moreover, to occur widely in many different cultures, then Goldberg's kind of functional analysis looks for physical determinants of a presumably fixed human nature. From this perspective, inequality, sexism, racism, and war can easily be seen as inevitable aspects of society.

If Goldberg's discussion were restricted to out and out ideological claims, bereft of empirical support, it would be possible to engage in polemics on the inevitability of patriarchy, male dominance, or impeachment. However, having garbed his analysis with social scientific language in the assumption that there are relevant, decisive data to be gathered in behalf of his grand theory, he tries to place his argument beyond ideological considerations. But he does not appreciate that the decision to collect certain kinds of data itself reflects certain interests and assumptions. Impressively reviewing anthropological literature and hormonal studies of sexual differentiation, Goldberg argues that there has never been

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a society that failed to associate leadership and authority with men.

Goldberg maintains that women may be better off in what he calls primitive societies, but they certainly are "inevitably," to use his term again, subordinate to men in all advanced industrial societies. Current technology supposedly requires male dominance and patriarchy, according to Goldberg. Thus, "the U.S. could not [if it wanted to] limit the social manifestations of [male dominance] as much as a primitive society could." Theoretically, America could lower the level of male aggression in America to that of the Pygmy society, where such aggression is relatively low, but only at what Goldberg considers an impossible price, namely: "if we were willing to give up science, bureaucratic organization, industrialization and democracy."

GOLDBERG CONFUSES the commonly understood notions of human nature with some presumably accurate reflection on human nature. Glorification of the "natural" often in fact rationalizes a continuation of oppression, since what is "natural" naturally cannot be changed. Obviously there is a biological base to human life; but this base is socially transformed in radically different ways by kinship structures, sexual norms, and the exchange values accorded to the different sexes. Biology is no more destiny than is society. Numerous feminist critics grant the prevalence of patriarchy, not as proof of its biological inevitability, but as a reflection of historical and social factors that may well have initially stemmed from biological factors, but after thousands of years can no longer be viewed as physically determined. The very advanced technology, in Goldberg's view, requiring male dominance, can easily be interpreted as evidence that biological influences can be effectively transformed through technology.

After asserting that an advanced technological society could not develop on matrilineal lines, Goldberg speculates: "but if one did exist," it would differ most notably from our society "in the dearth of male-female contacts and tenuousness of male-female relationships, in the total separation of the male and female roles." Apparently Goldberg believes that our presently patriarchal society fosters such relationships and contacts between females and males; he ignores or knows nothing of the womanized ghettos of the everyday world of millions of housewives. Still, Goldberg is assuredly right in saying that a matrilineal society would separate male and female just as much as the present patriarchal system does.

But his speculation only confirms that he takes for granted a society based on dominance and subordination; all that can vary is who dominates and who submits. He does not consider the possibility that society can be built, not upon aggression, but upon an egalitarian, communalistic spirit. Rather than succumbing to Goldberg's dichotomy of female or male dominance and its focus on biological determinants of the "appropriate" aggression, we might consider a society where "aggression" of any kind would not be highly valued and Goldberg's grand theory would become irrelevant. Such a society would rest, not on paternalistic or matriarchal relationships, but on a socially contracted egalitarianism.

For Goldberg the inevitability of patriarchy dovetails quite "naturally" with the inevitability of inequality, and not for women alone. Goldberg says that if one asks, "'does that mean that if half the members of every society were white and half were black and all societies were ruled by whites (or all by blacks) then you would say that one race was superior at attaining power for biological reasons, the answers is, of course, yes.'" Here, black and white supposedly represent biologically distinct races, whose very biologies dictate their positions.

Far from technology requiring male dominance, as Goldberg argues, it can provide for the liberation of instinctual needs previously tabooed or repressed. In this regard, technology takes on the role of the slaves in Plato's *Republic,* performing the labor necessary for a communalistic republic of free persons. With its material needs met by the technostructure, society has no need for competition, aggression, dominance/subordination, or repression—all of which may have been necessary in times of scarcity. Tenderness, sensuousness, and sensitivity become traits for all people, female and male, rather than exclusively feminine properties.

Goldberg's book is a kind of rearguard action attempting to bring people closer to commonly understood views of human nature. The male animal supposedly rules the human zoo, while the female meekly follows. In a society beyond scarcity, there can be no human zoo. To insist, after 10,000 years of human history, that biological differences between males and females play the same role they played at the beginnings of history, and that we are in fact limited to our unmediated biologies in a human zoo, is to ignore the considerable impact of technology on society. Whatever early differences between the sexes may have obtained, bulldozers have no sex. □

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Chomsky and Draper

Editor:

In the Winter 1975 issue of *Dissent*, there is a "Public Notice" consisting of a paragraph from a review of my book *Peace in the Middle East?* by Theodore Draper, in which he alleges that my criticism of a *Dissent* editorial "utterly distorted [its] plain sense." Had the editors checked the original (pp. 179, 195), they would have discovered at once that Draper simply fabricated the position that he attributed to me, lifting two phrases from a sentence that is entirely different in content. The actual criticism that appears, which is quite different from the one that Draper invented, is based on a reading of the editorial which is quite accurate. I will not give details here. There is an explanation in my response (*New Republic*, November 23, 1974). A more detailed analysis of this and other equally serious misrepresentations and errors of fact and logic appears in a letter rejected as too long for publication, which I will gladly send to anyone interested. It is worth noting that, in a reply (December 14), Draper stands by his original fabrication, thus revealing that it is not merely a case of misreading or error of reasoning, as might have been charitably assumed.

I will merely observe here that the position attributed to me in the "Public Notice" is not expressed, implied, or even vaguely hinted at in anything I wrote. Worse yet, what I actually wrote directly contradicts Draper's fabrication, as the reader may easily verify. Criticisms that one has concocted are naturally much easier to deal with than those that are actually presented. I hope that I am correct in assuming that the editors of *Dissent* would not wish to be a party to this deception.

NOAM CHOMSKY
Cambridge, Mass.

THE EDITORS *reply*:

We printed as a "Public Notice" in our last issue a quotation from Theodore Draper's review of Noam Chomsky's book, in the course of which Draper corrected what he took to be an inaccurate rendering of a statement on Vietnam that appeared in *Dissent* in 1963. Chomsky, replying in the *New Republic* (11/23/74), has charged Draper with a "fabrication" designed to defend the 1963 *Dissent* piece. On December 14, 1974, Draper printed a rebuttal to Chomsky that contains the following paragraph:

> *From* Dissent *to Diem*. According to Chomsky's book, an editorial in *Dissent* back in 1964, the year before the massive US intervention, showed that its editors were "oblivious to the likely consequences of a United States-Saigon victory, though the story of Diem's murderous assault on the opposition (with American backing) in the post-1954 period was already well known." *Dissent*'s editorial had actually advocated US support for drastic land reform in South Vietnam, the "coexistence of South and North Vietnam," and even US "developmental aid for *both* countries" (italics in original). The alleged obliviousness of *Dissent*'s editors is a purely Chomskian invention; the editorial explicitly evoked Diem's regime as a reason for rejecting policies aimed at a United States-Saigon military victory. To justify the hallucinatory leap from *Dissent*'s peaceful proposals to Diem's "murderous assault," Chomsky protests that he did not accuse *Dissent* of calling for a "war of attrition"; he merely accused it of calling for policies that could only lead to such an outcome. This is a shabby dodge for trying to make *Dissent*'s conciliatory views into their opposite. If drastic land reform, the "coexistence of South and North Vietnam," and US developmental aid for both countries deserve to be linked with a "war of attrition," "continued intervention" and "Diem's murderous assault," words have lost their meaning.

While agreeing that many nuances of opinion were possible in opposing the Vietnam War and without wishing to suggest that everything that appeared in *Dissent* on that, or any other subject, was always "correct," we do feel that Draper's version of the matter is accurate. And we wish that Chomsky weren't so quick to charge "fabrication" against a man whose intellectual scrupulousness—agreeing with his opinions or not—we know to be of the highest order. □

On the Middle East

Editor:

I agree with Tzvi Lamm that our main preoccupation and top priority should be "building bridges" with the Arabs, and that, since 1967, Israel should have done much more than it did in this respect. I cannot accept his broader analysis.

Lamm speaks of Zionism in its first period, the period of "realism": "Zionism ... became a national movement when its most sensitive people realized, while there was still time, that utter collapse was approaching, that there was no hope of living among those nations with whom the Jews then lived." This realization occurred at a time when Jews enjoyed full citizenship in all Western countries, when the governments of those countries treated them officially as they did all other citizens, when anti-Semitism consisted of a few pogroms in Russia whose victims numbered in dozens, the judicial persecution of one French army officer, and a widespread but lowly esteemed popular prejudice comparable in some ways to anti-black prejudice in modern America.

Now compare this with the situation of Israel among the Arab states after 1948. Despite frequent pogrom-like Arab attacks on Jews from 1929 onward, and the intransigent refusal of the Arab leaders to cooperate in any political settlement that would give the Jews a shred of sovereignty, the Zionists had used every means within their disposal to promote peace and compromise with the Arabs. Then, in 1948, the five neighboring Arab states attacked the newly born Jewish state with the hope of destroying it completely; at the same time, over half the Arab residents of the Jewish-occupied area left voluntarily, thus aligning themselves with the Arab invaders. The Arabs had expressed strong sympathy with the Nazis during World War II, to the point of endorsing the myth of the Zionist world conspiracy; the Arab states were then starting to brutalize and expel their Jewish minorities. If, in the Europe of 1900, "there was no hope of living among those nations with whom the Jews then lived," this was the case *a fortiori* of Israel in 1949, with one qualification only:

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Israel in 1949 could defend herself militarily. Surely this assessment must qualify as "realism."

Instead, Lamm calls it "autism" and "ethnocentrism." This incredible judgment distorts the rest of his analysis. His professed hope that Israel could have significantly improved the chances for peace by doing one or another thing differently between 1949 and 1967 seems naive. By a perfectionist standard, Israel should have offered rapprochement with Egypt in 1956—it would have done no harm, and would have placed Israel "beyond suspicion." It would not have tempted Egypt, since Israel had nothing tangible to offer in return for peace, and goodwill toward Israel was not one of Nasser's virtues. But the 1967 war seemed to change the situation by giving Israel "hostages" with which to bargain for peace, and greater freedom of maneuver on many levels. For instance, Israel could have fostered an autonomous Palestinian polity on the West Bank, which might eventually set a precedent as a democratic Arab entity favoring peaceful relations with Israel. But when the West Bank Arabs recently expressed themselves in favor of Arafat and the destruction of Israel, I wondered whether any noble gestures on Israel's part might not be just so much moralistic play-acting. . . .

Zionists used to ridicule the theory (propounded by assimilationist Jews) that if Jews would only behave nicely and remove all grounds for offense, anti-Semitism would vanish for want of a pretext. Lamm's argument sounds very much like this old theory. The Jews of Europe had faults, and Israel has faults. All faults ought to be corrected. But such faults have never been the root cause of Jewish catastrophe. When Zionists spoke of "normalization," they meant among other things that Jews should someday be entitled to their quota of all-too-human faults, and not have to establish their moral perfection as a prerequisite for other people's entertaining their right to exist. We have not yet reached that stage of history.

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A Word from France

The following comment, appearing in the November 1974 issue of the leading French review Esprit, *was written by* JACQUES BEKAERT.

Dissent — New York, 1954: a new review makes its appearance. Its name is also its initial program: *Dissent*. Not to march in step, but to raise one's voice when everyone else is silent, to question the padded comfort of the American intelligentsia while, at the same time, proclaiming oneself to be socialist. . . . This was more than enough to predict, logically, a short life span. Stalin had just died, the Korean War had ended in a draw. Those who in the '30s had looked hopefully in the direction of the Soviet Union began to be aware of the tragic deviations in the fatherland of communism. It was the epoch in which a soothing general, Dwight Eisenhower, first Republican president since Hoover, drew the United States into an era of slothful well-being. On the campus, a student generation prepared itself to taste the benefits of a society more and more consumerist in nature. . . .

Its first issue, in that reserved tone the review has always adopted, found the editors announcing their credo:

> The purpose of this new magazine is suggested by its name: to dissent from the bleak atmosphere of conformism that pervades the political and intellectual life of the United States; to dissent from the support of the *status quo* now so noticeable on the part of many former radicals and socialists; to dissent from the terrible assumption that a new war is necessary or inevitable, and that the only way to defeat Stalinism is through atomic world suicide.

And let us not forget that in 1954 the thought of Senator Joseph McCarthy was still very much alive and that one of his faithful supporters, Richard Nixon, was vice-president.

Twenty years later, *Dissent* is still alive. Better printed, better presented, still leading the good fight. The first years were rich, from the intellectual point of view. C. Wright Mills, Norman Mailer (*Dissent* published "The White Negro," his famous and controversial essay), the young Michael Harrington, Richard Wright shortly before his death, Paul Goodman, who had dreamed of the counter culture long before it became modish, Irving Howe; not to forget the Europeans: Ignazio Silone, George Lichtheim, Herbert Marcuse, Leszek Kolakowski; and, heading that roster, two old fighters with prestige intact: Norman Thomas and A.J. Muste. In 20 years *Dissent* witnessed the end of McCarthyism, the Vietnamese war, the Kennedy period and its brutal ending, the mass movement for civil rights, the backwaters of the counter culture, and Watergate. An uncomfortable epoch, throughout which *Dissent* remained the center for a restless, nondogmatic reflection that at each occasion runs the risk of displeasing everybody. Supporters of democratic socialism, the editors of *Dissent* are too lucid to entertain illusions. They have tried to maintain contact with the labor movement while others, more radical—at least in words—based all of their hopes for a revolution on the student youth. But *Dissent* is anything but a refuge for the "chic radicalism" that is the privilege of material wealth and moral comfort.

And so *Dissent* is still on its feet. Its situation is still precarious. For many years I always put the same question to Stanley Plastrik, one of the magazine's editors, each time we meet again: "How is *Dissent* doing?" And for years I always get the same answer: "It's rough!" But *Dissent* is not wedded to success. How can one expect success by systematically upsetting—and each time for good reasons—those who are closest to you? For, at the very heart of *Dissent*'s undertaking is a never-denied passion for freedom. In an essay published long ago, Irving Howe and Lewis Coser saw socialism not only as a search for happiness but "as the extension of freedom." But there is no regime that, sooner or later, is not tempted to abuse this freedom. . . .

To celebrate its 20th anniversary, *Dissent* put together in a special issue some of the most important articles it has published. The balance is impressive. But the important thing is that for a long time *Dissent* has kept that questioning voice the Left, and not only that of the United States, will always need. □

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